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Foreword
This report provides indicators for comparing pension policies across OECD countries. It gives
estimates of the level of pension people will receive if they work for a full career and if today’s pension
rules stay unchanged.
Monika Queisser and Edward Whitehouse of the Social Policy Division of the OECD’s
Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs prepared the report. Rie Fujisawa and Edward
Whitehouse were responsible for the pension modelling and the analysis of the tax position of
pensioners. Anna Cristina D’Addio and Jongkyun Choi assisted in finalising the report.
National officials provided invaluable, active assistance in collecting information on their
countries’ pension and tax systems. The results have been confirmed by national authorities with the
exception of those for Italy, which are based on the OECD’s interpretation of parameters and rules
provided by the government.*
Numerous OECD colleagues provided guidance and information, particularly Mark Pearson,
Martine Durand and John Martin. The OECD private-pensions team in the Directorate of Financial
and Enterprise Affairs – particularly Fiona Stewart and Juan Yermo – provided useful input to the
special feature on private pensions. Delegates to the OECD Working Party on Social Policy advised on
modelling procedures and development of indicators for cross-country comparisons of pension
systems. They also gave constructive comments on earlier drafts.
The report is the product of a joint project co-financed by the European Commission and the
OECD; the project also benefited from a financial contribution made by the government of
Switzerland.
The OECD pension models use the APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across Countries)
infrastructure originally developed by Axia Economics, with the help of funding from the OECD and
the World Bank.
* Italy has expressed serious doubts about the adequacy of data used in the report, and consequently
about the comparability of results. In particular, baseline assumptions about labour market entry
ages and career length (respectively, 20 and 45 years) are different from those agreed in a comparable
exercise undertaken at the EU level, and differ from current Italian labour market norms.  Italy
thinks interpretations based on these data may be misleading.
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Editorial 
Pension Reform: The Unfinished Agenda
Editorial – Pension Reform: The Unfinished AgendaSince the early 1990s, pension reform has been high on the agenda in many OECD
countries. Governments have either undertaken far-reaching, structural pension reforms
or adopted a series of smaller reforms which, taken together, affect future pension
entitlements substantially. These reforms, like pension systems themselves, have had
many diverse and complex features. They have included, among other things, increases in
pension ages, changes in the way that benefits are calculated and smaller real pension
increases than in the past. However, despite the different approaches, there is a clear
underlying trend towards a reduced pension promise for today’s workers, when compared
with past generations. This is necessary to ensure the financial sustainability of pension
systems for both current and future retirees.
To the extent that this objective is achieved, this is good news. But there is no reason
for complacency. Even though pension reforms were substantial in the OECD as a whole,
the agenda remains unfinished. This unfinished agenda includes five main issues.
First, some countries still need a fundamental overhaul of their public pension schemes.
In Greece and Spain, for example, full-career workers can expect sizeable pension benefits if
they retire at the standard pension age. But in reality many retirees receive only the
minimum pension because of insufficient contribution coverage. At the same time, these
countries also have incentives that encourage early retirement. Population ageing will
increase the financial pressure on these schemes and reforms are needed urgently.
Second, some major pension reforms are being phased in too slowly. This is the case in
Austria, Italy, Mexico and Turkey. In Turkey, for example, the new retirement age of 65 will
only be reached in 2043 for men and even later for women. In Austria and Mexico, people
who were already covered by the public pension scheme (even for a short period) are
guaranteed that their benefit is either no lower or only a little lower than under the old
system. Finally, the reform of 1995 in Italy will only begin to affect people who retire
around 2017 or later. Even though the long-run financial position of the pension systems of
these countries is much improved, the slow pace of change will result in many decades
more of relatively high expenditures. These financial pressures might require ad-hoc,
short-term adjustments that may perversely cause more hardship than faster reforms
would have done.
Third, while a common response to a reduced pension promise is to exhort workers to
save more for their own retirement, saving through voluntary plans might not be sufficient
to ensure adequate replacement of pre-retirement incomes. This has long been an issue in
countries such as Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States where
the public pensions are relatively small, especially for middle and high earners. In the
future, more countries will face the same problem: reductions in public pensions will
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require more personal savings to maintain retirement living standards. One way of
boosting coverage of voluntary private pensions is through so-called “automatic
enrolment”, under which workers are covered unless they opt out. This was recently
introduced in New Zealand and is under discussion elsewhere. Another route to broaden
private pension coverage is to extend collective bargaining to embrace retirement-income
issues. For example, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries ensure almost-universal
coverage of supplementary pensions in this way.
Fourth, many pension systems still encourage early retirement even though the
standard retirement age has been raised to 65 years in most OECD countries and, in some
cases, even beyond. Several countries have tried to close pathways into early retirement
through unemployment or disability benefits, for example. Some countries will in future
link retirement ages or benefit levels to changes in life expectancy. These steps are
promising, but will have to stand the test of time. Recent experience has shown that some
countries have failed to apply the rules that adjust pensions to life-expectancy increases
due to political pressures or electoral cycles.
Fifth, some of the reforms might result in a greater risk of poverty in old-age for low-
income workers. A number of countries – such as Italy, Poland and the Slovak Republic – have
introduced much closer links between contributions paid into the pension systems and later
retirement benefits. While this should encourage workers to work longer, it also increases
the risk of being poor in retirement for those who have low incomes throughout their
working life or those who have missing periods of contributions due to unemployment,
caring periods or moves between dependent employment and self-employment. Countries
will have to monitor closely the income situation of retirees and establish safety-nets to
prevent a resurgence of old-age poverty.
Pension reform can be politically difficult. But the experience of the OECD countries
over the past 10-15 years suggests that obstacles to pension reform are not insuperable:
more than half of them have had major changes over that period. The pension-reform
laggards should take heart from this experience and press ahead with necessary changes
to their retirement-income systems.
John P. Martin
Director,
Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, OECD
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Executive Summary
This second edition of Pensions at a Glance updates all the important indicators of
retirement-income systems developed for the first edition. The values of all pension
system parameters reflect the situation in the year 2004. The general approach adopted is
a “microeconomic” one, looking at prospective individual entitlements under all 30 of
OECD member countries’ pension regimes.
The report starts by showing the different schemes that together make up national
retirement-income provision, including a summary of the parameters and rules of pension
systems. This is followed by eight main indicators of pension income that are calculated
using the OECD pension models. This issue also contains two special analyses on pension
reforms and private pensions, which use the OECD pension models to explore more deeply
the central issues of pension policy in national debates. Finally, the report provides detailed
background information on each of the 30 countries’ retirement-income arrangements.
For workers at average earnings, the average for the OECD countries of the gross
replacement rate, i.e. the ratio between pension benefit and pre-retirement earnings, from
mandatory pensions is 59%. But taxes play an important role in old-age support.
Pensioners often do not pay social security contributions and, as personal income taxes are
progressive and pension entitlements are usually lower than earnings before retirement,
they usually pay less taxes. For average earners, the net replacement rate across OECD
countries is 70% on average, some 11 percentage points higher than the average gross
replacement rate.
For low earners, the average net replacement rate across OECD countries is 83%. But there
are regional differences: the Nordic countries offer a 95% net replacement rate to workers
on half average earnings while the Anglophone OECD countries pay 76% of previous net
earnings.
What matters for governments, however, is not only the replacement rate but the value of
the overall pension promise. This is measured by the indicator of pension wealth which
takes life expectancy and the indexation of pensions in payment into account. Using this
indicator, the pension promise is most expensive in Luxembourg. On average, each
male pensioner will receive the equivalent of USD 920 000 and each female retiree over
USD 1 million. The Netherlands and Greece rank second and third on this measure. The
most modest pension systems are those of Belgium, Ireland, Japan, the United Kingdom
and the United States where pension wealth is around two-thirds of the average for
OECD countries. The lowest ranking is occupied by Mexico where men and women are
promised a pension equivalent to USD 34 000 and 32 000, respectively.
Nearly all the 30 OECD countries have made at least some changes to their pension
systems since 1990. As a result, the average pension promise in the 16 countries – whose
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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reforms are studied in this report – was cut by 22%. For women, the reduction was 25%.
Only in two of the 16 countries – Hungary and the United Kingdom – were there increased
pension promises on average.
How will these changes affect different individuals? Some countries – such as France,
Portugal and the United Kingdom – are moving towards greater targeting of public
pensions on low earners thus bolstering the safety-net. Others – such as Poland and the
Slovak Republic – have moved to tighten the link between pension entitlements and
earnings, which may put low-earners at a higher risk of poverty. In Germany, Japan,
Mexico, Poland and the Slovak Republic, for example, the net pension entitlement for a
full-career worker with half average earnings was around 41% of average earnings before
reform, slightly below the average for the OECD as a whole. The reforms will cut this to just
32.5%. In contrast, Finland, France, Hungary, Korea, New Zealand and the United Kingdom
have protected low-income workers from cuts in benefits in their pension reforms.
The intense reform activity in OECD countries means that today’s workers will have to do
more on their own to prepare for tomorrow’s retirement. In some countries, the savings
effort necessary to reach the OECD average replacement rate is substantial, even if workers
save throughout their entire career. If young workers miss out on the first 10 or 15 years of
their career because of other demands on their budget, reaching a sufficient pension level
will become even more difficult. This report illustrates how important it is that workers
start saving early and contribute regularly.
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Structure of the Report 
and Methodology
The general approach of Pensions at a Glance is a “microeconomic” one, looking at
prospective individual entitlements under all 30 of OECD member countries’ pension
regimes. This method is designed to complement alternative comparisons of retirement-
income systems: long-term fiscal and financial projections (for example, Dang et al., 2001;
and European Union, 2006) and analysis of income-distribution data (such as Förster and
Mira d’Ercole, 2005; and Disney and Whitehouse, 2001).
The report is divided into three main parts. Part I presents the information needed to
compare pension policies in a clear, “at a glance” style. It starts by showing the different
schemes that together make up national retirement-income provision. Next, there is a
summary of the parameters and rules of pension systems.
This is followed by eight main indicators that are calculated using the OECD pension
models.
● The first two are the most familiar to pension analysts. Both are replacement rates, i.e.,
the ratio of pension benefits to individual earnings. These are given in gross and net
terms, taking account of taxes and contributions paid on earnings and on retirement
incomes. Two analyses of the sensitivity of the gross replacement rate follow. The first
looks at individuals who enter the pension system later than the baseline assumption,
while the second considers the importance of investment returns in pension systems
with defined-contribution (DC) components.
● The next two indicators are pension wealth, again given in gross and net terms. Pension
wealth is a more comprehensive measure of pension entitlements than replacement
rates because it takes account of pension ages, indexation of pensions to changes in
wages or prices and life expectancy.
● Countries differ in the way that their pension systems aim to provide an old-age safety-
net or replace a target share of pre-retirement income. The balance between these two is
explored by the next pair of indicators: the first on the progressivity of the pension
benefit formula and the second on the link between pension and earnings.
● The final two indicators aim to summarise the pension system as it affects individuals
across the earnings distribution, showing the average pension level, pension wealth and
the contribution of each component of the retirement-income system to overall benefits.
Two special chapters form Part II of this report. They cover pension reforms and private
pensions, respectively. Both of these analyses use the OECD pension models to explore
more deeply the central issues of pension policy in national debates. The framework of
Pensions at a Glance is forward-looking, focusing on future pension entitlements of today’s
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workers. However, the past decade has seen intense reform activity in the world of
pensions and retirement. The first special chapter looks at what countries did and how this
is likely to affect future benefits. A number of these reforms have increased the role of the
private sector in pension provision. The second special chapter identifies the complex
range of private retirement arrangements and quantifies the savings effort individuals will
have to make to maintain standards of living in retirement.
Finally, Part III provides detailed background information on each of the 30 countries’
retirement-income arrangements. These include pension eligibility ages and other
qualifying conditions; the rules for calculating benefit entitlements; the treatment of early
and late retirees; and more detailed information on the pre-reform scenarios explored in
the special chapter on pension reforms. The country studies summarise the national
results in standard charts and tables.
The remainder of this section describes the methodology used to calculate pension
entitlements. It outlines the details of the structure, coverage and basic economic and
financial assumptions underlying the calculation of future pension entitlements on a
comparative basis.
Future entitlements under today’s parameters and rules
The pension entitlements which are compared are those that are currently legislated
in OECD countries. Changes in rules that have already been legislated, but are being
phased-in gradually, are assumed to be fully in place from the start. Reforms that have
been legislated since 2004 are included where sufficient information is available (in
Portugal, for example). Some changes (such as the increase in pension age in Germany and
the reform package in the United Kingdom) have not been finalised or were finalised too
late for inclusion.
The values of all pension system parameters reflect the situation in the year 2004. The
calculations show the pension entitlements of a worker who enters the system today and
retires after a full career. The results are shown for a single person only.
Career length
A full career is defined here as entering the labour market at age 20 and working until
the standard pension-eligibility age, which, of course, varies between countries. The
implication is that the length of career varies with the statutory retirement age: 40 years
for retirement at 60, 45 years for retirement at 65, etc. As the results can be sensitive to the
career-length assumption, calculations are also made for situations where workers enter at
age 25 and so retire with five years less than a full career.
Coverage
The pension models presented here include all mandatory pension schemes for
private-sector workers, regardless of whether they are public (i.e. they involve payments
from government or from social security institutions, as defined in the System of National
Accounts) or private. For each country, the main national scheme for private-sector
employees is modelled. Schemes for civil servants, public-sector workers and special
professional groups are excluded.
STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT AND METHODOLOGY
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007 13
Systems with near-universal coverage are also included provided they cover at least
90% of employees. This applies to schemes such as the occupational plans in Denmark, the
Netherlands and in Sweden. An increasing number of OECD countries have broad coverage
of voluntary, occupational pensions and these play an important role in providing
retirement incomes. For these countries, a second set of results is shown with voluntary
pension schemes in the special chapter on private pensions.
Resource-tested benefits for which retired people may be eligible are also modelled.
These can be means-tested, where both assets and income are taken into account, purely
income-tested or withdrawn only against pension income. The calculations assume that
all entitled pensioners take up these benefits. Where there are broader means tests, taking
account also of assets, the income test is taken as binding. It is assumed that the whole of
income during retirement comes from the mandatory pension scheme (or from voluntary
pension schemes in those countries where they are modelled).
Pension entitlements are compared for workers with earnings between 0.5 times and
twice the economy-wide average. This range permits an analysis of future retirement
benefits of both the poorest and richer workers.
Economic variables
The comparisons are based on a single set of economic assumptions for all
30 countries. In practice, the level of pensions will be affected by economic growth, wage
growth and inflation, and these will vary across countries. A single set of assumptions,
however, ensures that the comparisons of the different pension regimes are not affected by
different economic conditions. In this way, differences across countries in pension levels
reflect differences in pension systems and policies alone.
The baseline assumptions are:
● real earnings growth: 2% per year (given the assumption for price inflation, this implies
nominal wage growth of 4.55%);
● individual earnings: assumed to grow in line with the economy-wide average. This
means that the individual is assumed to remain at the same point in the earnings
distribution, earning the same percentage of average earnings in every year of the
working life;
● price inflation: 2.5% per year;
● real rate of return after administrative charges on funded, defined-contribution
pensions: 3.5% per year;
● discount rate (for actuarial calculations): 2% per year (see Queisser and Whitehouse,
2006 for a discussion of the discount rate); 
● mortality rates: the baseline modelling uses country-specific projections (made in 2002)
from the United Nations/World Bank population database for the year 2040;
● earnings distribution: composite indicators use the OECD average earnings distribution
(based on 18 countries), with country-specific data used where available.
Changes in these baseline assumptions will obviously affect the resulting pension
entitlements. The indicators are therefore also shown for alternative assumptions
regarding the rate of return on funded defined-contribution schemes. The impact of
variations in economy-wide earnings growth, and for individual earnings growing faster or
slower than the average, was shown in the first edition of Pensions at a Glance (OECD, 2005)
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The real rate of return on defined-contribution pensions is assumed to be net of
administrative charges. In practice, this assumption might disguise genuine differences in
administrative fees between countries (see Whitehouse, 2000 and 2001 for an analysis).
The calculations assume the following for the pay-out of pension benefits: when DC
benefits are received upon retirement, they are paid in the form of a price-indexed life
annuity at an actuarially fair price. This is calculated from mortality data. Similarly, the
notional annuity rate in notional accounts schemes is (in most cases) calculated from
mortality data using the indexation rules and discounting assumptions employed by the
respective country.
Taxes and social security contributions
Information on taxes and social security contributions which were used to calculate
the net indicators for 2002 were included in the country chapters in the first edition of
Pensions at a Glance (OECD, 2005). The tax and social security contribution rules and
parameters have been updated to 2004 but are not repeated in this volume for reasons of
space (Fujisawa and Whitehouse, forthcoming 2007, provides more information).
The modelling assumes that tax systems and social-security contributions remain
unchanged in the future. This implicitly means that “value” parameters, such as tax
allowances or contribution ceilings, are adjusted annually in line with average earnings,
while “rate” parameters, such as the personal income tax schedule and social security
contribution rates, remain unchanged. General provisions and the tax treatment of workers
for 2004 can be found in the OECD report Taxing Wages (OECD, 2006). The conventions used in
that report, such as which payments are considered taxes, are followed here.
Average earnings
Starting with this edition, Pensions at a Glance uses a new and more comprehensive
measure of average earnings corresponding to an “average worker” (AW). This is broader
than the previous benchmark of the “average manual production worker” (APW). This new
concept was introduced in the report Taxing Wages (OECD, 2006) and also serves as
benchmark for Benefits and Wages (OECD, 2007).
The reasoning behind the change was that a manual worker in the production sector
is not representative of the “typical taxpayer”, given the steady decline in manual employment
in manufacturing in most OECD countries. The new base for calculating average earnings
includes more economic sectors and both manual and non-manual workers. The concept
and definition of earnings, however, remains the same: gross wage earnings paid to
average workers, measured before deductions of any kind, but including overtime pay and
other cash supplements paid to employees.
Table 0.1 reports average earnings levels under the old (APW) and new (AW) definition,
for the year 2004. Only three countries (Ireland, Korea and Turkey) are not yet able supply
earnings data on the broader basis and so the modelling is based on the old, APW measure
of average earnings. 
The effect of broadening the types of workers covered has very different effects on
measured average earnings in different OECD countries. In 19 of the 27 countries for which
new, AW data are available, these are higher than average earnings under the previous,
APW definition but the size of the difference varies greatly (see Figure 0.1). The change in
definition increases measured average earnings by 30% or more in six countries (Austria,
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France, Greece, Hungary, Portugal and the United Kingdom). For three additional countries
the increase was 20% (Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden). In contrast, a sizeable decrease
occurred only in the United States (13%), with more modest declines (of around 5% or less)
in seven further countries.* 
Table 0.1. OECD measures of average earnings, 2004
National currency and USD at market price and purchasing-power-parity exchange rates
OECD measure of average earnings Exchange rates with USD
Old – 
National currency 
(APW)
New – 
National currency 
(AW)
New – 
USD, market price
New – 
USD, PPP
Market price PPPs
Australia 52 777 48 827 35 922 35 917 1.36 1.36
Austria 24 946 32 872 40 842 37 872 0.80 0.868
Belgium 32 281 35 578 44 205 41 151 0.80 0.865
Canada 40 912 38 945 29 933 31 269 1.30 1.25
Czech Republic 213 573 209 489 8 153 14 936 25.69 14.03
Denmark 323 900 316 500 52 860 37 684 5.99 8.40
Finland 29 152 31 539 39 186 32 372 0.80 0.974
France 23 087 29 549 36 713 32 199 0.80 0.918
Germany 34 088 41 046 50 998 45 898 0.80 0.894
Greece 12 525 17 360 21 569 24 996 0.80 0.695
Hungary 1 262 712 1 697 268 8 377 13 682 202.61 124.05
Iceland 2 849 554 2 770 000 39 463 29 461 70.19 94.02
Ireland 30 170 n.a. 37 485 30 321 0.80 1.00
Italy 23 044 22 053 27 400 25 628 0.80 0.861
Japan 4 223 100 4 943 208 45 708 37 139 108.15 133
Korea 27 356 688 n.a. 23 888 34 974 1 145.20 782
Luxembourg 32 586 39 171 48 668 42 649 0.80 0.918
Mexico 66 432 76 332 6 767 10 446 11.28 7.31
Netherlands 32 457 37 026 46 003 41 300 0.80 0.897
New Zealand 41 778 39 428 26 129 26 793 1.51 1.47
Norway 314 523 366 161 54 332 41 005 6.74 8.93
Poland 26 745 29 263 8 015 15 858 3.65 1.85
Portugal 9 372 12 969 16 113 18 344 0.80 0.707
Slovak Republic 190 000 200 722 6 228 11 679 32.23 17.19
Spain 17 913 19 828 24 635 26 215 0.80 0.756
Sweden 251 282 300 814 40 949 32 773 7.35 9.18
Switzerland 64 419 70 649 56 849 40 900 1.24 1.73
Turkey 13 959 n.a. 9 789 16 788 1.43 0.831
United Kingdom 20 560 27 150 49 747 43 881 0.55 0.619
United States 34 033 30 355 30 355 30 355 1.00 1.00
n.a.: Not available.
AW = average wage.
APW = average production worker.
PPP = purchasing power parity.
Note: Monetary values for Turkey divided by 1 000 000. Average earnings are not available on the AW measure for
Ireland, Korea and Turkey.
Source: OECD (2006), p. 13; and OECD Main Economic Indicators.
* Countries have endeavoured to supply data based on the new Average Wage concept. However, as
when any new series is introduced, there are teething problems and different interpretations of
guidelines need to be reconciled. It appears possible, for example, that the US data excludes some
groups that are included in other countries' estimates of the average wage, which may partly explain
the surprisingly low US average wage estimate. This issue is subject of ongoing work, and updates to
the wage series will be posted on the OECD website as and when they become available.
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Figure 0.1. Percentage difference of average earnings AW levels with regard 
to previous APW levels, 2004
Source: OECD (2006), p. 13. 
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/886456570455
Table 0.2. Total life expectancy at age 65, 2040 projected mortality rates
Men Women
Australia 84.0 87.4
Austria 83.7 87.3
Belgium 83.8 87.3
Canada 83.8 87.4
Czech Republic 82.5 86.0
Denmark 83.1 86.0
Finland 83.6 87.5
France 83.9 87.6
Germany 83.2 86.6
Greece 83.3 86.6
Hungary 80.8 85.0
Iceland 84.8 87.5
Ireland 82.8 86.2
Italy 83.0 87.0
Japan 85.8 88.7
Korea 81.8 85.6
Luxembourg 83.0 87.2
Mexico 80.9 84.8
Netherlands 83.5 86.7
New Zealand 83.6 86.8
Norway 84.2 87.5
Poland 81.5 85.6
Portugal 82.8 86.2
Slovak Republic 81.1 85.1
Spain 83.4 87.0
Sweden 84.3 87.5
Switzerland 84.5 88.2
Turkey 80.0 83.0
United Kingdom 83.3 86.4
United States 83.8 87.3
OECD average 83.1 86.6
Note: These projections build on recent national census data. The assumptions for future changes in mortality rates
vary between countries but nonetheless use a consistent methodology. The resulting mortality rates can differ from
national projections because of differences in assumptions.
Source: OECD calculations based on United Nations/World Bank population database.
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Demographics and life expectancy
Table 0.2 shows the country-specific total life expectancy, separately for men and
women, conditional on surviving until age 65. Given that pension entitlements are
projected into the future, the calculations use the projections for 2040 from the United
Nations/World Bank population database. Workers who enter the labour market in 2004
will retire between 2044 and 2051. Unfortunately, mortality-rate projections are available
only for 2040 and 2075.
Citizens of poorer OECD member states are projected to retain lower life expectancies
than their counterparts in richer economies. In Hungary, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Turkey, life expectancy at age 65 is 1½-3 years shorter than the OECD average.
Japan and Switzerland have significantly longer life expectancy than the OECD mean today
and are projected to remain at the top in 2040. Other countries are clustered around the
OECD average.
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PART I 
Comparing Pension Policies 
of OECD Countries
This part starts with an overview of the different schemes that together make up
national retirement-income systems. A summary of the key features of pension
systems – the parameters and rules – follows. The main empirical results,
consisting of eight indicators that are calculated using the OECD pension models,
are then presented.
The first two indicators are both replacement rates; that is, the ratio of pension
benefits to individual earnings. These are given in gross and net terms, taking
account of taxes and contributions paid on earnings and on retirement incomes.
There are also two sensitivity analyses of the gross replacement rate: gross pension
replacement rates with entry at age 25; and gross pension replacement rates with
different rates of return.
The next two indicators are based on pension wealth, again in gross and net terms.
Pension wealth, unlike replacement rates, reflects differences in pension ages,
indexation of pensions in payment and national life expectancy.
The balance between the two core objectives of pension system – adequacy and
insurance – is explored by the next pair of indicators, on the progressivity of the
pension benefit formula and the link between pension and earnings.
The final two indicators are: weighted averages – pension levels and pension
wealth; and structure of the pension package. They summarise the pension system
as it affects individuals across the earnings distribution.
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Overview of Retirement-Income 
Provision
OECD countries’ retirement-income regimes are diverse and often involve a number of
different programmes. As a result, classifying pension systems and different retirement-
income schemes is difficult. The taxonomy used here, building on earlier work (OECD, 2004,
2005a), is based on the role and objective of each part of the pension system. The framework
consists of two mandatory “tiers”: a redistributive part and an insurance part. Redistributive
components of pension systems are designed to ensure that pensioners achieve some
absolute, minimum standard of living. Insurance components are designed to achieve some
target standard of living in retirement compared with that when working. Voluntary
provision, be it individual or employer-provided, makes up a third tier. Within these tiers,
schemes are classified further by their provider (public or private) and the way benefits are
determined (defined benefit or defined contribution, for example).
Table I.1 shows the diverse structure of pension systems in OECD countries. The table
looks at schemes that might affect people who have spent all or most of their careers
covered by the national pension system (and so excludes, for example, safety-net
programmes that affect only or mainly people with large gaps in their contribution
histories). 
All OECD countries have safety nets that aim to prevent poverty in old age. All of these
programmes, here called “first-tier, redistributive schemes”, are provided by the public
sector. There are three main types.
With basic-pension schemes, the benefit is either flat rate (the same amount is paid to
every retiree) or it depends only on years of work, but not on past earnings. Additional
income does not change the value of basic pensions. Thirteen countries have a basic
pension scheme or other provisions with a similar effect.
The other two kinds of first-tier retirement-income programmes target payments on
older people with low incomes. These are distinguished by the way in which benefits are
targeted.
Resource-tested plans pay a higher benefit to poorer pensioners and reduced benefits to
better-off retirees. The value of benefits depends either on income from other sources or on
both income and assets. Some countries provide a safety net for older people through
general social-assistance benefits. There are 16 OECD countries with resource-tested
programmes likely to affect low earners who spend all or most of their careers in the
national pension system.
Minimum pensions, found in 14 countries, are similar to resource-tested plans since
they also aim to prevent pensions from falling below a certain level. The difference lies in
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the way in which the value of entitlements is determined. Minimum pensions take account
only of pension income, often from a single pension scheme, and are not affected by
income from other savings or assets. Minimum credits in earnings-related schemes, such
as those in Belgium and the United Kingdom, have a similar effect: benefits for workers
with very low earnings are calculated as if the worker had earned at a higher level.
The second tier in this typology of pension schemes plays an “insurance” role. It aims
to provide retirees with an adequate income relative to their previous earnings, not just a
poverty-preventing absolute standard of living. Like the first tier, it is mandatory. Only
Ireland and New Zealand do not have mandatory, second-tier provision.
Some 16 OECD countries have public, defined-benefit (DB) plans, making them the
most common form of pension-insurance provision. In DB schemes, the amount a
pensioner will receive depends on the number of years of contributions made throughout
Table I.1. Structure of pension systems in OECD countries
First tier Second tier
Universal coverage, redistributive Mandatory, insurance
Public Public Private
Resource tested Basic Minimum Type Type
Australia ✓ DC
Austria ✓ DB
Belgium ✓ ✓ DB
Canada ✓ ✓ DB
Czech Republic ✓ ✓ ✓ DB
Denmark ✓ ✓ DC
Finland ✓ DB
France ✓ ✓ DB + points
Germany ✓ Points
Greece ✓ ✓ DB
Hungary DB DC
Iceland ✓ ✓ DB
Ireland ✓ ✓
Italy ✓ NDC
Japan ✓ DB
Korea ✓ DB
Luxembourg ✓ ✓ ✓ DB
Mexico ✓ ✓ DC
Netherlands ✓ DB
New Zealand ✓
Norway ✓ ✓ Points DC
Poland ✓ NDC DC
Portugal ✓ DB
Slovak Republic ✓ Points DC
Spain ✓ DB
Sweden ✓ NDC DB + DC
Switzerland ✓ ✓ DB DB 
Turkey ✓ DB
United Kingdom ✓ ✓ ✓ DB
United States ✓ DB
DB = defined benefit.
DC = defined contribution.
NDC = notional accounts.
Source: Information provided by national authorities. See OECD (2004, 2005a) for a more detailed definition of these terms.
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the working life and on some measure of individual earnings from work. Four countries
have “points” schemes: the French occupational plans and the German, Norwegian and
Slovak public schemes. Workers earn pension points based on their individual earnings for
each year of contributions. At retirement, the sum of pension points is multiplied by a
pension-point value to convert them into a regular pension payment.
Four countries have private occupational DB plans. In the Netherlands and Sweden
the DB nature is explicit. In Iceland and Switzerland, the government sets the contribution
rate, a minimum rate of return and the annuity rate at which the accumulation is
converted into a pension, policies that together define the pension benefit.
The next most common form of pension-insurance provision is the defined-
contribution (DC) plan. In these schemes, contributions flow into an individual account
and the accumulation of contributions and investment returns is usually converted into a
pension-income stream at retirement. DC schemes are organised in different ways. In
Australia, employers must cover their workers while in Hungary, Mexico and Poland,
workers choose a pension provider without employer involvement. In Sweden, only a small
contribution goes into the mandatory individual accounts with additional DC provision for
most workers under the quasi-mandatory occupational schemes.
There are also notional-accounts (NDC) schemes: the public pension plans of Italy,
Poland and Sweden. These are schemes which record each worker’s contributions in an
individual account and apply a rate of return to the accounts. The accounts are “notional”
in that both the incoming contributions and the interest charged to them exist only on the
books of the managing institution. At retirement, the accumulated notional capital in each
account is converted into a stream of pension payments using a formula based on life
expectancy.
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Key Features of Pension-System Design
The main features of OECD member countries’ pension systems are summarised in
Table I.2 below. These follow the typology of the previous section, dividing the pension
system into two tiers. The summary necessarily leaves out much of the institutional
details. More complete descriptions are provided in the country studies (Part III).
First-tier, redistributive schemes
The level of benefits under first-tier, redistributive schemes is expressed as a percentage
of average earnings in each country (see the discussion of average earnings data in the
section on methodology above).
In the cases of minimum pensions and basic schemes, the benefit entitlement is
shown for a worker who enters at age 20 and works without interruption until he reaches
the standard pension eligibility age. In most OECD countries, this is age 65 as shown in the
last lines of Table I.2. Only full-career workers with very low earnings will be eligible for the
resource-tested programmes; the majority of beneficiaries will be those with short and
interrupted contribution histories. The final row shows the total, first-tier benefit for a full-
career worker. In some cases, workers can receive several different types of first-tier
benefits, while in other cases they are only eligible for one programme.
The average minimum retirement benefit across OECD countries is a little under 29%
of average earnings.
Second-tier, insurance schemes
The information on the second, insurance tier is shown separately for earnings-
related and defined-contribution (DC) plans.
The information on earnings-related schemes begins with the scheme type: defined
benefit (DB), points or notional accounts (NDC). The main parameter accounting for
differences in the value of these schemes is the accrual rate per year of contribution, that is,
the rate at which a worker earns benefit entitlements for each year of coverage. The accrual
rate is expressed as a percentage of the earnings that are “covered” by the pension scheme.
Most pension schemes cover only part of workers’ earnings to calculate pension benefits.
For points systems, the effective accrual rate shown in Table I.2 is the ratio of the cost of
a pension point to the pension-point value, expressed as percentage of individual earnings.
This, like the accrual rate in DB schemes, gives the benefit earned each year as a proportion
of earnings in that year. In notional-accounts schemes, the effective accrual rate is calculated
in a similar way to obtain the annual pension entitlement as a proportion of earnings in a
given year. The calculations, which depend on the contribution rate, notional interest rate
and annuity factors, are described in detail in Pensions at a Glance (OECD, 2005a).
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In a little under half of the countries with earnings-related plans (of all three types),
the accrual rates are linear. In the other countries, the pension benefit earned for each year
of coverage varies, either with individual earnings, with the number of years of
contributions or with individual age.
In eight cases, the accrual rate varies with earnings (indicated in Table I.2 by [w]). In
the public schemes of the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Portugal and the United States, the
pattern is progressive, giving higher replacement rates to lower-income workers. In the
United Kingdom, the accrual rates are U-shaped, highest for low earners, then smaller,
then higher again. In the occupational plans of France and Sweden, the benefits are
designed to offset the redistribution in the public scheme; they pay a higher replacement
rate to high earners on their pay above the ceiling of the public plan.
In the occupational plans of Finland and Switzerland, pension accrual increases with
age (shown as [a]).
Two countries have accrual rates that vary with length of service ([y]). In Luxembourg, the
accrual rate increases for people with a longer contribution history. In Spain, there are three
accrual rates. The pattern is the reverse of that in Luxembourg: the highest accrual rate is for
the first few years of coverage and the lowest for later years in longer contribution histories.
Defined-contribution plans
The key parameter for DC plans is the proportion of earnings that must be paid into the
individual account by employees, employers or the government. The average contribution
rate in the eight countries with a mandatory DC plan is 7.25%. The largest contribution is in
Denmark, made up of 1% to the special pension and an average of 10.8% to quasi-mandatory,
occupational schemes. In Australia and the Slovak Republic, the contribution rate is 9%.
Norway has recently made coverage of DC occupational schemes mandatory, but the
contribution rate is only 2%. In Sweden, employees must contribute 2.5% of earnings to a DC
account and white-collar, private sector workers are also covered by a DC scheme with a 2%
contribution rate. The contribution rate is 6.5% in Mexico. The additional government
contribution of 5.5% of the minimum wage is shown as a basic scheme because it is a flat
amount for each year of service.
Measuring earnings to calculate benefits
DB pension entitlements depend on the past earnings of the individual worker but the
way in which these are measured differs. Table I.2 shows whether lifetime average or a
limited number of best or final years’ salaries are used. It is important to remember that the
information shown here relates to the long-term rules of the system: the averaging period is
being changed in a number of countries (see the special chapter on pension reform).
By far the most common method is to use the full lifetime average of earnings to
calculate benefits. This is the approach in 17 countries, with Canada, the Czech Republic
and the United States averaging earnings over the great majority of the career (30-35 years).
There are five exceptions. Final salaries will be used to calculate benefits in Greece, Spain
and in the DB occupational scheme in Sweden. The public pension schemes of France and
Norway will be based on the best 25 and 20 years’ earnings respectively.
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Valorisation
Closely linked with the earnings measure is the policy of valorisation or revaluation,
whereby past earnings are adjusted to take account of changes in living standards between
the time pension rights accrued and the time they are claimed. (This is sometimes called
pre-retirement indexation.) If benefits are based on the final year’s salary, there is no need
for valorisation. But it is necessary to protect the value of pension entitlements when
benefits are based on earnings measured over a longer period. The uprating of the pension-
point value and the notional interest rate in points and notional-accounts systems,
respectively are the exact corollaries of valorisation in DB plans (see Queisser and
Whitehouse, 2006, Box 4 for a detailed explanation).
The effect of valorisation policy on pension entitlements is large due to a “compound-
interest” effect. On the baseline economic assumptions used in this report – i.e., real wage
growth of 2% and price inflation of 2.5% – prices valorisation for a full career (between
age 20 and 65) results in a pension that would be 40% lower than a policy of full adjustment
of earlier years’ pay in line with economy-wide average earnings.
The most common practice – followed in 15 OECD countries – is to revalue earlier
years’ pay in line with the growth of average earnings in the economy. Belgium, France and
Spain, however, revalue earnings only with price inflation, although the effect in Spain is
relatively small because only the final 15 years’ salary enters the benefit formula,
compared with 25 years in the French public scheme and the lifetime average in Belgium
and the French occupational plans. Finland, Portugal and Turkey revalue earlier years’
earnings to a mix of price and wage inflation.
Ceilings on pensionable earnings
Most countries do not require high-income workers to contribute to the pension system
on their entire earnings. Usually, a limit is set on the earnings used both to calculate
contribution liability and pension benefits. This ceiling on the earnings covered by the
pension system has an important effect on the structure, size and cost of second-tier
schemes. The average ceiling on public pensions for 19 countries is 189% of average
economy-wide earnings. (This average excludes eight countries where there is no public
pension scheme for which a ceiling is relevant, such as basic or targeted programmes and
three countries that have no ceiling on earnings eligible for a public pension.)
Table I.2 also shows ceilings for mandatory private pension systems and for the public,
occupational plans in France and Finland. Of the nine countries with this type of
programme, three have no ceiling: Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands. The ceilings of the
occupational plans in France and Sweden are three and 2.8 times respectively the cap on
pensionable earnings in the public programme (equivalent to over 3 times average economy-
wide earnings). The ceiling on mandatory contributions to the defined-contribution (DC)
plan in Mexico is also relatively high.
Pension eligibility ages
The majority of OECD member countries have a standard retirement age of 65 for men.
Pension eligibility ages for women are still lower in several countries but, in most of these,
they will be equalised gradually with those of men (in Belgium, Hungary and the United
Kingdom, for example). Iceland, Norway and the United States have a standard pension age
of 67 and other countries, such as Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom, are also
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proposing increase pension age above 65. France is the only OECD country which allows
normal retirement at age 60. More than half of OECD countries, however, allow retirement
before the normal pension age, although usually only with reduced benefits.
Indexation of pensions in payment
Indexation refers to the policy for the up-rating of the value of the payment from the
point of claim of the pension benefit onwards. Pension benefits are usually adjusted in line
with an index of consumer prices. Some countries have mixed uprating of benefits, to a
combination of price inflation and wage growth: the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, the
Slovak Republic and Switzerland.
Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal have adopted progressive indexation mechanisms,
which give higher increases to low pensions than to higher benefits. Italy provides full
price adjustment for low pensions and 90% or 75% of price inflation to higher pensions. In
Portugal, pensions are adjusted to a mix of price inflation and GDP growth; the exact
increases depend both on the level of pensions and on GDP growth rates.
Indexation of pension-system parameters
Indexation affects not only pensions in payment but also the parameters of pension
systems. In resource-tested and basic pension schemes, the adjustment of benefit levels to
the point when they are first claimed is more important than the adjustment of benefits in
payment.
Take the United Kingdom’s basic pension scheme as an example. This has been linked
to prices since 1981, when it was worth 24% of average earnings. Today, it is worth just 15%
of average earnings. The change in indexation procedure reduced the entitlements not
only of pensioners but also the benefits of all future workers. If the procedure continues,
then the basic pension for new entrants will be worth just 6.4% of average earnings when
they retire in 45 years’ time, just 40% of its value relative to earnings now. (This calculation
uses the baseline real-earnings-growth assumption of 2% per year.)
Canada and Sweden also link their resource-tested schemes to prices (while the
United Kingdom now links this to average earnings). The implication, over the long periods
involved in pension policy, is that these programmes will all but disappear. For new
entrants, the minimum retirement income in 45 years time would be just 12% of average
earnings in Canada and 14% in Sweden. It is difficult to believe that it will be politically
possible to pay such low incomes to poor, old people. As a result, these policies are unlikely
to be sustainable or, indeed, sustained.
Therefore, the modelling in this report explicitly assumes that these benefits and
parameters are linked to average earnings, and not prices, even though this is what
legislation specifies. Obviously this assumption has a big effect on the results when
calculating the value of the pension promise.
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Table I.2. Summary of pension-scheme parameters and rules
Australia Austria Belgium Canada
Czech 
Republic
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
First tier
(% average earnings)
 Resource-tested 25 28 22 17 26 18 19 32 19 11
 Basic – – – 14 8 18 – – – –
 Minimum – – 341 – 12 – – 23 – 34
 Overall entitlement 25 28 34 31 26 36 19 32 19 34
 (full-career worker)
Second tier
Earnings-related
 Type None DB DB DB DB None DB DB/Points Points DB
 Accrual rate – 1.78 1.33 0.63 0.45[w]2 – 1.5[a]4 1.75 [w]5, 6 1.00 2.575
 (% indiv. earnings)
 Earnings measure – 40 L b34 f30 – L b25/L L f5
 Valorisation – w15 p w w – 80w/20p p/p w16 17
 Indexation – d p p 33w/67p – 20w/80p p/p w16 d
Defined contribution
 Contribution rate 9 – – – – 11.8 – – –
 (% indiv. earnings)
Ceilings 
(% average earnings)
 Public – 147 117 96 None – – 101 151 2757
 Private/occupational 257 – – – – – None 302 – –
Pension age
 Normal 65 65 65 65 63 65 65 60 65 65
 (women) (59-63)3
 Early 55 60 60 60 62 63 55
 (women) (56-60)3
Parameters are for 2004 but include all legislated changes that take effect in the future. For example, some countries are
increasing pension ages and extending the earnings measure for calculating benefits; pension ages for women are shown only
if different from those for men. Early pension ages are shown only where relevant.
– = not relevant; [a] = varies with age; [w] = varies with earnings; [y] = varies with years of service.
b = number of best years; f = number of final years; L = lifetime average.
d = discretionary indexation; fr = valorisation at a statutorily fixed rate; p = valorisation/indexation with prices;
w = valorisation/indexation with average earnings; GDP = linked to gross domestic product.
DB = defined benefit; DC = defined contribution; NDC = notional accounts.
1. Belgium, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom: minimum benefit calculated from minimum credit.
2. Czech Republic, Portugal, United States: higher accrual rates on lower earnings, lower accruals on higher earnings.
3. Czech Republic: pension ages for women vary with number of children.
4. Finland: higher accrual rates at older ages.
5. France, Greece, Sweden: data shown combines two different programmes.
6. France, Sweden: higher accrual rate on higher earnings under occupational plans.
7. Greece: effective ceiling calculated from maximum pension.
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Table I.2. Summary of pension-scheme parameters and rules (cont.)
Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands
New
Zealand
First tier
(% average earnings)
 Resource-tested – 188 27 – – – – – – –
 Basic – 9 30 – 16 30 10 7.0/4.210 31 40
 Minimum 22 – – – – – 39 26 – –
 Overall entitlement 22 27 30 22 16 30 39 26 31 40
 (full-career worker)
Second tier
Earnings-related
 Type DB DB None NDC DB DB DB None DB None
 Accrual rate 1.22 1.40 – 1.75 0.55 1.5 1.85 [y]9 – 1.7511 –
 (% indiv. earnings)
 Earnings measure L L – L L L L – L14 –
 Valorisation w fr – GDP w w w – w –
 Indexation 50w/50p p – p18 p p w – w –
Defined contribution
 Contribution rate 8 – – – – – – 6.510 – –
 (% indiv. earnings)
Ceilings 
(% average earnings)
 Public 220 – – 370 150 160 215 – – –
 Private/occupational 220 None – – – – – 377 None –
Pension age
 Normal 62 67 66 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
 (women) (60) 60
 Early 65 60 60 60 57 60
 (women)
8. Iceland: includes two different programmes.
9. Luxembourg: higher accrual rate for longer contribution periods.
10. Mexico: additional contribution of 5.5% of minimum wage is shown as a basic pension. The lower value of the annuity
calculated is for women (because women retire earlier than men).
11. Netherlands: accrual rate varies between occupational schemes.
12. Norway: lower accrual rate on higher earnings.
13. Spain: higher accrual rate on early years of service and lower on later years.
14. Netherlands: earnings measure is average salary for around two-thirds of occupational plans and final salary for one-third.
15. Austria: valorisation assumed to move to earnings as the averaging period for the earnings measure is extended.
16. Germany: valorisation can be reduced by any increase in contribution rates and for the potential contribution to private
pensions. Indexation can be reduced by any increase in contributions.
17. Greece: valorisation in line with pension increases for public-sector workers.
18. Italy: indexation is fully to prices for low pensions, 90% of prices or 75% of prices for higher pensions.
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Table I.2. Summary of pension-scheme parameters and rules (cont.)
Norway Poland Portugal
Slovak 
Republic
Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey
United 
Kingdom
United 
States
First tier
(% average earnings)
 Resource-tested 33 – 20 – – 34 24 6 20 22
 Basic 18 – – – – – – – 15 –
 Minimum – 23 44 221 30 – 18 28 151 –
 Overall entitlement 33 23 44 22 30 34 24 28 30 22
 (full-career worker)
Second tier
Earnings-related
 Type Points NDC DB Points DB NDC/DB DB DB DB DB
 Accrual rate 1.05 [w]12 0.67 [w]2 1.16 [y]13 1.18[w]5, 6 [w/a] 2.0 [w]21 [w]2
 (% indiv. earnings)
 Earnings measure b20 L L L f15 L/f L L L b35
 Valorisation w w19 25w/75p w p w w 50w/50p w w22
 Indexation w p19 p/GDP20 50w/50p p w-1.6 50w/50p p p p
Defined contribution
 Contribution rate 2 7.3 – 9 – 4.55 – – – –
 (% indiv. earnings)
Ceilings 
(% average earnings)
 Public 219 230 None 300 165 132 108 245 115 290
 Private/occupational – – – – – 367 108 – – –
Pension age
 Normal 67 65 65 62 65 65 65 65 65 67
 (women) (60) (64)
 Early 55 60 61 63 62
 (women) (62)
19. Poland: valorisation to real wage bill growth but at least price inflation. Indexation has been 80% prices and 20% wages but
moved to prices from 2005.
20. Portugal: indexation will be higher relative to prices for low pensions and vice versa . Indexation will be more generous the
higher is GDP growth.
21. United Kingdom: accrual rate highest for low earnings, then lower then higher again.
22. United States: earnings valorisation to age 60; no adjustment from 60 to 62; prices valorisation from 62 to 67.
Source: Information provided by national authorities and OECD calculations.
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Retirement-Income Indicators
The first two indicators are both replacement rates; that is, the ratio of pension
benefits to individual earnings. These are given in gross and net terms, taking
account of taxes and contributions paid on earnings and on retirement incomes.
There are also two sensitivity analyses of the gross replacement rate: gross pension
replacement rates with entry at age 25; and gross pension replacement rates with
different rates of return.
The next two indicators are based on pension wealth, again in gross and net terms.
Pension wealth, unlike replacement rates, reflects differences in pension ages,
indexation of pensions in payment and national life expectancy.
The balance between the two core objectives of pension system – adequacy and
insurance – is explored by the next pair of indicators, one on the progressivity of the
pension benefit formulae and the other on the link between pension and earnings.
The final two indicators are: weighted averages – pension levels and pension
wealth; and structure of the pension package. They summarise the pension system
as it affects individuals across the earnings distribution.
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Gross Pension Replacement Rates
For workers at average earnings, the average for
the OECD countries of the gross replacement rate
from mandatory pensions is 58.7%. There is
substantial variation across countries, with Greece
and Luxembourg at the top of the range, offering
replacement rates of more than 90%. The lowest
replacement rates for average earners are paid in the
United Kingdom, Ireland and Japan, while countries
such as Norway and Switzerland are in the middle of
the range. Replacement rates from mandatory
schemes tend to be the lowest in the six mainly
English-speaking countries, averaging 38.5% for
workers on mean earnings. They are the highest in
the five Southern European nations – Greece, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and Turkey – averaging 74.3%.
Low earners – workers earning only half the
mean – have higher replacement rates than median
or mean earners: on average, 73%. This reflects the
fact that most countries attempt to protect low-
income workers from old-age poverty. The cross-
country variation of replacement rates at this
earnings level is much lower than it is for pensions of
those who earn twice the average. The highest gross
replacement rate for low earners is found in
Denmark at 120%, which means that full-career
workers with permanently low earnings have more
money when they retire than when they were
working. The lowest rate is observed in Germany
where full-career workers on half average earnings
receive only a 40% replacement rate.
At high earnings, Greece again offers the highest
pensions, reflecting both a high accrual rate and a
high ceiling on pensionable earnings. While most
other countries have lower ceilings and therefore
lower replacement rates for high earners, the Greek
system offers the same rate to full-career workers up
to 275% of average earnings. In contrast, high earners
receive the lowest benefits relative to their previous
earnings in Ireland. The variation across countries in
replacement rates for high earners is much greater
than it is for people on low or average pay.
Finally,  the table also presents pension
replacement rates for women in the four countries
where these differ from those of men (due to a lower
pension eligibility age for women than for men). The
difference between the sexes in replacement rates is
particularly stark in two of the countries with
defined-contribution schemes: Mexico and Poland.
In both countries, normal pension age for women
is 60 while for men it is 65. This means that women
accumulate capital in the individual pension
accounts over a shorter period. It also means that
women spend a longer period in retirement over
which pension capital must be spread. As a result,
replacement rates at average earnings are around
one third smaller for women than they are for men.
In Mexico, the differential between men and
women’s replacement rates is larger than in Poland
because annuities are calculated using sex-specific
mortality rates rather than unisex life tables.
Definition and measurement
The gross replacement rate is defined as gross pension entitlement divided by gross pre-retirement earnings. It
is shown here at median earnings and at 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5 and 2 times average (mean) earnings.
The old-age pension replacement rate is a measure of how effectively a pension system provides income during
retirement to replace earnings, the main source of income prior to retirement. Often, the replacement rate is
expressed as the ratio of the pension over the final earnings before retirement. However, the indicator used here
shows the pension benefit as a share of individual lifetime average earnings (re-valued in line with economy-wide
earnings growth). Under the baseline assumptions, workers earn the same percentage of economy-wide average
earnings throughout their career. In this case, lifetime average re-valued earnings and individual final earnings
are identical. If people move up the earnings distribution as they get older, then their earnings just before
retirement will be higher than they were on average over their lifetime and replacement rates calculated on
individual final earnings will be lower.
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Gross replacement rates by earnings
Median 
earner
Individual earnings, multiple of mean Median 
earner
Individual earnings, multiple of mean
0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Men Men (cont.)
Australia 47.9 70.7 52.3 43.1 33.8 29.2 New Zealand 46.8 79.5 53.0 39.7 26.5 19.9
Austria 80.1 80.1 80.1 80.1 78.5 58.8 Norway 60.0 66.4 61.2 59.3 50.2 42.7
Belgium 40.7 57.3 40.9 40.4 31.3 23.5 Poland 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2
Canada 49.5 75.4 54.4 43.9 29.6 22.2 Portugal 54.3 70.4 54.5 54.1 53.4 52.7
Czech Rep. 54.3 78.8 59.0 49.1 36.4 28.9 Slovak Rep. 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7
Denmark 83.6 119.6 90.4 75.8 61.3 57.1 Spain 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 67.1
Finland 63.4 71.3 63.4 63.4 63.4 63.4 Sweden 63.7 79.1 66.6 62.1 64.7 66.3
France 51.2 63.8 51.2 51.2 46.9 44.7 Switzerland 62.0 62.5 62.1 58.4 40.7 30.5
Germany 39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9 30.0 Turkey 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5
Greece 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 UK 34.4 53.4 37.8 30.8 22.6 17.0
Hungary 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 US 43.6 55.2 45.8 41.2 36.5 32.1
Iceland 80.1 109.9 85.8 77.5 74.4 72.9
Ireland 38.2 65.0 43.3 32.5 21.7 16.2 OECD 60.8 73.0 62.7 58.7 53.7 49.2
Italy 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.9
Japan 36.8 47.8 38.9 34.4 29.9 27.2 Women (where different)
Korea 72.7 99.9 77.9 66.8 55.8 45.1 Italy 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8
Luxembourg 90.3 99.8 92.1 88.3 84.5 82.5 Mexico 31.1 52.8 35.2 29.7 28.5 27.9
Mexico 36.6 52.8 37.3 35.8 34.4 33.6 Poland 44.5 46.2 44.5 44.5 44.5 44.5
Netherlands 81.7 80.6 81.5 81.9 82.4 82.6 Switzerland 62.6 62.8 62.6 59.1 41.2 30.9
Source: OECD pension models.
Gross replacement rates by earnings
Note: Countries are ranked in order of gross pension replacement rates (GRR) of average earners, i.e. mean GRR in the chart.
Source: OECD pension models.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/546202021514
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Net Pension Replacement Rates
The personal tax system plays an important role
in old-age support. Pensioners often do not pay social
security contributions and, as personal income taxes
are progressive and pension entitlements are usually
lower than earnings before retirement, the average tax
rate on pension income is typically less than the tax
rate on earned income. In addition, most income tax
systems give preferential treatment either to pension
incomes or to pensioners, by giving additional
allowances or credits to older people. Therefore, net
replacement rates are usually higher than gross
replacement rates.
For average (mean) earners, the net replacement
rate across OECD countries is on average 70%, which
is some 11 percentage points higher than the gross
replacement rate. The pattern of replacement rates
across countries is different on a net rather than a
gross basis.
For example, Belgium and Germany have
considerably higher net replacement rates than gross.
This is due, first, to favourable treatment of pension
income under social security contributions and,
secondly, because replacement rates are relatively low
which, with strongly progressive personal income
taxes, means that people pay much less in income tax
when retired than they did when working. Germany is
gradually withdrawing the current, very generous tax
treatment of pension income but the differential
between gross and net replacement rates will remain
large even when this policy is fully in place.
In contrast with Belgium and Germany, New
Zealand and Sweden move lower down the rankings
measured on a net rather than a gross basis. This is
because these countries tax pension income and
earnings at very similar rates.
For low earners (with half of mean earnings), the
average net replacement rate across OECD countries is
84%. The effect of taxes and contributions on net
replacement rates for low earners (at half average
earnings) is more muted than for workers higher up
the earnings scale. This is because low-income workers
typically pay less in taxes and contributions than those
on average earnings. In many cases, their retirement
incomes are below the level of income-tax standard
reliefs (allowances, credits, etc.). Thus, they are unable
to benefit fully from additional concessions granted to
pensions or pensioners under the income tax.
The difference for low earners is 11 percentage
points, on average. Belgium and the Czech Republic
have much higher replacement rates for low earners
when measured on a net basis. In Mexico, the net
replacement rate of low earners is below the gross
rate because low-income workers pay less in tax than
low-income pensioners (at the same level of income).
The differential  between net and gross
replacement rates for high earners is again
11 percentage points. But this implies that personal
income taxes and social security contributions play a
greater role than for average or low earners because
net replacement rates – at 61% for high earners – are
lower than for lower-income workers. The tax
system therefore reduces the progressivity of
retirement-income systems. The net replacement
rate for workers earning twice the average is highest
in Turkey where high-income workers also have the
highest rates across the earnings range. Not
surprisingly, the lowest rates are found in the flat-
rate pension systems of New Zealand and Ireland. In
both countries, workers earning twice the average
will receive pensions that amount to less than a
quarter of their previous net earnings.
There are regional differences in the gap between
gross and net replacement rates. For median earners
in the EU-15 countries, net replacement rates are on
average 11 percentage points higher than gross rates.
In Nordic countries, the difference is smaller: net rates
are less than 7 percentage points higher than gross
rates. This is due to the fact that income taxes play a
more important role in the Nordic countries than
elsewhere: workers on mean earnings pay 33% of
their wages in taxes and contributions in the Nordic
countries compared with 26.5% for the OECD as a
whole and still lower – 22.5% – in the English-speaking
countries. When it comes to low earners, however, the
Nordic countries offer a 96% net replacement rate
while the Anglophone OECD countries pay 76% of
previous net earnings.
Definition and measurement
The net replacement rate is defined as the individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirement
earnings, taking account of personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers and
pensioners. Otherwise, the definition and measurement of the net replacement rates are the same as for the gross
replacement rate (see previous indicator). The results again cover full-career workers with median earnings and
with 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5 and 2 times average (mean) earnings.
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Net replacement rates by earnings
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of mean
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of mean
0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Men Men (cont.)
Australia 61.7 83.5 66.2 56.4 46.1 40.8 New Zealand 48.6 81.4 54.9 41.7 29.4 23.2
Austria 90.6 90.4 90.6 90.9 89.2 66.4 Norway 70.0 77.1 71.2 69.3 62.5 55.1
Belgium 64.4 77.3 65.5 63.0 51.1 40.7 Poland 74.8 74.5 74.8 74.9 75.0 77.1
Canada 62.8 89.2 68.3 57.4 40.0 30.8 Portugal 67.4 81.6 66.0 69.2 72.2 73.7
Czech Rep. 70.3 98.8 75.6 64.4 49.3 40.2 Slovak Rep. 71.9 66.4 70.6 72.9 75.4 76.7
Denmark 94.1 132.7 101.6 86.7 77.0 72.2 Spain 84.2 82.0 83.9 84.5 85.2 72.4
Finland 68.0 77.4 68.4 68.8 70.3 70.5 Sweden 66.2 81.4 69.2 64.0 71.9 73.9
France 62.8 78.4 64.9 63.1 58.0 55.4 Switzerland 68.8 75.0 68.2 64.3 45.7 35.1
Germany 57.3 53.4 56.6 58.0 59.2 44.4 Turkey 103.4 101.0 102.9 104.0 106.4 108.3
Greece 111.1 113.6 111.7 110.1 110.3 107.0 UK 45.4 66.1 49.2 41.1 30.6 24.0
Hungary 96.5 94.7 95.1 102.2 98.5 98.5 US 55.3 67.4 58.0 52.4 47.9 43.2
Iceland 86.9 110.9 92.0 84.2 80.3 79.7
Ireland 44.4 65.8 49.3 38.5 29.3 23.5 OECD 72.1 83.8 74.0 70.1 65.4 60.7
Italy 77.9 81.8 78.2 77.9 78.1 79.3
Japan 41.5 52.5 43.5 39.2 34.3 31.3 Women
Korea 77.8 106.1 83.1 71.8 61.9 50.7 Italy 63.8 63.6 64.4 63.4 63.7 63.5
Luxembourg 98.0 107.6 99.8 96.2 92.9 91.0 Mexico 32.2 50.3 35.7 31.7 32.3 33.2
Mexico 37.9 50.3 37.8 38.3 39.0 40.0 Poland 55.3 57.5 55.3 55.2 55.0 56.4
Netherlands 105.3 97.0 103.8 96.8 96.3 94.8 Switzerland 68.1 75.4 68.9 65.0 46.3 35.5
Source: OECD pension models.
Net replacement rates by earnings
Note: Countries are ranked in order of net pension replacement rates (NRR) of average earners, i.e., mean NRR in the chart.
Source: OECD pension models.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/304061275274
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Gross Pension Replacement Rates with Entry at Age 25
Under the baseline assumptions used in this
report ,  workers enter the labour market at
age 20 and work until the standard retirement age.
For the vast majority of OECD countries – with
pension ages of 65 – this assumption results in a
career length of 45 years. However, the lower pension
age in France results in a full career length of
40 years and the higher ages in Iceland, Norway and
the United States imply career lengths of 47 years. In
the four countries that intend to retain different
pension ages for men and women in the long term
(see Table), career lengths are shorter for women
than for men by between one and five years.
In reality, careers are currently shorter than the
baseline assumption of 40-47 years: some workers
start paid work later than age 20 and many spend
time out of the labour market for various reasons. In
addition, early retirement is still common in many
OECD countries. As a sensitivity analysis, therefore,
gross replacement rates are presented here for a
shorter career. The alternative assumption is that
workers enter the labour market at age 25. For the
majority of countries, this results in a career length
of 40 years. Again, it is shorter in France – 35 years –
and longer for Iceland, Norway and the United States
– 42 years. The table shows gross replacement rates
from old-age pensions relative to earnings under this
assumption.
For workers at average earnings, the average
gross replacement rate for OECD countries for entry
age 25 is 54.1%, compared to 58.7% for labour-market
entry at age 20. Workers earning only half the
average again receive higher replacement rates: on
average 69.2%, compared to 73% for entry at age 20.
At median earnings, i.e. at the earnings level both
below and above which half of all workers are
situated, the average OECD gross replacement is
56.3%, compared to 60.8%.
In Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and the
United States, replacement rates are the same for entry
at ages 20 and 25. This is because Ireland and New
Zealand have flat-rate pension systems. In Spain and
the United States, the maximum replacement rate is
reached after 35 years; therefore, contributing five
years more does not change the pension benefit level
except if these years are among the highest earnings.
The assumed age of labour-market exit is the
normal pension age for each country in the analyses
with entry at both age 20 and age 25. In France,
however, benefits are more tightly tied to years of
contributions than they are in most other countries.
The first results in the table show the case of an
indiv idual  working  at  ag es 25-60 ,  g iv ing  a
replacement rate of 37.4% for an average earner,
compared with 51.2% for an average earner with a
career spanning ages 20 to 60. Given the size of the
penalty for retiring at 60 for workers entering at
age 25, the table also shows as a memorandum the
results for a French worker contributing from
age 25 to age 65.
Are estimates of future pension entitlements
based on this shorter career length “better” than
those assuming a longer period? The first point that
needs to be borne in mind is that the aim of all these
estimates is not to predict future pensions; it is to
describe how pension systems operate. Having said
that, the shorter working career is certainly close to
the experience of current pensioners. Whether this
will be the case in the future is speculation. OECD
(2006) suggests that after years or even decades of
contracting, the average age of retirement in some
countries has started to rise instead. (See also OECD,
2005b, indicator SS8).
More important for the purposes of this exercise
is the fact that recent changes in the pension
systems of many countries have extended credits for
time out of the labour force. Child care, higher
education, receipt of sickness, invalidity benefits and
unemployment all result in periods being credited to
an individual’s contribution record in many
countries. In the future therefore, it seems likely that
if people do not have full careers when they reach
retirement age, they nevertheless will have a variety
of credits which will need to be taken into account.
Definition and measurement
The gross replacement rate is defined as gross pension entitlement divided by gross pre-retirement earnings. It
is shown here at median earnings and a 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, and 2 times average earnings levels. The rates are here
shown for workers who enter the labour market at age 25 and work until the standard retirement age in the
respective country. Until they reach age 25, workers are assumed not to earn any pension entitlements.
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Gross replacement rates by earnings: entry at age 25
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of mean
0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Australia 45.9 68.7 50.3 41.0 31.8 27.2
Austria 71.2 71.2 71.2 71.2 69.7 52.3
Belgium 37.9 50.9 38.1 37.6 29.2 21.9
Canada 49.5 75.4 54.4 43.9 29.6 22.2
Czech Republic 49.1 71.5 53.4 44.3 32.8 26.0
Denmark 78.2 113.9 85.0 70.6 56.2 50.0
Finland 58.2 68.7 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2
France 37.5 63.8 42.5 37.4 34.0 32.3
Germany 35.5 38.6 35.5 35.5 35.5 26.7
Greece 92.9 92.9 92.9 92.9 92.9 92.9
Hungary 66.8 66.8 66.8 66.8 66.8 66.8
Iceland 74.8 104.6 80.4 68.4 64.6 63.1
Ireland 38.2 65.0 43.3 32.5 21.7 16.2
Italy 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0
Japan 34.4 45.5 36.5 32.1 27.6 24.9
Korea 64.6 88.8 69.2 59.4 49.6 40.1
Luxembourg 79.8 89.1 81.6 77.8 74.0 72.2
Mexico 31.5 52.8 35.2 30.8 29.5 28.8
Netherlands 76.7 78.6 77.1 76.3 75.5 75.1
New Zealand 46.8 79.5 53.0 39.7 26.5 19.9
Norway 59.0 65.6 60.2 58.2 49.1 41.5
Poland 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3
Portugal 54.3 70.4 54.5 54.1 53.4 52.7
Slovak Republic 48.8 48.8 48.8 48.8 48.8 48.8
Spain 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 67.1
Sweden 60.5 75.9 63.5 57.2 60.5 63.1
Switzerland 58.2 57.7 58.1 55.2 38.6 28.9
Turkey 65.9 67.2 65.9 65.9 65.9 65.9
United Kingdom 32.6 51.9 36.2 29.1 21.2 15.9
United States 43.6 55.2 45.8 41.2 36.5 32.1
OECD average 56.3 69.2 58.4 54.1 49.2 44.9
Women
Italy 45.7 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8
Mexico 31.1 52.8 35.2 29.7 28.5 27.9
Poland 38.1 46.2 44.5 44.5 44.5 44.5
Switzerland 57.8 62.8 62.6 59.1 41.2 30.9
Memorandum: 
France
Career 25-60 37.5 63.8 42.5 37.4 34.0 32.3
Career 25-65 51.9 63.8 51.9 51.9 47.9 45.9
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Gross Pension Replacement Rates with Different Investment Returns
A real rate of return on investments of 3.5% a
year is a relatively conservative assumption by
historical, empirical standards. Between 1984 and
1996, real rates of return on the investments of
pension funds in 8 OECD countries averaged 8% per
year (OECD, 1998, Table V.3). Nonetheless, some
commentators argue that the risk-adjusted rate of
return on defined-contribution pensions cannot
exceed the riskless interest rate (for example, Bodie,
1995). This variable, which underlies the actuarial
calculations in this report, is assumed to be 2%. Still
others point to the very high administrative costs
which have affected individual pension entitlements
in some countries as a reason why even more
conservative rate of return assumptions should be
made (see the references in Whitehouse, 2000 and
2001). On the other hand, other analysts argue that
there is an “equity premium” that delivers higher
returns than the riskless interest rate even allowing
for the costs of the risk borne. These issues have
generated a substantial literature. (See, inter alia,
Blanchard, 1993; Constantinides et al. ,  1998;
Jagannathan and Kocherlakota, 1996; and Mehra and
Prescott, 1985.)
The replacement rates shown in the charts
cover workers at four different levels of earnings.
They include all sources of retirement income, not
only those from the defined-contribution plan. The
charts below show the replacement rate under
different assumptions for the real rate of return (on
the horizontal axis).
Of all the eight countries, pension entitlements
are most sensitive to the rate of  return on
investments in Mexico. This is because the other
seven countries have substantial public pensions
(whose value, of course, does not vary with the rate
of return) whereas Mexico only has a relatively small
minimum pension. A high rate of return (6%) would
virtually double the value of Mexican pension
entitlements relative to the baseline assumption (of
3.5%) for workers on median earnings or above. Low-
income workers, however, would be entitled to the
minimum pension at all rates of return below
4.5%.Only above this level would they build up
sufficient funds in their individual accounts to
see any benefit from higher returns.
In contrast, contribution rates to private DC
schemes are the lowest of these eight countries in
Norway (2% of earnings)  and Sweden (2 .5%
individual and 2% occupational) and so these
schemes provide only a small part of the overall
pension package. The total replacement rate
therefore varies much less with the rate of return on
investments.
Total pensions in Denmark, Poland and the
Slovak Republic are more sensitive to returns than in
Norway and Sweden because contribution rates are
higher: between 9 and 11%. Increasing the rate of
return from 3.5% to 6% would increase total pensions
by around 50% in all these cases. Australia, too, has a
relatively high contribution rate of 9%. However, the
means test in the public scheme means that the
gains in DC benefits from a higher return are partly
offset by a lower public pension.
The sensitivity of the total pension entitlement
to rates of return varies significantly with individual
earnings in three countries: Australia, Denmark and
Mexico. In all three, this is because of the effect of
first-tier, public pensions. Low-income workers are
much less affected by rates of return than are
average and high earners. In Hungary, Poland and
the Slovak Republic, in contrast, workers at the
earnings levels shown are all equally affected by
differences in rates of return.
Definition and measurement
Eight OECD member countries have defined-contribution (DC) plans as part of their mandatory retirement-
income provision. Pension entitlements in DC schemes depend crucially on the rate of return earned by the
contributions when they are invested. The baseline assumption of the pension modelling is that the real return
earned by DC pensions is 3.5% per year, net of administrative charges.
Here, replacement rates are also calculated assuming lower or higher rates of return, varying between 1% and
6% a year in real terms. (These returns are deliberately symmetric around the baseline assumption.)
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Gross replacement rates by earnings and rate of return on defined-contribution pensions
Note: The vertical scale has been capped at 125% replacement rate. For low earners in Denmark, the replacement rate at the highest
investment return is 157%.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/857341456784
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Gross Pension Wealth
Pension wealth shows the size of the lump sum
that would be needed to buy a flow of pension
payments equivalent to that promised by the
mandatory pension system in each country. Taking
Japan as an example, the mandatory pension for a
man on average earnings is worth 5.7 times
individual earnings at the time of retirement. At half
average earnings the mandatory pension is worth
7.9 times individual earnings because replacement
rates are higher for low earners.
Luxembourg has the highest pension wealth at
every level of earnings. For average earners, it
is 19.3 for men and 23.5 for women. This is worth
double the average for OECD countries, which
amounts to 9.3 for men and 10.9 for women. Pension
wealth for average earners is  lowest in the
United Kingdom, closely followed by Mexico.
Exploring the results on a regional basis, gross
pension wealth for average earners is almost
identical between the EU-15 countries, the Nordic
and the Southern European countries. The regional
average ranges between 10.4 and 10.7. In the six
Anglophone OECD countries, however, pension
wealth of people on mean earnings – at an average of
6.3 times annual pay – is lower by one third than in
these other regions.
In countries with shorter life expectancies, such
as Hungary, Poland and Turkey, benefits are paid for
a shorter retirement period and so, other things
equal, the benefit level can be higher. The effect is
the reverse in Switzerland and the Nordic countries,
where life expectancies are high. Unlike measures of
replacement rates, the link between affordability and
life expectancy is captured by the pension-wealth
indicator.
The chart and the table at the bottom isolate the
effect of the different factors that determine pension
wealth. The chart on the left-hand side explores the
impact of differences in pension age. It shows,
separately for men and women, remaining life
expectancy from age 55 to age 70 along with the
annuity factor, which measures pension wealth. The
same annual pension paid to a 60-year-old is worth
17.5% more for a man and 16.1% more for a woman
than a benefit drawn at age 65.
Pension wealth also depends on the indexation
of pensions in payment. The table shows that, using
the baseline assumption of 2% real wage growth,
indexation to earnings would result in pension wealth
over 20% higher than under price indexation (which is
the most common procedure in OECD countries).
Mixed indexation – partly to wages, partly to prices –
is becoming more common (see “Key features of
pension-system design”, above). The table shows how
much higher pension wealth is with these policies
than with price indexation. The effect of more
generous indexation procedures is larger for women
than for men. This is because of women’s longer life
expectancy, of over 3½ years on average in OECD
countries, resulting in a longer expected retirement
over which to benefit from real benefit increases.
Finally, pension wealth also depends on life
expectancy. Mortality rates are expected to fall over
the coming decades, and so pension wealth
measured using today’s data would be 14.5% lower
for men and 12.1% lower for women than the
baseline, which is projected mortality rates for 2040.
Cross-country differences are also important.
Pension wealth, other things equal would be 12.3%
higher for men and 8.3% higher for women in Japan
than the average country, because of longer life
expectancy. In the opposite direction, pension
wealth would be 14% lower in Turkey than the
average across OECD countries.
Definition and measurement
Replacement rates give a first indication of the magnitude of the pension promise, but they are not comprehensive
measures, since they measure only the flow of pension benefits at the time of retirement. For a full picture, it is
necessary to take account of life expectancy, retirement ages and the indexation of pension benefits, which
together determine for how long the pension benefit must be paid and how its value evolves over time. This is
captured by pension wealth, a measure of the stock of future flows of pension benefits.
The calculation of pension wealth uses a uniform discount rate of 2% and country-specific life tables. Since the
comparisons refer to prospective pension entitlements, the calculations use mortality projections for the
year 2040.
Pension wealth is measured and expressed as a multiple of gross annual individual earnings. It is shown here
for workers with earnings of 0.5, 1 and 2 times the average, separately for men and women.
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Gross pension wealth by sex and earnings
Multiple of individual annual gross earnings
Men Women
0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2
Australia 12.5 7.3 4.6 14.6 8.4 5.4
Austria 12.2 11.7 8.1 14.2 13.5 9.4
Belgium 8.8 6.2 3.6 10.2 7.2 4.2
Canada 11.5 6.7 3.4 13.4 7.8 4.0
Czech Republic 13.0 8.1 4.8 15.3 9.5 5.6
Denmark 19.5 11.9 8.7 22.3 13.6 9.9
Finland 11.2 10.0 10.0 13.2 11.8 11.8
France 11.5 9.2 8.0 13.2 10.6 9.3
Germany 7.2 7.2 5.5 8.6 8.6 6.5
Greece 14.3 14.3 14.3 16.6 16.6 16.6
Hungary 12.4 12.4 12.4 15.4 15.4 15.4
Iceland 17.7 11.8 11.0 20.0 13.3 12.3
Ireland 11.5 5.8 2.9 13.7 6.9 3.4
Italy 10.0 10.0 9.9 10.7 10.7 10.6
Japan 7.9 5.7 4.5 8.9 6.4 5.1
Korea 13.9 9.3 6.3 16.6 11.1 7.5
Luxembourg 21.8 19.3 18 26.6 23.5 22.0
Mexico 7.0 4.8 4.5 8.5 4.8 4.5
Netherlands 14.9 15.1 15.2 17.4 17.7 17.8
New Zealand 14.7 7.4 3.7 17.3 8.6 4.3
Norway 11.5 10.2 7.3 13.4 11.3 8.5
Poland 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.9 8.6 8.6
Portugal 10.5 7.9 7.7 12.3 9.2 9.0
Slovak Republic 8.8 8.8 8.8 10.7 10.7 10.7
Spain 12.2 12.2 10.1 14.3 14.3 11.8
Sweden 12.6 10.0 10.5 14.4 11.4 12.0
Switzerland 10.7 9.8 5.1 13.1 12.0 6.3
Turkey 9.2 9.2 9.2 10.7 10.7 10.7
United Kingdom 8.0 4.6 2.5 9.1 5.3 2.9
United States 7.9 5.9 4.6 9.2 6.8 5.3
OECD average 11.8 9.4 7.8 13.7 10.9 9.0
Source: OECD pension models.
Annuity factors and life expectancy 
by sex and age
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/270401783055
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Sensitivity of pension wealth to indexation 
procedure and life expectancy
Indexation Prices Wages 80p/20w 67p/33w 50p/50w
Men 0 +21.7% +3.9% +6.5% +10.1%
Women 0 +24.5% +4.3% +7.3% +11.3%
Mortality rates 2002 2020 2040 Japan Turkey
Men –14.5% –7.2% 0 +12.3% –14.4%
Women –12.1% –5.1% 0 +8.3% –14.1%
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Net Pension Wealth
Net pension wealth shows the size of the lump
sum that would be needed to buy the flow of pension
payments, net of personal income taxes and social
security contributions, promised by the mandatory
pension system in each country. The charts compare
gross and net pension wealth for men and women
respectively. In countries that lie on the 45-degree
line, gross and net pension wealth are the same
because there are no taxes due on pension income.
Beginning with average earners, pension wealth
is the same net and gross in eight countries. In the
Slovak Republic and Turkey, this is because pensions
are not subject to tax. In Australia, Canada, the
Czech Republic, Ireland, Mexico and Portugal, this is
because mandatory replacement rates are low
relative to other OECD countries. Workers on average
earnings will not build up sufficient mandatory
pension entitlement to be taxed in retirement, due to
basic income-tax reliefs and the exemption of
pension income from social security contributions.
However, high earners in Australia and Portugal will
be entitled to some taxable mandatory pension and
so net pension wealth is lower than gross for people
with double average earnings.
In some cases, countries’ rankings of pension
wealth changes significantly when measured on a
net basis. For example, the Czech Republic has the
12th highest net pension wealth for an average
earner compared with the 19th highest measured on
a gross basis.
While in eight countries average earners will
not be liable for taxes and contributions on their
retirement incomes, in others – especially the five
Nordic countries, but also Austria – retirees are likely
to have a substantial tax burden. In part, this reflects
the high level of the gross replacement rate from the
mandatory system but also high general levels of
taxation in the Nordic countries. Thus, countries
that rely heavily on income taxation rank lower in
net pension wealth than they do in gross terms.
Finland and Sweden, for example, fall from joint 9th
in the ranking of gross pension wealth for average
earners to positions 18 and 20, respectively, for net
pension wealth for men. Measured on a gross basis,
pension wealth is 70% higher in the five Nordic
countries than in the six Anglophone countries.
However, comparing net pension wealth, the
difference is just 30%.
At the top and the bottom of the ranking for
average earners, however, there are no changes.
Luxembourg again has the highest net pension
wealth at every level of earnings. For men, net
pension wealth for average earners is lowest in the
United Kingdom, followed by Mexico, at less than
five times annual individual earnings. However, the
position of the two countries is reversed for women,
with Mexico having the lowest.
Turning to low earners, the OECD average net
pension wealth is lower than gross wealth by
0.9 times annual individual earnings. This reflects
the fact that low earners will be liable for income tax
on their mandatory pensions in ten OECD countries.
In Germany and Greece, such workers would only
pay social security contributions on their pension
income while, in seven countries, low-income
pensioners would pay both taxes and contributions.
For average earners, the differential between gross
and net pension wealth is slightly higher: 1.3 times
annual individual earnings and higher still – 1.6 – for
men on double average earnings. The average
proport ion  of  pension paid  in  taxes  and
contributions is 6.6% for low earners (50% of mean)
compared with 11.6% for average earners and 16.4%
for high earners (200% of mean).
Definition and measurement
Net pension wealth is the present value of the flow of pension benefits, taking account of the taxes and social
security contributions that retirees have to pay on their pensions. It is measured and expressed as a multiple of
gross annual individual earnings in the respective country. The reason for using gross earnings as the comparator
is to isolate the effects of taxes and contribution paid in retirement from those paid when working. This definition
means that gross and net pension wealth are the same where people are not liable for contributions and income
taxes on their pensions.
Net pension wealth is shown for workers with pay of 0.5, 1 and 2 times the average (mean).
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Net pension wealth by sex and earnings
Multiple of individual annual gross earnings
Men Women
0.5 1 2 0.5 1 2
Australia 12.5 7.3 4.3 14.6 8.4 5
Austria 11 9 5.7 12.8 10.4 6.6
Belgium 8.8 5.6 3.1 10.2 6.5 3.6
Canada 11.5 6.6 3.3 13.4 7.7 4.0
Czech Republic 13 8.1 4.8 15.3 9.5 5.6
Denmark 13.4 8.0 5.3 15.4 9.2 6.1
Finland 9.6 7.4 6.6 11.4 8.8 7.8
France 10.8 8.1 6.6 12.4 9.3 7.6
Germany 6.2 6.3 4.2 7.9 7.0 4.9
Greece 14.3 13.0 11.1 16.5 15.1 12.8
Hungary 12.4 10.8 8.9 15.3 13.4 11.0
Iceland 14.7 9.1 7.6 16.6 10.2 8.6
Ireland 11.5 5.8 2.9 13.7 6.9 3.4
Italy 10.0 8.4 7.4 10.7 9.4 8.2
Japan 7.2 5.3 4.0 8.2 5.9 4.5
Korea 13.7 9.1 6.0 16.3 10.8 7.1
Luxembourg 19.6 15.6 12.7 24 19.1 15.5
Mexico 7.0 4.8 4.5 8.5 4.8 4.5
Netherlands 13.5 12.3 10.5 15.8 14.3 12.3
New Zealand 12.2 6.1 3.0 14.3 7.1 3.6
Norway 10.1 8.3 5.6 11.8 9.7 6.6
Poland 7.2 7.0 6.9 7.9 7.3 7.1
Portugal 10.5 7.9 7.4 12.3 9.2 8.7
Slovak Republic 8.8 8.8 8.8 10.7 10.7 10.7
Spain 11.0 10.1 7.9 12.9 11.9 9.3
Sweden 9.5 7.2 6.8 10.9 8.2 7.8
Switzerland 10.1 8.1 4.2 12.4 9.9 5.2
Turkey 9.2 9.2 9.2 10.7 10.7 10.7
United Kingdom 7.9 4.5 2.5 9.1 5.2 2.8
United States 7.9 5.7 4.3 9.2 6.6 5.0
OECD average 10.9 8.1 6.2 12.7 9.4 7.2
Source: OECD pension models.
Gross versus net pension wealth by sex, average earner
Note: Both scales of both charts have been capped at pension wealth of 15 times individual earnings, which excludes Luxembourg and
the Netherlands from both charts and Greece and Hungary from the chart for women.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/237612383126
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Progressivity of Pension Benefit Formulae
“Pure” basic pension systems pay the same flat-
rate amount to all pensioners regardless both of their
earnings history and their other sources of income.
Such a scheme is sometimes also called a “demogrant”
or a “citizen’s pension”. The relative pension value is
independent of earnings and the replacement rate
declines with earnings. At the other end of the
spectrum of benefit design is a “pure insurance”
scheme, which aims to pay the same replacement rate
to all workers when they retire. Defined-contribution
plans conform to this pure-insurance model if the
contribution rate is a constant proportion of earnings
for all workers. The same applies to earnings-related
schemes that offer the same accrual rate regardless of
earnings, years of service or age.
These two benchmarks – pure-insurance and
pure-basic schemes – underpin an “index of
progressivity” constructed for cross-country
comparison of pension benefit formulae. The index is
designed so that a pure basic scheme would score 100%
and a pure insurance scheme zero. (This is based on
the measure of effective progression devised by
Musgrave and Thin, 1948.) The former is maximally
progressive; the latter is not progressive since the
replacement rate is constant. A high score is not
necessarily “better” than a low score or vice versa.
Countries with a high score simply have different
objectives than countries with a low score.
The first column of the table shows the results for
the Gini coefficient of gross pension benefits. The
second column shows the index of progressivity of the
benefit formula. In pure basic systems – Ireland and
New Zealand – the index is, of course, 100%. Other
countries with highly progressive pension systems are
Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, and the United
Kingdom where the index is above 65%. These
countries all have targeted or basic pensions that play a
major role in retirement-income provision.
At the other end of the scale, Finland, Hungary,
Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic and
Turkey have almost entirely proportional systems with
very limited progressivity. The index is less than 10% in
all these cases. This group includes two of the
countries with notional accounts, which were
deliberately designed to have a close link between
contributions and benefits. Other countries lie between
these two groups.
The average index across OECD countries is 36.9%.
The regional differences, however, are striking. While
the Anglophone countries show an average index
of 82.7%, meaning that their systems are strongly
progressive, Southern European countries present an
average index of only 10.2%, indicating a very strong
link between earnings and pension benefits.
To explore the extent to which inequality in
pension entitlements is explained by differences in the
benefit formula or in inequality of earnings in a
particular country, the table presents results based on
both the national and the OECD average distribution of
earnings. (The charts below show the distribution of
earnings for selected countries.) Taking the OECD
averages for the 18 countries for which data are
complete, the index of progressivity is around 37%
using both the OECD average earnings distribution
and country-specific information. There are only
significant differences in countries where the national
earnings distribution is very different from the OECD
average. For example, the Gini coefficient on earnings
in the United States is 32.7% compared with the OECD
average of 26.9% so the progressivity index is
10 percentage points higher measured using national
data. Belgium has the most equal distribution of
earnings of the 18 countries for which the OECD has
data. Its pension system is therefore less equalising
when measured using national data.
Finally, it is important to note that the index of
progressivity of pension benefit formulae measures
only the mandatory parts of the pension systems.
Some countries have extensive private occupational
and personal pension provision. Taking these into
account would make the distribution of pensioners’
incomes wider.
Definition and measurement
OECD countries’ pension systems have very different philosophies, particularly in their relative emphasis on
the insurance and redistributive roles. The strength of the link between pre-retirement earnings and post-
retirement pension entitlements is here measured by a summary indicator, the progressivity index. The index is
designed so that a pure basic scheme would score 100% and a pure insurance scheme, zero. The calculation is
based on the Gini coefficient. The higher the Gini coefficient, the more unequal is a distribution. Formally, the
index of progressivity is calculated as 100 minus the ratio of the Gini coefficient of pension entitlements divided
by the Gini coefficient of earnings (expressed as percentages). In each case, the Gini coefficients are calculated
using the earnings distribution as the weight. Calculations were carried out both with national data (where
available) and with the OECD average for the earnings distribution.
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Gini coefficients on pension entitlements and earnings
OECD average and national earnings-distribution data
OECD average distribution National earnings distribution
Pension Gini Progressivity index Pension Gini Progressivity index Gini wage
Australia 7.3 73.1 7.4 72.8 27.1
Austria 18.9 30.4
Belgium 11.2 58.8 9.9 54.1 20.7
Canada 3.7 86.6
Czech Republic 8.7 68.0 8.7 66.6 25.5
Denmark 11.1 59.3
Finland 25.1 7.6 22.4 6.7 23.6
France 20.5 24.6
Germany 20.0 26.7 19.5 25.7 26.3
Greece 26.5 2.6
Hungary 26.9 1.3 33.4 0.6 33.5
Iceland 18.0 33.9
Ireland 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 29.2
Italy 26.4 3.1 22.8 3.7 23.1
Japan 14.4 46.9 14.4 45.6 26.4
Korea 12.3 54.8 14.2 51.9 29.3
Luxembourg 22.2 18.6
Mexico 19.0 30.3
Netherlands 26.9 0.0 25.9 0.0 25.1
New Zealand 0.0 100.0 27.7
Norway 17.1 37.4 13.9 36.9 21.2
Poland 25.4 6.5 28.8 5.6 30.2
Portugal 22.1 18.8
Slovak Republic 26.5 2.7
Spain 22.1 18.8 25.8 16.9 30.8
Sweden 23.7 12.9 20.7 10.2 22.7
Switzerland 12.7 53.3
Turkey 25.1 7.8
United Kingdom 5.1 81.1 5.1 82.3 28.9
United States 16.1 40.9 16.1 51.0 32.7
OECD average 17.2 36.9
OECD 18 17.0 37.5 17.0 37.1 26.9
Note: OECD 18 refers to the 18 countries for which national earnings-distribution data are available.
Source: OECD pension models; OECD earnings-distribution database.
Distribution of earnings: OECD average and selected countries
Source: OECD earnings-distribution database.
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Pension-earnings Link
The chart shows relative pension levels in OECD
member countries on the vertical axis and individual
pre-retirement earnings on the horizontal. Countries
have been grouped by the degree to which pension
benefits are related (or not) to individual pre-
retirement earnings. The grouping is based on the
value of the Gini coefficient of the distribution of
pension levels across the earnings range weighted by
the OECD average distribution of earnings. The
calculation method and results are set out in the
previous section on the progressivity of pension
benefit formulae.
In the first set of five countries (Panel A), there is
little or no link between pension entitlements and pre-
retirement earnings. In Ireland and New Zealand,
pension benefits are purely flat rate. In Canada, the
relative pension level varies little: from 37% for low
earners to 44% for those on average earnings and
above. Although Canada has an earnings-related
pension scheme, its target replacement rate is very low,
its ceiling is set at average economy-wide earnings and
a resource-tested benefit is withdrawn against
additional income from the earnings-related scheme.
In the United Kingdom, the earnings-related scheme
has a strongly progressive formula and there is also a
basic pension. In Australia, the relatively flat curve
results mainly from the means-tested public pension
programme. There is also a limit to the earnings for
which employers must contribute to the DC scheme.
At the other end of the spectrum lie five countries
with a very strong link between pension entitlements
and pre-retirement earnings (Panel F). In the
Netherlands, there is no ceiling to pensionable
earnings in the quasi-mandatory occupational
schemes. In the Slovak Republic and Italy, ceilings on
pensionable earnings are set at three times or more
average economy-wide earnings. For low-paid workers,
top-ups from the minimum pensions in are apparent
in the charts for all countries except Hungary. But apart
from this narrow earnings range, relative pension
levels increase with individual earnings in a linear way.
The five countries in Panel E have a slightly
weaker link between individual pre-retirement
earnings and pensions than those in Panel F. This is
due to safety-net benefits for low earners.
The remaining half of OECD countries represents
intermediate cases (between those with little or no
link between individual earnings and pensions and
those with a strong or very strong link). The ten
countries in Panels B and C exhibit stronger links
between pensions and pre-retirement earnings than
the first group of countries, but their pension systems
have much more progressive formulae than those of
the five countries shown in Panel F. In the Czech
Republic, Norway and the United States this
redistribution to low earners is primarily the result of
a progressive benefit formula that replaces a larger
share of pre-retirement income for poorer workers
than for average and higher-income earners. In
Iceland, this is done through targeted retirement-
income programmes. Denmark has significant basic
and targeted schemes.
Panel D shows five countries that lie towards
the middle of the OECD countries in terms of the link
between pension entitlements and pre-retirement
earnings. France and Portugal have redistributive
pension programmes – minimum and targeted
schemes – at lower-income ranges and strong
earnings-benefit links at higher income levels. In
Germany, there is no minimum pension but poor
retirees are eligible for benefits from the general
social assistance programme.
Definition and measurement
The strength of the link between pension entitlements and individual earnings is measured using the relative
pension level, that is, the gross individual pension divided by gross economy-wide average earnings (rather than by
individual earnings as in the replacement-rate results). It is best seen as an indicator of pension adequacy, since it
shows the benefit level that a pensioner will receive in relation to average earnings in the respective country. Individual
replacement rates may be quite high, but the pensioner may still receive only a small fraction of economy-wide
average earnings. If, for example, a low-income worker – who earned only 50% of economy-wide average earnings –
has a replacement rate of 100%, the benefit will only amount to 50% of economy-wide average earnings. For an average
earner, the replacement rate and the relative pension level will be the same.
The relative pension levels are used here to illustrate the link between individual pre-retirement earnings and
pension benefits in each country. They are shown for individual earnings from 0.5 to 2 times average (mean) earnings
levels.
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The link between pre-retirement earnings and pension entitlements
Gross pension entitlement as a proportion of economy-wide average earnings
Source: OECD pension models.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/852105726472
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Weighted Averages: 
Pension Levels and Pension Wealth
The measure of weighted average pension level
combines the earnings distribution with the
projections of pension entitlements. The relative
pension level is averaged over individuals across the
earnings range using the earnings-distribution weights
(see the charts in the indicator on “Progressivity of
pension benefit formulae”). The result is the weighted
average of the pension entitlement expressed as a
percentage of economy-wide average earnings.
This indicator is presented in the first column of
the table. The average level across the OECD
countries is 57.5%. Again, there are vast differences
between countries. Seven countries’ mandatory
systems deliver an average pension of less than 40%
of average earnings. These are Belgium, Germany,
Ireland, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. Greece and Luxembourg are found at the
other end of the spectrum. The weighted average
pension levels in these countries are 95% and 87%,
respectively. A further five countries have an average
pension level above 75%: Denmark, Hungary, Iceland,
the Netherlands and Spain. Next, with pension levels
in the low seventies, are Austria and Turkey.
The same weighting can also be applied to the
pension wealth measure. The second and third
columns of the table show the weighted average of
pension wealth, separately for men and women.
Given that women’s life expectancy is higher than
men’s, women’s pension wealth is relatively higher
in all countries. The final column of the table also
gives the figures for average pension wealth in
US dollars, based on average market exchange rates
for 2004.
Luxembourg, not surprisingly, has the highest
pension wealth, which averages almost 19 times
average earnings for men and 23 times for women.
This is worth USD 920 000 for men and over
USD 1.1 million for women. The averages across
OECD countries are 9.2 times average earnings for
men and 10.7 for women. The Netherlands and
Greece rank second and third. Denmark, Hungary,
Iceland and Spain are closely clustered with pension
wealth of 11-12 times average earnings.
Average pension wealth is over half a million
US dollars in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway.
On this comprehensive measure, the most modest
pension systems are those of Belgium, Ireland,
Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United
States where pension wealth is less than six times
average earnings. This is around two-thirds of the
average for OECD countries.
The systems of countries with short life
expectancies – such as Poland and Turkey – have
more modest values for pension wealth at 8.2 and
9.1, respectively. Despite its relatively high weighted
average pension level, Turkey has a lower pension
promise given that life expectancy is low compared
with other OECD countries. Pension wealth is in turn
higher in countries such as France and Hungary
because of earlier retirement ages than is the norm
for OECD countries. In France, for example, the
weighted average pension level is significantly lower
than the OECD average while pension wealth is
around the average;  this  is  the result  of  a
combination of a low pension age and high life
expectancy.
Definition and measurement
Building on the results for replacement rates and pension levels across the range of individual earnings, it is
possible to develop composite indicators of countries’ pension systems that aggregate the results for workers at
different earnings levels. The indicators are the weighted average pension level and the weighted average pension
wealth. The indicators build on the calculations of pension entitlements for people earning between 0.3 and
3 times the economy-wide average (a larger range than shown in the results tables).
Each level of individual earnings is given a weight based on its importance in the distribution of earnings. The
calculations use the average distribution of earnings based on data for 18 OECD countries. The earnings
distribution is skewed. The mode (or peak) of the distribution is at around two-thirds of mean earnings. The
median (the earnings level both below and above which half of employees are situated) is typically
between 80 and 85% of mean earnings. Two-thirds of people earn less than mean earnings. Thus, there are many
people with low earnings, and fewer with high earnings, so low earners are given a larger weight in the calculation
of the indicator than high earners.
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Weighted average pension level and pension wealth
Pension level as a percentage of economy-wide average earnings, pension wealth as a multiple of economy-wide average 
earnings and in US dollars
Average pension level Average pension wealth Average pension wealth (USD)
Men Men Women Men Women
Australia 42.9 7.2 8.4 259 000 302 000
Austria 72.8 10.6 12.4 433 000 551 000
Belgium 36.7 5.6 6.5 248 000 318 000
Canada 41.6 6.4 7.4 192 000 233 000
Czech Republic 46.7 7.7 9.1 63 000 77 000
Denmark 76.8 12.1 13.9 640 000 719 000
Finland 64.1 10.1 12.0 396 000 462 000
France 50.1 9.0 10.4 330 000 389 000
Germany 36.9 6.7 8.0 342 000 439 000
Greece 95.1 14.2 16.6 306 000 358 000
Hungary 76.5 12.4 15.4 104 000 129 000
Iceland 81.0 12.5 14.1 493 000 525 000
Ireland 32.5 5.8 6.9 217 000 259 000
Italy 67.7 9.9 10.8 271 000 293 000
Japan 33.5 5.5 6.3 251 000 293 000
Korea 63.8 8.9 10.7 213 000 265 000
Luxembourg 86.7 18.9 23.3 920 000 1 144 000
Mexico 37.3 5.0 5.3 34 000 32 000
Netherlands 81.8 15.1 17.8 695 000 814 000
New Zealand 39.7 7.4 8.6 193 000 225 000
Norway 54.0 9.3 11.0 505 000 581 000
Poland 60.1 8.2 8.6 66 000 69 000
Portugal 55.4 8.1 9.5 131 000 148 000
Slovak Republic 56.5 8.8 10.8 55 000 67 000
Spain 75.6 11.3 13.4 278 000 352 000
Sweden 66.3 10.6 12.2 434 000 467 000
Switzerland 49.4 8.3 10.3 472 000 682 000
Turkey 72.0 9.1 10.8  89 080 105 000
United Kingdom 30.0 4.5 5.2 224 000 264 000
United States 40.2 5.7 6.7 173 000 206 000
OECD average 57.5 9.2 10.7 301 000 359 000
Source: OECD pension models; OECD earnings-distribution database.
Weighted averages compared: pension levels versus pension wealth by sex
Source: OECD pension models; OECD earnings-distribution database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/810503277546
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Structure of the Pension Package
Thirteen countries have basic pension schemes,
but their importance in terms of the resource
transfer to older people varies substantially. In
Ireland and New Zealand, there is only a basic
pension; thus, its share is 100%. In Korea and in the
United Kingdom, the basic pension makes up around
one half of the total resource transfer to pensioners.
Basic pensions in Japan and in the Netherlands make
up around 40% of the transfer, while in Canada,
Denmark and Norway, they contribute about one
third to the total pension promise.
Resource-tested programmes also vary hugely
in importance. Australia stands out as the only
country where this type of benefit makes up almost
half of the total pension package. The public pension
in Australia is means-tested but the parameters of
the means test currently result in well over half of
older people receiving some public pension.
Resource-tested benefits are also significant in
Canada, Denmark and Iceland. For the United
Kingdom, resource-tested benefits play a very
important role in providing today’s older people’s
incomes. In the long term, however, this will
diminish because of the shift to a more progressive
formula in the public, earnings-related scheme (as
shown by the size of the minimum pension, which
derives from minimum credits under this plan). Also,
the modelling assumes that the basic pension will
increase in future in line with earnings. If the basic
pension were price-indexed, then much of its role
would be taken up by resource-tested benefits
instead.
The two countries with the largest role for
minimum pensions – Belgium and the United
Kingdom – both have minimum credits. Only in
Mexico, Portugal and Sweden are minimum pensions
expected to provide a significant part of the overall
pension package.
It is important to remember that these results
are based on the case of full-career workers. All of
the first-tier programmes – basic, resource-tested
and minimum pensions – will be much more
important for people with incomplete contribution
histories. However, it is very difficult to obtain
information on the distribution of past contribution
histories let alone predict these weights into the
future.
The upper chart shows the overall balance
between first- and second-tier schemes in the overall
retirement-income package. In Ireland and New
Zealand, there are no second-tier, mandatory
pensions and in the United Kingdom, most of the
earnings-related plan goes into providing benefits
related to the minimum credit. At the other end of
the spectrum, the second tier provides 99% or more
of pensions for full-career workers in ten countries.
In some of these – such as Austria, Italy, Poland,
Spain and Turkey – this reflects the high replacement
rate target of the second tier. In others, such as
Switzerland and the United States, the pension
benefit formula of the public scheme is progressive,
meaning that much of the redistributive work done
by the first tier in other countries is carried out by
second-tier plans.
Within the second tier, there are defined-
contribution (DC) plans in eight countries. These
predominate in the resource transfer to older people
in Mexico and are half or more of the total in
Australia, Poland and the Slovak Republic. All other
plans are earnings-related, either defined-benefit
(DB), notional accounts or points systems.
The lower chart shows the balance between
public and private provision of mandatory pensions
for full-career workers, including both first and
second tiers. In the 11 countries where the private
sector is involved in the mandatory pension system,
the private sector on average provides 51% of the
retirement-income package. This ranges from 11% in
Norway to 84% in Mexico. In other countries, of
course, voluntary private pensions play an important
role (see the special chapter on private pensions in
Part II).
Definition and measurement
The structure of the pension package is illustrated by using the indicator of weighted average pension wealth
presented immediately above. The weights are based on the distribution of earnings. The contribution that each
component of the system makes to the potential resource transfer to pensioners from mandatory programmes is
calculated as the weighted average pension wealth from each source.
The contribution of each pension system component to the pension promise as a percentage of the total. Since
the weighted average pension wealth in some countries does not include all components (e.g. resource-tested
programmes often do not enter into this measure as in most countries full-career workers are not eligible for
these benefits), the cells for these components remain empty.
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Balance between first-tier, redistributive 
programmes and second-tier, insurance schemes
Percentage of weighted average pension wealth
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/313333516308
Balance between public and private provision 
of mandatory pensions 
Percentage of weighted average pension wealth
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/758801064205
Structure of the pension package
Percentage contribution of components of the pension system 
to weighted average pension wealth
First tier Second tier
TotalResource
-tested
Basic Minimum Public
Private 
DB
Private 
DC
Australia 45.8 54.2 100.0
Austria 100.0 100.0
Belgium 5.41 94.6 100.0
Canada 16.5 34.5 49.0 100.0
Czech Republic 17.2 82.8 100.0
Denmark 12.5 31.5 56.02 100.0
Finland 1.5 98.5 100.0
France 1.3 1.9 96.83 100.0
Germany 1.1 98.9 100.0
Greece 0.1 99.94 100.0
Hungary 65.9 34.1 100.0
Iceland 5.7 13.3 81 100.0
Ireland 100 100.0
Italy 0.1 99.9 100.0
Japan 40.2 59.8 100.0
Korea 51.95 48.1 100.0
Luxembourg 13.36 0.1 86.6 100.0
Mexico 11.87 4.3 83.9 100.0
Netherlands 38.2 61.8 100.0
New Zealand 100 100.0
Norway 30.1 0.4 58.5 11.1 100.0
Poland 0.3 48.8 50.9 100.0
Portugal 3.5 96.5 100.0
Slovak Republic 0.2 45.3 54.5 100.0
Spain 0.2 99.8 100.0
Sweden 4.7 49.0 26.4 19.98 100.0
Switzerland 0.1 68.4 31.5 100.0
Turkey 0.8 99.2 100.0
United Kingdom 0.5 50.8 33.89 15.0 100.0
United States 100.0 100.0
OECD 2.8 1.9 17.8 58.7 6.7 12.2 100.0
1. Belgium: includes both minimum pension and minimum credits.
2. Denmark: private DC plans include both quasi-mandatory
occupational (51.0%) and the special pension (5.0%).
3. France: public pensions include both the state scheme (59.3%) and
the complementary, occupational scheme (37.5%).
4. Greece: public pension is made up of the main (73.0%) and the
supplementary components (26.9%).
5. Korea: basic component represents the part of the public pension
based on average rather than individual earnings.
6. Luxembourg: basic pension also includes the end-of-the-year
allowance.
7. Mexico: basic component calculated from the flat-rate
government contribution to DC accounts of 5.5% the real
minimum wage from 1997.
8. Sweden: private DC includes both the mandatory premium
pension (11.2%) and the occupational DC scheme (8.7%).
9. United Kingdom: minimum pension relates to minimum credits
in public, earnings-related scheme.
Source: OECD pension models.
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PART II 
Pension Reforms 
and Private Pensions
This part presents two special chapters on pension reforms and private pensions.
Both chapters use the OECD pension models to explore more deeply the central
issues of pension policy in national debates.
The framework of Pensions at a Glance is forward-looking, focusing on future
pension entitlements of today’s workers. However, the past decade has seen intense
reform activity in the world of pensions and retirement in many OECD countries.
The first special chapter looks at what countries did and how this is likely to affect
future benefits.
A number of these reforms have increased the role of the private sector in pension
provision. The second special chapter identifies the complex range of private
retirement arrangements and quantifies the savings effort necessary to maintain
standards of living in retirement.
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1. A Decade of Pension Reforms: 
The Impact on Future Benefits
In the past decade, around half of OECD countries have either undertaken far-reaching
reforms that have changed the structure of their pension systems or adopted a series of
smaller reforms which, taken together, often also have had a substantial impact on future
pension entitlements.
This special chapter discusses the most important pension reforms that took place in
OECD countries since the early 1990s. It starts with an overview of the types of reform
measures taken. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of these reforms on pension
entitlements. The effect is measured, using the OECD pension models, by comparing standard
indicators of pension systems. There have been numerous studies of the effect of pension
reform on the public finances,1 but only a few have explicitly considered the social impact of
changing retirement-income regimes, on equity and the distribution of income, for example.2
Four key impacts of pension reforms are explored. The first is the financial impact: how
much smaller will future benefits be for workers entering the labour market today
compared with earlier generations? The second is the distributional impact of reform: how
will different groups be affected by pension reforms? The third looks at the structure of
pension systems: how has responsibility for pension provision been rebalanced between
public and private sectors? A fourth motive for pension reform has been to raise work
incentives, i.e. encourage people to work longer.
1.1. Overview of pension reforms in OECD countries
Table II.1.1 summarises the elements of major reforms to retirement income systems
since 1990, with five main categories of change identified. Some 17 OECD countries had
major reforms that affected the entitlements of the standard, full-career worker over this
period. In the other 13 countries, changes were less significant in their impact: for
example, changing pension ages only for women or adjusting benefits for early or late
retirement alone. The empirical results in Section 1.2 below look at 16 of the 17 countries
with substantial changes. The only major reform not analysed is the introduction of
mandatory defined-contribution (DC) pensions in Australia.3
Increasing pension eligibility age
Most OECD countries now have a standard retirement age of 65 years for men. In
Iceland, Norway and the United States, the pension eligibility age is either already 67 or it
is being increased to this age. Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom are in the
process of legislating increases. France is the member country with the lowest pension
eligibility age: 60 years.
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Several countries, including Australia, Belgium, Portugal and the United Kingdom, will
equalise retirement ages for men with those of women. Following reforms, only Italy,
Mexico, Poland and Switzerland currently plan to have different pension ages for women
than men in the long term. In the Czech Republic, the retirement age for women depends
on the number of children.
Increases in pension age that affect both men and women are being implemented in
the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea and the United States.
Increasing pension eligibility ages will improve financial sustainability and retirement
incentives. However, there may be a social cost to such reforms if they penalise those who are
forced to retire early through no fault of their own.
Increasing the reward for continuing in work
Penalties for early retirement or increases in the number of years of contributions
required to receive a full pension have been introduced or increased in many countries, as
described in Live Longer, Work Longer (OECD, 2006b). Similarly, others have introduced or
increased the increments or bonuses paid to people retiring after the normal pension age.
The measures aim to reduce early pension benefits by an amount that corresponds both to
the lower amount of contributions paid by the worker and to the increase in the period over
which the worker will receive pension payments (see Whitehouse, 2007a; Queisser and
Whitehouse, 2006).
In Australia, a new lump-sum bonus was introduced as an incentive for older workers
to remain in the labour force for a longer time. In Finland, older workers are given higher
accrual rates while in Hungary the previously higher accrual rates for younger workers
were reduced to a uniform level for all workers. Austria, France, Germany, Portugal and the
United States all changed the benefit reductions and increments for early and late
retirement, respectively. In the United Kingdom, the public pension now offers a larger
increase for workers who stay in work beyond the standard retirement age.
These measures to improve retirement incentives should increase financial sustainability.
By improving equity between workers who retire at different ages, the social and
distributional effect can also be positive.
Changes in the way earnings are measured to calculate benefits
Many earnings-related schemes used to calculate benefits with respect to only a few
years of final or best earnings. Seven OECD countries have extended the period over which
earnings are measured since 1990. France is moving from the best 10 years to the best
25 years in the public scheme. Austria is gradually extending the averaging period from
the 15 to the 40 best years. Finland, Poland, Portugal and Sweden are all moving to a
lifetime average earnings measure. The largest change happened in the Slovak Republic
where the earnings measure used to be the best five in the final 10 years of earnings; it will
now be lifetime average earnings. As a result of these reforms, most OECD countries –
17 out of the 22 with the relevant kinds of scheme – now use a lifetime earnings measure
or a close proxy for it.
The impact of changes in the earnings measure on pension benefits depends on how
much earnings rise over the career of a worker (see below). If earnings stay stable over the
whole career, changes in the earnings measure will not affect entitlements. But for workers
with steeply rising earnings, the impact can be substantial.
II.1. A DECADE OF PENSION REFORMS: THE IMPACT ON FUTURE BENEFITS
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007 57
Extending the period over which earnings are measured will tend to cut pension
benefits. The average of the best years or final earnings is usually higher than the average
over the lifetime because the latter also takes earlier years with lower earnings into
account. Such reform will improve financial sustainability.
The social effects of such changes are more complex. Individuals who are most affected
are those whose earnings rise more steeply with age. These people tend to be higher paid
workers and, usually, men. Low-skilled workers typically have flatter real age-earnings
profiles, as do women (OECD, 2006b, Figure 3.4).
Changing the valorisation of past earnings
In all earnings-related public pension systems of OECD countries, past earnings are re-
valued to take account of changes in living standards between the time pension rights
accrued and the time they are claimed. This process is here called “valorisation” although
it is also known as pre-retirement indexation.
The majority of OECD countries with earnings-related schemes valorise past earnings
in line with economy-wide wage growth. However, several OECD countries have moved
away from earnings valorisation in recent years. For example, France moved to price
valorisation in the public scheme as early as 1985 and in the occupational schemes in 1996.
Finland, Poland and Portugal valorise past earnings with a mix of wage and price growth;
recent reforms have changed the weights of price and earnings inflation in the valorisation
formula used in Finland and Poland.
Valorisation of past earnings has a large effect on the value of pension benefits. A
generic example illustrates the impact of changes in valorisation policy: average real wage
growth of 2% and price inflation of 2.5% is assumed, implying a 4.5% annual increase in
nominal earnings. For a full-career worker, i.e., someone working from age 20 to 65,
valorising past earnings with prices results in a pension benefit on retirement that is 40%
lower than a pension resulting from valorisation in line with economy-wide average
earnings. This is due to the “compound-interest” effect: when their past earnings are re-
valued workers lose out each year of their career compared to the evolution of their wages.
Again, financial sustainability is improved by a move to a less generous valorisation
procedure. The social effects are the opposite of those arising from the extension of the
period over which earnings are measured to calculate benefits (see above). People with
steeper age-earnings profiles will tend to lose less from a shift to prices valorisation than
those with relatively constant real earnings. This is because prices valorisation puts a
lower weight on earlier years’ earnings (which are less important for a worker with a steep
age-earnings profile) than does earnings valorisation.
Linking pensions to higher life expectancy
Systemic reforms that established defined-contribution (DC) schemes or mechanisms
that adjust benefits or the pension age to increasing life expectancy have been proposed or
implemented in around half of OECD countries (see Whitehouse, 2007b).
DC schemes – whether they are funded or notional – automatically adjust benefits to
life expectancy. Pension capital is accumulated in an individual account and needs to be
transformed into a regular pension payment, an annuity, at retirement. Annuity benefits
will be lower, the higher life expectancy is at the time of retirement because of the longer
expected duration of the pension payment. Since the late 1990s, Hungary, Poland, the
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58 Table II.1.1. Reforms to national retirement income systems since 1990 in OECD countries
Pension eligibility age Adjusted retirement incentives
Change of years in benefit formula 
or qualifying conditions
Link to life expectancy 
and/or financial sustainability
Defined contribution scheme Other
Australia Pension age for women rising 
from 60 to 65.
Increase from 55 to 60 in age 
to access private pensions. 
New lump-sum bonus for 
deferring public pension.
Through annuity calculation 
in DC scheme.
Mandatory DC scheme introduced 
in addition to public pension. 
Lower withdrawal rate for income 
test in the public pension.
Austria Early retirement age increased 
by 1.5 years.
Pension corridor between 62 
and 65.
Pension ages for women aligned 
with those of men. 
Benefit reduction for early 
retirement introduced and set to 
increase. Tighter access to early 
retirement. 
Best 15 years to 40 years. Introduction of sustainability 
factor under discussion.
Reduction in accrual rate. Less 
generous indexation for higher 
pensions. 
Belgium Pension age for women aligned 
with that for men. 
Pension bonus for workers above 
age 62
Different accounting for work 
and credit periods
Fiscal incentive to take-up private 
pensions only at standard pension 
age.
Contribution condition for early 
retirement at 60 tightened. 
Canada Pre-funding of earnings-related 
plan.
Czech Republic Phased increase in normal 
pension age to 63. 
Changes in increments and 
reductions for early/late 
retirement.
Denmark Phased increase in normal 
pension age from 65 to 67.
Normal pension age linked to life 
expectancy.
Finland Increased accrual rate for people 
working age 63-67. 
10 last years to lifetime average. Life-expectancy multiplier 
(from 2010).
Basic part of national pension 
income-tested. Higher 
valorisation of past earnings and 
lower indexation of pensions 
in payment. 
France Changes in adjustment to benefits 
for early/late retirement in public 
and occupational pensions. 
Minimum contribution period 
increased. Earnings measure 
in public scheme from 
best 10 to best 25 years. 
Minimum contribution period 
to increase further with changes 
in life expectancy.
Targeted minimum income 
of 85% of minimum wage. 
Valorisation now effectively 
to prices in both plans.
Germany Reduction in benefits for 
retirement before 65. 
Valorisation and indexation cut 
back as system dependency ratio 
worsens.
Voluntary DC pensions with tax 
privileges. 
Phased abolition of favourable tax 
treatment of pension income. 
Greece Pension age rising from 58 to 65. 
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Hungary Gradual increase in pension 
age from 55 for women and 60 
for men to 62 for both.
Accrual rates linear rather than 
higher for earlier years.
Pension calculation based on gross 
rather than net earnings. 
Through annuity calculation in DC 
scheme.
DC scheme: mandatory for new 
entrants, voluntary for existing 
workers. 
Minimum pension to be 
abolished. Less generous 
Indexation of pensions in 
payment. Pensions subject 
to income tax. 
Iceland No significant changes since 1990
Ireland Incentives for voluntary 
retirement savings.
Pre-funding of public pensions. 
Increase in basic pension.
Italy Normal pension age for men 
increased from 60 to 65 and 
for women from 55 to 60. Early 
pension age for men with 
35 years’ coverage increases 
from 60 to 62.
Adjustment to early-retirement 
benefits through notional annuity 
calculation.
Qualification years for long-
service pension increased 
from 37 to 40 years.
Through notional annuity 
calculation.
From DB to notional accounts. 
Less generous indexation 
of higher pensions. 
Japan Pension age increasing from 60 
to 65. 
Pensionable earnings extended 
to include bonuses. 
Benefits adjusted to reflect 
expected change in dependency 
ratio. 
Accrual rate reduced. 
Korea Pension age rising from 60 to 65. 
Luxembourg No significant changes since 1990
Mexico Mandatory private DC scheme 
replaces public, DB plan. 
Netherlands Planned abolition of early 
retirement programme.
Shift from final to average lifetime 
salary in many occupational plans. 
New Zealand Pension age increased from 60 to 
65. 
Voluntary DC pensions with 
auto-enrolment and incentives. 
Pre-funding of public pension.
Norway Mandatory employer 
DC contributions.
Pre-funding of public pensions.
Poland Withdrawal of early retirement for 
certain groups of workers. 
From best consecutive 10 in final 
20 years to lifetime average. 
Through notional annuity 
calculation in public scheme 
and annuity calculation in DC. 
DC scheme mandatory for new 
entrants and workers under 30.
Abolition of basic pension.
From DB to notional accounts. 
Portugal Pensionable age for women 
aligned with that for men at 65.
Introduction of increments 
for late retirement and reductions 
for early retirement. 
From best 10 out of last 15 years 
to lifetime average earnings
Life-expectancy adjustment 
to benefits. 
Less generous indexation 
of higher pensions. 
Slovak Republic Increase in pension ages to 62 
for men and women. 
From best 5 in final 10 years to 
lifetime average earnings. 
Through annuity calculation in DC 
scheme.
DC scheme mandatory for new 
entrants and voluntary for existing 
workers.
From DB to points system. 
Spain Introduction of small increment 
for late retirement. 
Table II.1.1. Reforms to national retirement income systems since 1990 in OECD countries (cont.)
Pension eligibility age Adjusted retirement incentives
Change of years in benefit formula 
or qualifying conditions
Link to life expectancy 
and/or financial sustainability
Defined contribution scheme Other
II.1.
A
 D
EC
A
D
E O
F PEN
SIO
N
 R
EFO
R
M
S: T
H
E
IM
PA
C
T
 O
N
 FU
T
U
R
E B
EN
EFIT
S
PEN
S
IO
N
S
 A
T
 A
 G
LA
N
C
E: PU
B
LIC
 PO
LIC
IES
 A
C
R
O
SS O
EC
D
 C
O
U
N
T
R
IES
 – 2007 ED
IT
IO
N
 – ISB
N
 978-92-64-03214-9 – ©
 O
EC
D
 2007
60
Sweden Best 15 years to lifetime average 
(public, earnings-related scheme).
Through calculation of notional 
annuity and annuity in 
DC schemes. Additional 
sustainability adjustment 
in notional accounts. 
DC scheme mandatory for nearly 
all workers. Occupational plans 
switch from DB to DC.
From DB to notional accounts. 
Abolition of income-tax 
concessions for pensioners. 
Switzerland Pension age for women increased 
from 62 to 64. 
Reduction in required interest rate 
and annuity rate in mandatory 
occupational plans.
Turkey Pension age to increase to 65. Reduced accrual rate.
United Kingdom Women’s pension age and 
eligibility for guarantee credit 
rising from 60 to 65
Increment for deferring pension 
claim increased. Lump-sum 
option added.
Employers required to provide 
access to DC (“stakeholder”) 
pension. 
Increase in basic pension. 
Extension of means-tested 
supplements. Increased 
progressivity of earnings-related 
pension.
United States Increase in full pension age 
from 65 to 67.
Changes in adjustment for early/
late retirement. 
Source: Whiteford and Whitehouse (2006); national authorities. 
Table II.1.1. Reforms to national retirement income systems since 1990 in OECD countries (cont.)
Pension eligibility age Adjusted retirement incentives
Change of years in benefit formula 
or qualifying conditions
Link to life expectancy 
and/or financial sustainability
Defined contribution scheme Other
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Slovak Republic and Sweden have introduced funded DC plans as a substitute for part of
their public DB pension schemes. Australia’s DC plan was added in 1992 to the existing
means-tested public pension. In Mexico, the old public pension was entirely replaced by
DC plans, starting in 1997. Italy, Poland and Sweden, on the other hand, introduced
notional accounts schemes. All of these countries thus have systems which at least in one
or some components adjust to life expectancy.
Germany will adjust benefits in the points system to reflect the financial sustainability
of the pension system. If life-expectancy increases, ceteris paribus, the number of
pensioners per contributor increases and the pension benefit falls. However, the impact of
longer life expectancy on benefits might be offset if the number of active workers
contributing to the pension system were to increase. Austria is also discussing the
introduction of a similar financial-sustainability adjustment.
In Finland and Portugal, the value of pensions will be adjusted to changes in life
expectancy at retirement. Another method of adjustment is to increase the standard
retirement age and/or the number of contribution years necessary to get a full benefit in line
with the evolution of life expectancy. Denmark has introduced a direct link between increasing
life expectancy and the pension eligibility age. France, in the 2003 pension reform, linked the
required number of years of contributions to get a full pension with life expectancy.
Reducing benefits to reflect longer life expectancy will improve financial sustainability
but there may be adverse social effects. It is well established that there is a link between life
expectancy on the one hand and socio-economic status, income and wealth on the other
(see Brown and McDaid, 2002 for a survey of 45 studies). This can imply that increases in
pension ages or reductions in benefits due to increases in average life expectancy may
disproportionately hit lower earners. Retirement incentives will be improved because people
will have to work longer to build up the same benefit.
Introducing defined-contribution plans
As noted above, a series of OECD countries introduced DC plans as a substitute for part
of the public, earnings-related pension scheme. Usually, some or all workers had a choice
over whether to stay with the public, earnings-related pension or switch to mixed public/
private DC provision. (See Mattil and Whitehouse, 2007; and Whitehouse et al., 2007 for
further discussion of these reforms.)
The shift to DC pensions is the major reform which shifts the balance between public and
private sectors in pension provision. The financial effects are complex. There is not a direct
transfer from contributors to beneficiaries with DC plans as there is with a pay-as-you-go
system. However, there is still a transfer of resources between generations from workers to
retirees and so the overall financial effect is uncertain. Retirement incentives are generally
improved. The social effects depend on system design, in particular on the interaction with
other public retirement benefits.
Changing the indexation of pensions in payment
Indexation refers to the adjustment of pensions in payment to changes in prices or
earnings. In recent years, many OECD countries have moved away from indexation of
pension benefits to earnings towards full or partial indexation to prices. This preserves the
purchasing power of pensions, but means that pensioners do not share in the general
growth in living standards.4
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Some countries – Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic – adjust pensions using a
mixed index composed of wage growth and price inflation. This type of adjustment has
been in use in Finland and Switzerland for some time. Swiss pensions are increased with
an equally weighted index of wage and price growth while recent reforms in Finland
changed the relative weighting in the index. German pension indexation, which was linked
to wage growth net of taxes and social security contributions, will in future also be
adjusted to reflect the system dependency ratio, the relationship between contributors and
beneficiaries.
In Italy, higher pensions are increased by less than price inflation (75 or 90%), while
small and medium-level pensions are indexed to prices. Similarly, Austria indexes
pensions to prices only up to a ceiling; benefits above that level are increased by a fixed
amount and Portugal will in future increase smaller pensions by more than larger ones.
Pension uprating policy is a classic example of ad-hoc policy-making. Even if most
countries now have a formal link to prices, indexation is still often suspended as an
emergency measure to relieve strong financial pressures on the pension system. This
happened several times in Germany before the new link was introduced in 2004.
Indexation was also temporarily suspended in Belgium and in the United States. In
contrast, in the United Kingdom, ad-hoc changes were made in order to boost benefits,
despite a formal link of public pensions to price inflation.5
Less generous indexation of pensions in payment improves the financial sustainability
of pension systems, but it may pose challenges for long-term social and, thus, political
sustainability.
Pre-funding public pensions
As an alternative means of introducing pre-funding of pension liabilities as opposed to
relying on pay-as-you-go finance, some countries have established public pension
reserves. In addition to the long-standing reserves in Japan, Sweden and Switzerland, new
reserves have been introduced in Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and Norway (see Palacios,
2002). Because this paper focuses on benefit entitlements, these initiatives are not examined
further.
Pension contributions
One of the reasons for the recent wave of pension reforms in OECD countries has been
a concern over the effect of high taxes on labour on employment. Table II.1.2 shows the
evolution of contribution rates for pensions over the period 1994-2004. Perhaps
surprisingly, there is little evidence of an increased pension-contribution burden in this
period.
Some 21 OECD countries have a separately identifiable public pension contribution. In
half of these, the contribution rate remained basically unchanged over the decade at
around 20%. There were relatively large increases in Canada, Italy, Japan and Korea and
smaller increases in the Czech Republic and France. There were falls in five countries,
including Hungary, Japan and Netherlands.
There are a number of potential explanations for this counter-intuitive finding. First,
governments may have responded to rising pension costs by financing them from general
revenues rather than earmarked contributions. Secondly, contribution rates may have
remained constant while revenues were increased by broadening the contribution base (by
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increasing ceilings, for example). Thirdly, the profile of demographic ageing implies that
much of the pressure on pension costs is yet to come. Finally, pension reforms might have
succeeded in controlling costs. However, the OECD Social Expenditures database shows
that average public spending on old-age and survivors benefits in the OECD countries
increased from 6.7% of GDP in 1990 to 7.7% in 2003, see Table II.1.3. There were falls in only
seven countries, notably in Finland, Luxembourg and New Zealand. There were very large
increases in Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal and the Slovak Republic of between 3.5% and 7.5%
of GDP.
Table II.1.2. Pension contribution rates (employee plus employer),
1994, 1999 and 2004
1994 1999 2004
Australia Private contributions only
Austria 22.8 22.8 22.8
Belgium 16.4 16.4 16.4
Canada 5.2 7.0 9.9
Czech Republic 26.9 26.0 28.0
Denmark Private contributions only
Finland 18.6 21.5 21.4
France 21.5 24.0 24.0
Germany 19.2 19.7 19.5
Greece 20.0 20.0 20.0
Hungary 30.5 30.0 26.5
Iceland Private contributions only
Ireland No separate pension contribution
Italy 28.3 32.7 32.7
Japan 16.5 17.4 13.9
Korea 6.0 9.0 9.0
Luxembourg 16.0 16.0 16.0
Mexico Private contributions only
Netherlands 33.1 37.7 28.1
New Zealand No contributions
Norway No separate pension contribution
Poland – 32.5 32.5
Portugal No separate pension contribution
Slovak Republic 28.5 27.5 26.0
Spain 29.3 28.3 28.3
Sweden 19.1 15.1 18.9
Switzerland 9.8 9.8 9.8
Turkey 20.0 20.0 20.0
United Kingdom No separate pension contribution
United States 12.4 12.4 12.4
OECD (21) 19.9 20.3 20.0
Note: Rounded to one decimal place.
Source: OECD (1995b, 2001, 2006a).
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1.2. Impact of pension reforms in selected OECD countries
Reforms to retirement-income regimes, whether they occurred in one “big bang” or a
series of smaller changes, often changed a range of the parameters and rules of national
systems. This makes it difficult to compare these reform packages between countries
based on institutional information alone. The analysis that follows compares the
microeconomic indicators of pension systems – such as the replacement rate, the relative
pension level and pension wealth presented in Part I – before and after reforms. These
microeconomic measures are designed to complement the macro picture provided by long-
term financial projections of pension systems. The analysis focuses on 16 OECD countries
(Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom) where there
have been substantial pension reforms in the past decade.
Methodology
The results described as “post-reform” are those to be found in the rest of this report.
To summarise briefly, these take the situation of a worker entering the labour market
Table II.1.3. Public spending on old-age and survivors’ pensions, 1990-2003
1990 1995 2000 2003 Change 1990-2003
Australia 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.1 0.4
Austria 11.9 12.8 12.8 13.2 1.3
Belgium 9.1 9.4 9.1 9.3 0.2
Canada 4.3 4.8 4.4 4.4 0.1
Czech Republic 6.1 6.5 8.0 8.0 1.8
Denmark 7.4 8.4 7.1 7.2 –0.2
Finland 8.1 6.8 5.9 6.4 –1.7
France 10.9 12.2 12.0 12.3 1.4
Germany 10.2 10.9 11.2 11.7 1.5
Greece 11.1 10.8 12.2 12.4 1.3
Hungary n.a. n.a. 8.0 8.7 n.a.
Iceland 3.5 3.8 3.6 4.2 0.6
Ireland 4.2 3.7 3.4 3.7 –0.5
Italy 10.2 11.4 13.7 13.9 3.6
Japan 5.0 6.3 8.0 9.3 4.3
Korea 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.4 0.6
Luxembourg 9.6 10.3 7.8 6.5 –3.1
Mexico 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.2 0.7
Netherlands 7.0 6.1 5.6 5.8 –1.2
New Zealand 7.4 5.7 5.0 4.5 –2.9
Norway 7.6 7.5 6.8 7.4 –0.3
Poland 5.3 9.6 10.9 12.4 7.2
Portugal 5.4 7.9 8.7 10.5 5.1
Slovak Republic n.a. 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.5
Spain 8.1 9.2 8.8 8.4 0.3
Sweden 9.3 10.7 10.0 10.8 1.5
Switzerland 5.8 6.9 6.9 7.2 1.3
Turkey 3.2 3.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
United Kingdom 5.3 6.0 5.9 6.1 0.8
United States 6.1 6.3 6.0 6.3 0.2
OECD 6.7 7.3 7.4 7.7 1.0
n.a.: not available.
Source: OECD Social Expenditures database.
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in 2004 and spending the whole of his or her career under the same set of pension
parameters and rules: those applying in 2004 along with any legislated changes that will
take effect over time.
The pre-reform scenario is built on the following question: what would the parameters
and rules of the pension system have been in 2004 had the pension reform not taken
place? This stylised approach is designed to isolate the effects of the reform programme
from other changes of the past decade. Thus, mortality rates and economic variables are
the same in the two scenarios and the same modelling methodology is used (see the
section on “Structure of the report and methodology”, p. 11).
The aim is not to calculate pensions for people retiring in 2004. First, the frequency of
pension reforms in some countries would mean that many more than two sets of pension
rules would need to be modelled along with often complex transition provisions, making
the calculations intractable. Secondly, the position of current retirees is better assessed
using income-distribution or administrative data on actual benefits of retirees than by
microsimulation.
This approach means that two sets of prospective replacement rates are compared:
one set that shows the pension entitlements that workers entering the labour market
in 2004 were promised if the pre-reform system was still in place. And a second set that
shows what entitlements will be under the system that actually existed, i.e., the post-
reform system, for workers entering the labour market in 2004. This is a microeconomic
comparison and so is silent on the affordability of pension promises in the two scenarios.
Changes in the indexation of pensions in payment are captured in the pension-reform
modelling through the calculation of pension wealth. However, changes in policy over
indexation of pension-system parameters is more difficult to model realistically. As noted
in the section on methodology, some countries, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom,
in theory propose to index key parameters, such as the value of retirement safety nets, to
prices. As previously noted, if implemented over a 40- to 50-year period, this would result in
unrealistically low living standards for poorer pensioners which would not be politically
sustainable. Therefore, pension-systems parameters are assumed to increase over time in
line with average earnings. Note that this assumption is applied consistently to both pre-
and post-reform scenarios regardless of whether there has been any change in parameter-
indexation policy.
Replacement rates for average earners
Pension reforms since the 1990s had a strong impact on replacement rates for workers
on average earnings. Table II.1.4 shows gross replacement rates before and after the
reforms for men and, where they are different, for women. Replacement rates for workers
on average earnings are being cut by reforms in all countries except in Hungary where they
increase sharply by almost 20 percentage points. The Hungarian result, however, is
strongly influenced by the tax system since Hungarian pensions used to be calculated on
the basis of earnings net of income taxes. Thus, not all of the increase in replacement rates
in Hungary is due to pension reform; tax changes also have a powerful impact. In the
United Kingdom, replacement rates are the same before and after reform. The same is true
for New Zealand, where the reform merely increased the pension age from 60 to 65. This
change does not show up in the replacement rate since the benefit is flat rate. In Poland
and for women in Austria, replacement rates are expected to be similar before and after the
reforms. The largest reduction is in Mexico where replacement rates were cut by more than
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half for men and women. However, it should be noted that the post-reform system applies
to workers who entered the labour force after 1997. All existing workers were guaranteed
to receive at least the benefit that they would have been entitled to under the pre-reform
system. There are also large changes in Italy and Portugal, followed by Sweden, France and
Austria. Of course, many of these benefit cuts were necessary since the systems had
already encountered financial difficulties which were projected to worsen in the future.
The pre-reform systems were often “promising” levels of payment which could never
actually have been paid.
Adequacy of benefits for low-income workers
Table II.1.5 shows relative pension levels (the pension benefit as a share of economy-
wide average earnings) net of taxes and social security contributions for workers earning
half average earnings before and after the reforms. This is a more useful measure to assess
benefit adequacy than the replacement rate, since it shows how far away the lowest-income
pensioners are from the average standards of living of workers. It is thus a good indicator
of poverty risk for retirees.
The results show that only in two out of the 16 countries did the income position of
workers earning half the average improve due to reform. In the United Kingdom, the
benefit for the lowest-income group rose from 29% to 36% of average earnings. The
increase can be explained by the introduction of the Second State Pension which has
differential replacement rates over different bands of earnings. This mechanism increases
entitlements for people with low earnings. In addition, the previous minimum income
guarantee was increased from 18% of average earnings in 1997 to 21% in 2004; it was
subsequently replaced by the pension credit at broadly the same level. In Hungary, the
improvement is more marked for female low-income workers. The increase comes
Table II.1.4. Pre- and post-reform gross replacement rates for workers on average 
earnings in selected OECD countries1
Percentage of individual earnings
Men Women (where different)
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Austria 90.0 80.1 80.0 80.1
Finland 66.3 63.4
France 64.7 51.2
Germany 48.7 39.9
Hungary 57.7 76.9 52.7 76.9
Italy 90.0 67.9 80.0 52.8
Japan 40.7 34.4
Korea 69.3 66.8
Mexico 72.5 35.8 72.5 29.7
New Zealand 39.7 39.7
Poland 62.2 61.2 57.3 44.5
Portugal 90.1 54.1
Slovak Republic 59.5 56.7
Sweden 78.9 62.1
Turkey 107.6 72.5 102.8 72.5
United Kingdom 30.8 30.8
1. OECD countries that have implemented significant pension reforms over the past decade.
Source: OECD pension models.
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predominantly from the change in pension age, which was increased from 55 years for
women to 62 years. Entitlements are thus earned for more years both under the DB and the
DC components of the new pension system.
In Finland, France and Korea, the income position of low-income pensioners was
protected; pre- and post-reform relative pension levels are almost identical. The same is
true for female Austrian low-income pensioners. In the Finnish pension reform of 1996, the
basic element of the pension system that was partially pension-income tested was
replaced with a more targeted national pension that is fully withdrawn against other
pension income; in this way, poor pensioners who have insufficient entitlements from the
earnings-related pension scheme are guaranteed a minimum pension level. In France, the
result is due to a provision in the 2003 pension reform which stipulates that no full-career
worker should have a pension benefit below 85% of the net minimum wage. Although this
measure constituted a substantial increase for low-income pensioners, it only just about
compensates for the cuts that were made to benefits through the lengthening of the period
for the earnings base and the changes made to the occupational schemes in the 1990s.
All other countries saw a decline in benefits as a result of the reforms, even for the poorest
group of pensioners. Particularly large reductions of relative pension levels, amounting to 10 or
more percentage points, can be observed again in Mexico (from 39% to 28%), in Poland (50% to
39%) and in Portugal (from 58% to 45%). In Germany, the benefit fell from 40% to 33%.
In Mexico, the decline is due to the switch from the old DB system to a DC system.
Even though all workers receive a government subsidy to their individual accounts and
there is a minimum pension, this is not sufficient to maintain the relative pension level of
low-income workers who will retire under the new rules.
Table II.1.5. Net relative pension levels pre- and post-reform for low-income 
workers in selected OECD countries1
Men Women (where different)
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Austria 57.8 53.2 53.1 53.2
Finland 44.6 44.8
France 42.8 42.1
Germany 39.7 32.6
Hungary 52.5 58.4 42.9 58.4
Italy 55.9 46.7
Japan 32.2 26.9 51.1 36.3
Korea 54.3 54.2
Mexico 38.7 28.2
New Zealand 41.7 41.7 38.7 28.2
Poland 50.0 38.8 47.1 29.9
Portugal 58.5 45.0
Slovak Republic 41.8 36.5
Sweden 44.7 42.8
Turkey 77.2 52.0 73.2 52.0
United Kingdom 29.4 36.0
1. OECD countries that have implemented significant pension reforms over the past decade. The net relative
pension level is individual pension entitlement (net of any taxes and contributions) divided by average earnings,
again net of taxes and contributions.
Source: OECD pension models.
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In Poland, the reform did not change the level of the minimum pension. But full-career
workers on half average earnings are not entitled to this benefit. However, Poland
abolished the flat component of its old pension system, which hits low-income workers
hardest. Thus, the decline in benefits for workers on half average earnings can be
attributed entirely to the systemic reform from the old redistributive system to the new
mixed system consisting of notional accounts and funded DC schemes.
In Portugal, the recently agreed pension reform introduces an adjustment of future
pensions to increases in life expectancy at age 65. Based on the UN/World Bank database
on mortality rates, life expectancy in Portugal at age 65 in the year 2006 is 16.2 years. This
is projected to increase to 20.3 years life expectancy in 2050. Thus, benefits are expected to
be 81% of their value under current rules as a result of the link to life expectancy for an
individual spending a whole career with this adjustment. Due to the minimum pension,
however, the benefit falls less for low-income workers than for workers on average earnings.
In Germany, the decline of benefit is due to the change in calculating the pension-point
value (as explained above) and the gradual transition to EET taxation which implies an
increase in net wages and a reduction of net pension benefits; since there is no explicit
minimum pension in the German system, lower-income groups are not protected from the
decline. The only safety-net benefit available is social assistance, which, however, is available
to older persons under less strict conditions than for the working-age population. In
particular, for the elderly no recourse is taken to income or assets of other family members.
But for a worker at half average earnings the pension is above the social assistance level.
The effect of changes in the earnings measure
The pension modelling assumes that individual earnings grow in line with the
economy-wide average (of 2% real per year). Replacement rates are measured relative to
individual earnings, revalued in line with economy-wide average earnings growth to the
time of retirement and averaged across the career. With individual earnings tracking the
economy-wide average, revalued average earnings are the same as final salary.6
A number of countries have changed the way that earnings are measured to calculate
pension benefits, typically extending the period over which earnings are measured. In
some cases, the effect of these reforms is captured by the pension models under the
baseline assumptions. For example, the extension of the averaging period from 10 to
25 years in the French public pension scheme is calculated to cut benefits by 13.2% for a
worker whose earnings track the economy-wide average (because of prices valorisation of
earlier years’ earnings). In Portugal, the new earnings measure will be lifetime average
earnings valorised by a mixed index: 25% wage growth and 75% price inflation. On the
baseline assumptions, this is expected to cut benefits by 27% compared with the current
earnings measure (final 15 years’ salary). Of course, changes in earnings measures were
part of a broader reform package; these calculations do not relate to the aggregate effect.
In Poland, the Slovak Republic and Sweden, however, changes in the earnings measure
are not reflected in the baseline results. These three countries have all extended the
averaging period to the full career from much shorter periods. Individuals with earnings
that grow faster than those in the economy as a whole will lose from the change in
earnings measure. For example, a worker with 1% earnings growth ahead of the average
would lose 9.1% as a result of the change in earnings measure in Poland, 17.7% in the
Slovak Republic and 13.2% in Sweden.
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These calculations should be borne in mind when looking at the overall effect of
reforms, since the baseline assumptions understate the impact of changes on workers
whose earnings grow faster than the economy-wide average across the career.7
Links between earnings and benefits
This section examines how pension reforms have changed the links between earnings
and benefits. While the previous section focussed on the relative position of low-income
retirees, this part looks more broadly at the degree of redistribution across the entire
earnings range.
The analysis uses the index of pension benefit progressivity, which is described in
detail in Part I. It is designed in the following way: a basic pension scheme which pays the
same benefit to everyone scores 100% and is maximally progressive. A pure insurance
scheme that pays benefits which correspond to previous earnings scores zero. It has no
progressivity because it pays the same replacement rate to everyone.
The impact of pension reforms is shown in Figure II.1.1, which presents the pre- and
post-reform progressivity indices for the 16 countries. Several countries have made their
pension systems more progressive; these are shown on Panel A. The strongest increases
are found in Mexico, Portugal and in the United Kingdom. In Mexico, this results from the
combination of the government subsidy and the minimum pension. In Portugal, the
minimum pension compensates part of the benefit cuts for low-income earners leading to
a more progressive benefit structure. In the United Kingdom, the higher redistribution
results from the new rules that protect pension benefits for low-income earners; these
rules were discussed in the previous section. Smaller increases in progressivity occurred in
Austria and France. In Germany, there is only a small increase in progressivity due to the
fact that the old-age safety nets remained in place, albeit at a low level, while earnings-
related pension benefits were cut.
As expected, strong declines in progressivity can be observed in countries that
replaced all or parts of their old pension systems with notional or funded DC schemes
(Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary; see Panel B). All four countries have post-reform indices
of progressivity fairly close to zero; this shows that they have indeed moved to or are very
close to the pure insurance model with a strong link between pensions and earnings. The
Swedish pension reform, despite the large notional-accounts component and the
mandatory DC element of the new system, has not made the overall system less
progressive than the old system; this is due to the replacement of the previous universal
basic pension, which was paid to all income groups, with a targeted pension available only
to lower-income retirees.
In Italy, the reform abolished the previously existing minimum pension although there
remains a social-assistance benefit as a safety net; the link between earnings and benefits
was already strong in the old system. This explains why the reform did not change
progressivity much despite the introduction of the new notional defined-contribution
scheme. The old Hungarian scheme also had a minimum pension but this will not be paid
beyond 2009 and was thus not included in the post-reform model. In Poland, the fall in
progressivity is due to the removal of the basic pension component.
The largest change took place in the Slovak Republic where practically all
redistribution was removed from the pension system. The old Slovak pension system had
a ceiling on the value of pension benefits that effectively capped pensionable earnings just
II.1. A DECADE OF PENSION REFORMS: THE IMPACT ON FUTURE BENEFITS
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 200770
above economy-wide average earnings. This meant that higher-income workers received a
proportionately smaller benefit than low-income workers. The new two-tiered system
follows the insurance model: it has a tight link between earnings and benefits in both
components. The earnings-related scheme is based on pension points resulting in a
uniform accrual rate for all workers. There is no minimum pension anymore; instead, a
minimum income is used for pension benefit calculations. Finally, the DC component
obviously has a strict earnings-benefit link. The most relevant change for progressivity is
the introduction of a ceiling on pensionable earnings nearly three times as large as the
effective ceiling under the old system.
Rebalancing public and private provision
Five OECD countries (Hungary, Sweden, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Mexico) have
reset the balance between public and private pension schemes. Figure II.1.2 shows how
reforms have affected the composition of the average pension level and average pension
wealth (i.e. the discounted stream of average future pension payments) from public and
private sources.
The most radical change took place in Mexico where all of the pension system was
public before the reform and now only a small public component is retained. Three other
countries, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, also started with an entirely public
system before the reforms and moved to mixed systems. In Poland and the Slovak
Republic, now more than half of the pension promise is delivered through the private
sector, while in Hungary the public scheme still accounts for more than 60%.
Sweden stands out in this group of countries, since private employer-based pension
schemes have always been important in pension provision. After the pension reform, the
Figure II.1.1. Index of progressivity of benefit formula before and after reforms
Gini coefficient of pension entitlements relative to Gini coefficient on earnings
Note: For a detailed definition of the index, see the section on “Progressivity of Pension Benefit Formulae” in Part I.
Source: OECD pension models.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/450527113232
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private component increased to just under 50% of the pension promise. This was achieved
partly by introducing a new mandatory, privately-managed DC component.
Adjustments to life-expectancy changes
Countries that have introduced DC or notional accounts components into their
pension system have an automatic adjustment to life expectancy in these schemes. Others
have introduced or proposed links to life expectancy in their traditional DB public schemes.
The effects of these adjustments differ depending on their precise design and on the
offsetting impact of other parts of the retirement-income regime that are not linked to life
expectancy (see Whitehouse, 2007b).
Table II.1.6 summarises how the projected change in mortality between 2002 and 2040
(the years covered in the UN/World Bank population database) would affect pension benefits
in a selection of OECD countries that link pensions to life expectancy. On average, life
expectancy at age 65 is projected to grow by 3.2 years for the ten countries shown. The
projections are based on an assumption of convergence of mortality rates. Life expectancy is
predicted to increase by just 2.5 years in Sweden – which had the longest life expectancy
in 2002 – and by more than 3.5 years in the three Central and Eastern European countries,
which all had life expectancy at age 65 of less than 80 years in 2002.
In all cases, the life-expectancy link will reduce average pension levels. The fall
averages around 10% in the nine countries shown. At the same time pension wealth is
projected to increase, because not all parts of the pension system are affected. The
increase averages almost 7% across countries. Italy, Mexico and Poland have the smallest
increase in pension wealth over the period, reflecting the very strong links there between
life expectancy and pensions. In Hungary and the Slovak Republic, there remain large
public pension schemes that are not linked to life expectancy and so pension wealth
increases as mortality improves.
Figure II.1.2. The changing public private balance
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/565066581031
        
6:/&3

	,	## 2*"
		

	,	
#"
.&;0'(
;(.0+(*1(%7&,%*/(;(/*?>*,@*0;(.0+(*(0.%&%+7A ;(.0+(*1(%7&,%*4(0/'9*?>*,@*','0/A

6%+0.5


4()(%


,/0%)


/,;0<*#(16:/&3


(2&3,

II.1. A DECADE OF PENSION REFORMS: THE IMPACT ON FUTURE BENEFITS
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 200772
Reducing the long-term pension promise
One of the main objectives of pension reforms in OECD countries has been to cut
public pension expenditures and make pension systems financially sustainable in the face
of population ageing. Indeed, as Table II.1.1 showed, most common changes to pension
systems, such as less generous indexation and/or valorisation, changes in retirement age,
changes in the earnings measure, and so on, have had this effect.
To illustrate the extent of financial and fiscal consolidation, the value of the pension
promise is compared for pre- and post-reform systems. Again, it is worth noting that, just
because a pension system was legislated, does not mean that it would have been paid. Pre-
reform systems would often have proved unaffordable in the long term, so this indicator
can be thought of as illustrating the extent of change necessary to put pensions on a firm,
long-term financial footing.
The comparison is based on the indicator of weighted average pension wealth. This is
the most comprehensive measure of the scale of the pension promise made to today’s
workers because it takes account of differences in life expectancy, pension eligibility ages
and indexation of pensions in payment. The calculation is described in detail in the section
on weighted average pension levels and pension wealth in Part I of this report.
The impact of reform on the cost of the pension promise is shown in Figure II.1.3 for
men (Panels A and B) and women (Panels C and D). It can be seen that by far the largest
cost-cutting occurred in Mexico for male workers and, to an even greater extent, for female
workers. As discussed earlier, benefits were cut substantially through the move from the
old system dominated by the DB scheme to the new system which relies almost entirely on
a DC scheme. The decline is larger for women since the benefit in the old system was not
adjusted to women’s higher life expectancy; pension wealth was higher because women
live longer. Under the new scheme, women have the same retirement age as men and
annuities are calculated with sex-specific mortality tables which equalise pension wealth
from the DC scheme for men and women. The minimum pension component, however, is
not sex specific and thus women have a slightly higher pension wealth than men.
Table II.1.6. Effects of forecast improvements in life expectancy (2002-2040) 
on pension benefits in selected OECD countries1
Total life expectancy at age 65
Average pension level 
(% of average earnings)
Average pension wealth 
(multiple of earnings)
2002 2040 Change 2002 2040 Change 2002 2040 Change
Australia 82.8 85.6 +15.5% 44.7 42.6 –4.7% 6.5 7.2 +10.8%
Denmark 81.0 84.5 +21.7% 87.1 79.3 –9.0% 11.3 12.4 +9.7%
Finland 81.8 85.4 +21.5% 69.9 61.9 –11.4% 9.0 9.7 +7.4%
Hungary 78.9 82.7 +27.8% 79.6 73.4 –7.8% 10.3 11.9 +15.5%
Italy 82.3 84.9 +15.1% 73.1 65.0 –11.1% 9.4 9.5 +1.1%
Mexico 80.5 82.6 +13.7% 41.0 37.6 –8.3% 4.9 5.0 +2.0%
Poland 79.7 83.4 +25.2% 74.6 60.7 –18.6% 8.2 8.3 +1.2%
Portugal 80.8 84.4 +22.9% 67.9 56.3 –18.9% 8.2 8.3 +1.2%
Slovak Republic 79.4 82.9 +24.2% 63.2 57.1 –9.7% 8.0 8.9 +11.3%
Sweden 83.3 85.8 +13.4% 72.3 67.4 –6.8% 10.4 10.8 +3.8%
Note: Change in life expectancy is given as a percentage of additional life expectancy at 65 and not in total life
expectancy at 65. Based on unisex mortality rates.
1. These OECD countries have introduced LE adjustment.
Source: OECD pension models; UN/World Bank population database.
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In Italy, post-reform pension ages are the same for men and women, but they were
different before the reforms. Thus, women experience even greater losses in pension
wealth compared to men than they would only on the basis of the difference in life
expectancy.
In the new Polish pension system, the retirement age for women is still lower than for
men. Women therefore accumulate fewer contributions and retire on a lower benefit. Since
life expectancy of women is higher, however, women still have slightly higher pension
wealth than men. In the Slovak Republic, pension ages for men and women were increased
Figure II.1.3. Average pension wealth before and after reforms
Multiple of economy-wide average earnings
Note: The charts show the weighted average pension wealth (with the weights reflecting the distribution of earnings).
See the section on “Weighted averages: pension levels and pension wealth” in Part I.
Source: OECD pension models.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/837752045346
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to a uniform 62 years, though the reduction in cost from this measure is not very strong
since pension levels did not fall by as much as in the other countries. In Japan and Austria,
the cuts in the benefit accrual rate also helped lower costs. In Austria, more years of
accrual will actually increase the benefit for women, but the higher retirement age and
thus shorter retirement period for women will lead to an overall reduction in pension
wealth compared to the pre-reform system.
In Finland and Germany, changes in valorisation and post-retirement indexation
played an important role. Women’s pension wealth is still higher than that of men but the
losses experienced as a result of the reforms are broadly the same for both sexes.
Only in the United Kingdom did weighted average pension wealth increase. This was
due to changes in replacement rates, particularly for lower-income retirees. The increase
was stronger for women than for men due to higher life expectancy of women.
1.3. Conclusions
Nearly all the 30 OECD countries have made at least some changes to their pension
systems since 1990. There have been major reforms that will significantly alter future
retirement benefits in over half of them. This chapter has outlined eight different types of
change to pension schemes that make up recent pension reforms. Some, such as increases
in pension ages, are highly visible and controversial. Others, such as changes in the way in
which earnings are measured when calculating benefits, are more complex and technical
but, nonetheless, can have a huge impact on benefits.
The reform packages, like pensions systems themselves, had diverse and complex
features. However, there is a clear underlying trend towards a reduced pension promise for
today’s workers compared with past generations. The average pension promise in the
16 countries studied fell from 10.7 times annual earnings to 8.4 times for men, a cut of 22%.
For women, the reduction is larger: from 13 times annual earnings to 9.7 times, equivalent
to a reduction of 25%. Only in two of the 16 countries – Hungary and the United Kingdom –
were there increased pension promises on average.
Who reformed pensions and who did not? Six of the ten countries with the highest
public expenditures on pensions in 1990 – Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and
Finland (ordered from highest to lowest spenders) – have seen major reforms of their
pension systems since 1990. However, the rest of the top ten have seen little or no change
to their retirement-income regimes over that period. This group consists of Greece,
Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain, whose pension expenditures in 1990 averaged 9.5% of
GDP, compared with 6.7% for the OECD as a whole.
Substantial pension reforms occurred almost as often in the ten OECD countries that
had the lowest pension expenditures in 1990 as they did among those already facing a heavy
fiscal burden. This group of reformers consists of Japan, Korea, Mexico and Turkey. In Japan,
the need for change results from the pace and scale of demographic change: expenditures
already increased from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 9.3% in 2003. In Korea, Mexico and Turkey,
pension systems are less mature and the demographic situation is currently more favourable
than elsewhere in the OECD. Population ageing in Korea is expected to be very rapid. In
Mexico and Turkey, the pre-reform systems were very generous, with average pension
wealth of around 15 times annual earnings for men and 18 times for women, compared with
the OECD averages of 9 and 11 times earnings respectively. Reforms were therefore
necessary in these countries even though current pension spending is not especially large.
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An assessment of pension reforms in OECD countries cannot and should not be made
on fiscal criteria alone. For example, pension reforms also have profound social and
distributional implications: how will the changes affect different individuals? The answer
is complex. Some countries – such as France, Portugal and the United Kingdom – are
moving towards greater targeting of public pensions on low earners. Others – such as
Poland and the Slovak Republic – have moved to tighten the link between pension
entitlements and earnings when working to improve work incentives and compliance. This
has important implications for the future adequacy of retirement incomes for low earners.
In Germany, Japan, Mexico, Poland and the Slovak Republic, the net pension entitlement
for a full-career worker with half average earnings was around 41% of average earnings
before reform, slightly below the average for the OECD as a whole. The reforms will cut this
to just 32.5%. There is therefore a risk of a resurgence in old-age poverty in some countries.
In contrast, Finland, France, Hungary, Korea, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have
protected low-income workers from cuts in benefit in their pension reforms.
Reforming pensions is undoubtedly both a challenging and controversial issue
because it involves long-term planning by governments faced with numerous short-term
pressures. This chapter has shown that pension reform is not, however, politically
impossible. Countries that have yet to embark on necessary changes to retirement-income
provision can learn valuable lessons from those that have already made the journey.
Notes
1. Examples of this approach include Economic Policy Committee (European Union, 2005, 2006),
Salomaki (2006) and Dang et al. (2001).
2. McHale (1999) is one example. 
3. This is because the reform required employers to provide private pensions, of which coverage was
already widespread before the reform. Therefore, comparing only the mandatory parts of the new
system with a pre-reform scenario with only the public pension would be misleading.
4. Note that indexation of pensions in payment is often confused in the public debate with
“valorisation”, that is the adjustment of earlier years’ earnings to reflect price and wage inflation
up to the date of retirement.
5. Between 2000 and 2005, the basic pension increased by 7.9% in real terms, keeping its value
constant at 15.9% of average earnings on the national measure (Department of Work and Pensions,
2006b, Table 5.1).
6. Individual earnings in any time period i can be expressed as a multiple of earnings in the base
period (w0): wi = w0(1 + g)
i, where w is earnings and g is the growth of (individual and economy-
wide) earnings. Revaluing pay in line with earnings growth gives for each period:
wi = w0(1 + g)
i(1 + g)R – i. This is constant over time and so final and lifetime average revalued
earnings are equal in this case.
7. Figure 3.4  in OECD (2006b) shows that average earnings of 60-64 year old men are 136% of those of
25-29 year olds, implying annual career earnings growth that averages about 0.8% above the
economy-wide average. For women, the ratio of older workers’ wages to younger is 112%, implying
annual career growth of 0.3%, should this pattern hold in the future.
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2. The Role of Private Pensions 
in Providing Future Retirement Incomes
Cross-country analysis of retirement-income regimes cannot ignore the important and
growing role that private pensions play in providing for old age. In 11 OECD countries –
Australia, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom – the private sector delivers part of the mandatory
provision for income in old age. Furthermore, in six of these – Australia, Hungary, Mexico,
Norway, Poland and the Slovak Republic – the private sector’s involvement dates only from
the 1990s. As well as the spread of mandatory private pensions, 40% or more of the workforce
is covered by voluntary private pensions in nine OECD countries.
Section 2.1 of this chapter on private pensions looks at the extent of mandatory
private retirement-income provision under both voluntary and mandatory plans.
Section 2.2 explores the changing nature of private pension provision. Private pensions
have traditionally been employer-provided and been of the defined-benefit (DB) type,
where the entitlement depends on some measure of individual earnings and years of
service. But in a number of countries, defined-benefit pensions are now disappearing to be
replaced by defined-contribution (DC) plans. The pension benefit in DC plans depends on
the value of individual and employer contributions, the investment returns that these earn
and the terms on which accumulated retirement-income capital can be converted into a
flow of pension benefits.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 focus on the balance between mandatory and voluntary provision
for retirement. The analysis measures the scale of the “retirement-savings” gap: the role
that voluntary pensions should play when mandatory pensions are relatively low.
The proportion of earnings that need to be contributed to fill the retirement-savings
gap is calculated in Section 2.5. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 show how this depends crucially on
the years over which people contribute and the rate of return on the funds invested in the
pension plan.
Section 2.8 compares replacement rates between countries where retirement savings
are almost wholly mandatory and those where voluntary savings are important.
2.1. Coverage of private pensions
Table II.2.1 shows the types of pension scheme offered in different countries. It also
shows data on the proportion of people who are covered and the average (or typical)
contribution rate. Where countries also have DB plans, the data on contribution rates refer
only to DC schemes. Information is shown for the two main type of private pension
scheme in each country.
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Unfortunately, data on coverage of private pensions can be extremely difficult to
obtain and is often difficult to compare because of institutional differences in the markets
for long-term savings. Table II.2.1, therefore, draws on a number of sources and the
estimates shown should be regarded as preliminary.
Table II.2.1. Types of private pension scheme, coverage and average 
contribution rates
Largest scheme Second largest scheme
Scheme Coverage Contribution Scheme Coverage Contribution
Australia MO/P > 90% 9%
Austria VO 35% 1.5-2% VP 10% –
Belgium VO 40-50% 1-5%
Canada VO 39% 8.5% VP 50% –
Czech Republic VO/P 40% 2.8%
Denmark MP > 90% 1% QMO > 80% 10.8-17%
Finland VP 15% 3% VO 7% 2%
France VO 10% VP 8%
Germany VO 57% 2-4% VP 13% 2-4%
Greece VO/P negligible –
Hungary MP1 58% 8% VO/P 31% 5%
Iceland MO > 90% 10%
Ireland VO/P 52% c. 10%
Italy2 VO 8% 2.35% VP 2% –
Japan3 VO 45%
Korea VO negligible
Luxembourg VO 20% – VP 5% 4%
Mexico MP 31% 6.275%
Netherlands QMO > 90% –
New Zealand VO 20% –
Norway MO > 90% 2% VO 45% –
Poland MP1 49% 7.3% VO/P negligible –
Portugal VO 4% 3% VP 1.5% –
Slovak Republic MP1 45% 9% VP 27% 5.4%
Spain VP 40% – VO 10% –
Sweden MP > 90% 2.5% QMO > 90% 2%
Switzerland MO > 90% 7-18%
Turkey VO/P negligible –
United Kingdom4 VO 43% c. 9% VP 16% –
United States VO 47% c. 9% VP 17%
M = mandatory.
O = occupational (employer-based).
P = personal (individual-based).
QM = quasi-mandatory (coverage through collective agreements).
V = voluntary.
Note: The contribution rates shown are for DC plans in countries where there are also DB occupational schemes
(Canada, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States).
1. Membership is compulsory for new labour-market entrants (and sometimes for younger workers) in these
countries but optional for existing workers. Coverage will therefore tend towards 100% over time.
2. The severance pay scheme, known as TFR, can be converted into a retirement-savings plan. Contribution rates are
6.91% for new workers and 2.41% for existing workers. Severance-payment schemes – which may be used to
finance retirement – are also important in Japan and Korea.
3. This shows the total covered by tax-qualified pension plans, employees’ pension fund or both.
4. The schemes shown are those that are contracted out of the state second pension. Thus, part of the benefits from
these schemes is a component of mandatory retirement-income provision.
Source: OECD Private Pension Statistics; European Union, Social Protection Committee (2005); Copeland (2006);
Schembari (2004); Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000); Government Actuary’s Department (2005, 2006); national
authorities.
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The table shows that 11 OECD countries have mandatory (or quasi-mandatory) private
pensions. Eight of these countries have private pensions of the DC type. In the
Netherlands, 97% of members of the quasi-mandatory occupational pension schemes are
covered by a DB scheme (with the remainder in DC plans). In Iceland and Switzerland, the
mandatory occupational plans work in a similar way. Both are based on a mandatory
contribution level, a statutory interest rate and a statutory annuity rate. These are
therefore closer to DB (and other kinds of earnings-related scheme) than they are to
DC plans as normally understood by the term.
Coverage of mandatory and quasi-mandatory pension schemes usually exceeds 90%
of employees. However, in Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic, only younger workers
and/or new labour-market entrants were required to join the new private pension
schemes. Some existing workers were able to choose between remaining solely in the
public, earnings-related scheme or switching to mixed public/private-DC provision. Hence,
coverage of these programmes is between 45 and 60% of the current workforce, but this will
rise over time to the whole labour force.1
The rest of this chapter focuses on voluntary private pension provision: voluntary in the
sense that either employers do not have to provide an occupational plan or that individuals do
not have to join a personal plan. The relevant coverage rates for voluntary pensions from
Table II.2.1 are summarised in Figure II.2.1, which gives a clearer picture of the differences
between countries. In four countries – Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United
States – coverage of voluntary, private pensions exceeds half of the workforce. This is mainly
through employer-provided schemes, but personal plans also play an important role in all
four countries. Covering around 45% of workers, voluntary private pensions are also
widespread in Belgium, Japan and Norway. At the other end of the chart, 10% or fewer workers
are covered by voluntary, occupational, private pensions in Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Figure II.2.1. Coverage of voluntary private pensions
Note: See notes to Table II.2.1.
Source: OECD Private Pension Statistics; European Union, Social Protection Committee (2005); Copeland (2006);
Schembari (2004); Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000); Government Actuary’s Department (2005, 2006); national
officials.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/000011070715
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As mentioned at the outset, measuring coverage of private pensions is an inexact
science. Data on coverage of personal, voluntary, private pensions is especially difficult to
obtain and institutional differences are even more significant than they are for voluntary,
occupational pensions. For example, Table II.2.1 does not contain data on personal pension
coverage in Australia, Belgium, Japan and New Zealand, where some sources suggest that
this is widespread.
2.2. Types of voluntary private pension provision
The first edition of Pensions at a Glance modelled pension entitlements for members of
occupational, defined-benefit pension plans in only three countries: Canada, the United
Kingdom and the United States. These countries were chosen for three reasons: first, the
breadth of occupational-pension coverage; secondly, the important role that private
pensions already play in providing retirement incomes; and, thirdly, availability of data on
the rules and parameters of different employers’ plans for these countries. However, there
has been a shift2 from DB to DC pensions in these three countries for workers in the private
sector and more limited change in Ireland.
Canada
Statistics Canada reports a decline in occupational-pension coverage since the
early 1980s. Among men, for example, the proportion of employees covered fell from 55%
in the early 1980s to 42% in 2000. The proportion of women covered increased slightly from
37 to 39% over the same period (Morissette and Johnson, 2003). The survey of occupational
pension schemes shows rapid growth in coverage of DC pensions – membership up 180%
between 1993 and 2003 – albeit from a small base. Overall, DC plans increased their share
of members from 9% in 1993 to 15% in 2003. In the private sector, DC schemes accounted
for 24% of members in 2003 compared with 14% a decade earlier.
This, however, understates the shift from DB to DC provision. Many employers now
offer group personal pensions (known as registered retirement savings plans or RRSPs)
instead of traditional occupational plans. Unfortunately, the degree to which this has offset
the decline in occupational pension coverage cannot be determined because of lack of
suitable data (Schembari, 2004).
Ireland
Between 1999 and 2005, the number of people in occupational pensions increased by
nearly 30%, according to the Pensions Board. However, the number in DC plans grew by 63%
while DB schemes added only 18% more members. Moreover, most of the growth of
DB coverage occurred in the public sector. The number of members of DB schemes (broadly)
in the private sector (defined formally as those subject to the funding requirement) increased
by just 5%. The proportion of members of occupational scheme in the private sector covered
by DC arrangements increased from less than 40% in 1999 to 50% in 2005.
United Kingdom
There has been a substantial decline in private-sector, DB occupational plans. These
covered 23% of total employees the United Kingdom in 1988-89, nearly halving to 12%
in 2002-03. In contrast, the proportion of the workforce in public-sector defined-benefit
plans remained broadly constant over most of the period, with a recent increase to 19%
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reflecting the expansion of the public sector. This meant that the number covered by
private occupational plans fell below those in public plans in 1994-95 (Department of Work
and Pensions, 2006a).
According to the Government Actuary’s Department (2006), the number of members of
private-sector DB plans fell from 4.8 million in 2000 to 3.7 million in 2005. The decline in
DB occupational plans in the private sector appears to have accelerated recently: 42% of
active members of private-sector, DB plans are in schemes that are closed to new
members. In 2003-04 alone, 0.25 million people left these closed plans (either to retirement
or to another job) while a net 50 000 were lost from open schemes. This 0.3 million fall is
equivalent to a loss of 14% of total members in a single year.
United States
The shift from DB to DC private pensions began earlier in the United States than
elsewhere. By 1980, for example, some 32% of active members of an occupational pension
scheme were covered by a DC plan. This proportion doubled over the next 15 years to reach
64% by 1995 and grew further to 71% by 2003 (US Department of Labor).
The changing structure of private pension provision
The shift from providing occupational pensions through DB schemes to a DC model
has reached different stages in different countries. Many workers are still covered by
DB plans, but this is increasingly a legacy from the past. Coverage will diminish rapidly
because many schemes are now closed to new members. In countries which retain
predominantly DB occupational pension coverage – such as Iceland, the Netherlands and
Switzerland – this tends to result from government mandates or provision is quasi-mandatory
as a result of industrial-relations agreements.
The framework of Pensions at a Glance is forward-looking at it considers workers in the
private sector. Very few, if any, individuals entering the labour market today in the countries
discussed above will join a DB pension scheme and remain a member of such a plan for their
whole working lives. The rest of this chapter, therefore, focuses on DC pension plans.3
2.3. Mandatory replacement rates and the pension savings gap
Figure II.2.2 shows again the projected gross replacement rate for the average earner
with a full career, which ranges from 31% of individual earnings in the United Kingdom to 96%
in Greece (see Part I, “Gross pension replacement rate”). The average gross replacement rate
for the 30 OECD countries is almost 59%.
The analysis that follows focuses on the 11 countries at the bottom of the chart that have
below-average mandatory replacement rates. What level of voluntary, private pension savings
would be needed to deliver an overall gross replacement rate in these countries that equalled
the OECD average? This is obviously an arbitrary target but it is illustrative to set a benchmark
relative to all OECD countries, including those with mainly mandatory retirement provision.
The difference between the national mandatory replacement rate and the OECD
average is here called the “retirement-savings gap”. Along with all six of the mainly
English-speaking members of the OECD – Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom and the United States – mandatory gross replacement rates are below the
OECD average in four continental European countries – Belgium, the Czech Republic,
France and Germany – and in Japan.4
II.2. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS IN PROVIDING FUTURE RETIREMENT INCOMES
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007 81
In the United Kingdom, private pension savings would need to deliver a replacement
rate of 28% to bring the overall pension up to the level of the OECD average. France has the
smallest retirement-savings gap of the 11 countries analysed: 7.5%. For the 11 countries as
a whole, the replacement rate from mandatory pensions is 40.6% for average earners,
giving a retirement-savings gap of 18.2% on average (relative to the OECD average gross
replacement rate for an average earner of 58.7%).
2.4. Mandatory replacement rates and private-pension coverage
Do individuals respond to lower replacement rates from mandatory pensions by
making voluntary, private provision for retirement? Figure II.2.3 combines the evidence on
coverage of private pensions from Table II.2.1 and Figure II.2.1 with the projections of the
replacement rates from mandatory pensions for average earners, which were shown in
Figure II.2.2. Two clusters of countries are readily apparent in Figure II.2.3.
First, there is a range of mainly Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Spain and Turkey – but also including Finland5 and Poland, that have voluntary private
pension coverage of less than 10%. These nations also have relatively high mandatory
replacement rates for average earners (measured on a prospective basis). For these
seven countries, the average gross replacement rate is 71% compared with 59% for the
OECD as a whole.
Figure II.2.2. The retirement-savings gap
Gross replacement rate for an average earner from mandatory pension schemes and difference from OECD 
average replacement rate
Source: OECD pension models.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/000033132132
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The second cluster consists of eight countries with much lower mandatory
replacement rates. Unsurprisingly, half of this group are from the mainly English-speaking
countries – Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Germany and Japan show a similar relationship between private
pension coverage and the scale of the mandatory pension system. In these eight countries,
the mandatory replacement rate for the average earner is just 38%.
A number of governments – Germany, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom,
for example – explicitly aim to increase the proportion of the workforce with voluntary
private pensions. It is worth noting that voluntary private pension coverage does not reach
much over 50% of the workforce. Mandating private pensions appears, from the
international experience, the only way to have private-pension coverage at a level
significantly above one half (Table II.2.1).
2.5. Filling the retirement-savings gap
In the 11 countries under study, the gross replacement rate for the average earner
under the mandatory pension system averages 40.6% of earnings. Voluntary, private
pension savings would need to provide an additional replacement rate of 18.1% to bring
pensions in these countries up to the OECD average relative to individual earnings, as
shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table II.2.2.
Figure II.2.3. Average projected mandatory pension and coverage of voluntary 
private pensions
Note: Regression results are coverage = 67.8 (10.6) – 0.692 (–.176) x gross replacement rate (standard errors in
parentheses). Both are significant at 1%. The R2  is 0.434. The two clusters marked are countries with high mandatory
replacement rates and low coverage of private pensions and vice versa (see text).
Source: Coverage data from Table II.2.1 refer to occupational private pension schemes; gross replacement rates for
average earners from OECD pension models.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/000060622602
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The lingering demise of DB occupational pension schemes means that new labour-
market entrants in these 11 countries will have access mainly or only to DC plans to close
the retirement-savings gap. Table II.2.2 shows the steps required to calculate the
contribution rate – the proportion of earnings paid into the defined-contribution account –
that would deliver the replacement rate required to equal the OECD average pension.
The 11 countries under study differ in the normal pension age, as shown in
Column 3 of Table II.2.2. The normal pension age is age 65 in eight of the countries, but is
60 in France, 62 in Hungary and will reach 67 in the United States. The normal pension age
affects the duration over which contributions are made. On the baseline assumption of
labour-market entry at age 20, individuals will contribute for between 40 and 47 years,
although in most cases this will be for a 45-year period, as shown in Column 4 of
Table II.2.2. Column 5 shows the accumulated pension capital at the time of retirement for
each unit of contributions and how this varies with the contribution period. With 45 years’
contributions, the accumulated capital at retirement would be 64.3 times the annual
contribution. The difference between the 45 units contributed and the 64.3 units of
accumulated pension capital is because of the compound-interest effect. (The results in
Table II.2.2 use the baseline assumptions of this report: 2% annual growth in real earnings
and a 3.5% annual real return on investments.) 
Normal pension ages – along with national life expectancy – also affect the duration
over which the pension is likely to be paid. This is the role played by the “annuity factor” in
these calculations. The annuity factor – Column 6 – gives the present value of a flow of
pension payments, taking account of differences in pension age and life expectancy.
The final column of Table II.2.2 shows the percentage of earnings that an average
earner would need to pay into a private pension plan to plug the retirement-savings gap.
The results are also shown graphically in Figure II.2.4. The United Kingdom has the largest
replacement-rate gap and the highest required contribution rate. Japan’s replacement-rate
gap is 4 percentage points lower than in the United Kingdom but life expectancy is longer,
as evidenced by the higher annuity factor in Table II.2.2. The required contribution rate in
Japan is 6.7% compared with 6.9% in the United Kingdom. France has the smallest
replacement-rate gap, but normal retirement age of 60 and life expectancy above the OECD
average together imply that the annuity factor is the highest in Table II.2.2. This, in turn,
increases the required contribution rate compared with countries with normal retirement
at 65 or more. The required contribution rate is 2.6% in France and the Czech Republic.
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Table II.2.2. Filling the retirement-savings gap
Calculating the required contribution rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mandatory GRR 
(%)
GRR gap 
(%)
Pension age Years Accumulation Annuity factor
Contribution rate 
(%)
Australia 43.1 15.6 65 45 64.3 16.5 4.0
Belgium 40.4 18.3 65 45 64.3 16.4 4.7
Canada 43.9 14.8 65 45 64.3 16.4 3.8
Czech Republic 49.1 9.6 63 43 60.4 16.6 2.6
France 51.2 7.5 60 40 54.8 19.3 2.6
Germany 39.9 18.8 65 45 64.3 16.0 4.7
Ireland 32.5 26.2 65 45 64.3 15.7 6.4
Japan 34.4 24.3 65 45 64.3 17.6 6.7
New Zealand 39.7 19.0 65 45 64.3 16.2 4.8
United Kingdom 30.8 27.9 65 45 64.3 16.0 6.9
United States 41.2 17.5 67 47 68.3 15.3 3.9
Note: GRR = gross replacement rate. The calculations assume a real rate of return on investment of 3.5% per year. A
full career of contributions is defined as from age 20 to the normal pension eligibility age. Actuarial calculations use
World Bank/United Nations mortality projections for 2040.
Source:
Replacement rates – Columns 1 and 2 – are taken from the OECD pension models. For information on normal pension
eligibility ages, see the country chapters in this report.
Years of contributions – Column 4 – are simply the difference between normal pension eligibility age and age 20, the
baseline assumption for labour-market entry.
The calculation of accumulated pension capital – Column 5 – is based on , where K is pension capital,
g is real earnings growth and r is the real rate of return on investments and T is the duration of contributions. The
derivation of this formula is explained in Box 1 of Queisser and Whitehouse (2006).
The calculation of the annuity factor – Column 6 – is based on the survival function, si, which is defined as ,
where Π is the product operator and λ is the mortality rate by age, indexed i, and R is the retirement age. The annuity
factor, A is then . See Box 2 of Queisser and Whitehouse (2006).
Source: The required contribution rate – Column 7 – is the replacement rate gap – Column 2 – divided by the capital
accumulation – Column 5 – multiplied by the annuity factor – Column 6.
Figure II.2.4. Filling the retirement-savings gap
Contribution rate with a full history required for average earner to reach OECD average gross replacement rate
Source: OECD pension models; see Table II.2.2.
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2.6. Contribution density and the retirement-savings gap
The baseline assumption when Pensions at a Glance compares mandatory pension
systems is that of a full-career worker, defined as a worker who enters the labour market at
age 20 and contributes every year until the normal pension age in the respective country.
The reasoning behind this assumption is set out above in the methodology section.
However, people can usually choose whether or not to be covered by voluntary schemes and
how much to contribute. In contrast, mandatory pension systems cover workers whether
they like it or not. Secondly, they do not offer a choice of how much to contribute. Thirdly,
through systems of credits for childcare and unemployment, they also often cover people
when they are not working. A full career of contributions is therefore less realistic as a
baseline for voluntary, private pensions than it is for mandatory schemes.
Figure II.2.5 shows how the number of years over which people contribute affects the
contribution rate required to fill the retirement-savings gap, that is, to deliver an overall –
mandatory plus voluntary – replacement rate that equals the OECD average mandatory
replacement rate. At the left-hand side of the chart is the required contribution rate with a
full contribution history – from age 20 to national normal pension age – which reprises the
results in Table II.2.2 and Figure II.2.4 above.
The next entry on the chart shows the situation with five years missing from the
contribution history, i.e., assuming people delay starting their private pension until age 25.6
With ten missing years – at the centre of the chart – the required contribution rate in the
United Kingdom increases to nearly 10%, compared with 7% with a full career. With
20 missing years, contributions need to be nearly 15% to plug the retirement-savings gap.
In Ireland and Japan, the necessary contribution rates are a little below the rates for the
United Kingdom.
In Belgium, Germany and New Zealand, the required contribution rate is around 4.6%
for a full career, 6.7% with ten missing years and 10% with 20 missing years.
Figure II.2.5. Contribution density and the retirement-savings gap
Contribution rate needed to reach OECD average gross replacement rate by number of years of contributions
Note: Missing years are assumed to occur at the beginning of the career.
Source: OECD pension models. For details, see notes to Table II.2.2.
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2.7. Real rates of return on investments and the retirement-savings gap
The value of DC pensions during retirement depends crucially on the rate of return on
investments as well as on the amount contributed. Figure II.2.6 shows how varying the real
rate of return affects the contribution rate required to fill the retirement-savings gap
relative to the baseline assumption of this report, which is a 3.5% real return.
What matters for the replacement rate with a DC pension is the differential between
the real return on investments and real wage growth. The analysis underlying
Figure II.2.6 holds the assumed rate of wage growth constant at 2%. It then looks at a
situation with lower investment returns of 2%, that is, equal to real wage growth. It also
considers a higher investment return of 5%. These low- and high-return scenarios are
symmetric around the baseline.
Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom have the largest retirement-savings gaps,
averaging 6.7% on the baseline assumptions. However, a lower rate of return would
naturally mean that individuals would need to contribute more. To fill the retirement
savings gap in these three countries would need a 9.5% contribution rate if real returns were
only 2%. In contrast, higher returns would offset some of the requirement to contribute to
the private pension plan, lowering the necessary contribution rate to only 4.5%.
At the other end of the scale, the contribution rates required in the Czech Republic and
France would be 3.7% with low returns, 2.6% at the baseline and 1.8% with high returns.
2.8. Indicative gross replacement rates including voluntary pensions
With assumptions of how long people contribute to voluntary private pensions and
how much they contribute, the OECD pension models can calculate the overall
replacement rate from both mandatory and voluntary pensions. Of the 11 countries that
have been the focus of this chapter, there are data available on coverage of voluntary
pensions for all bar Australia (Table II.2.1). Coverage in France and New Zealand is 20% or
less and so these plans are less likely to play an important role in providing retirement
Figure II.2.6. Rate of return on investments and the retirement-savings gap
Contribution rate needed to reach OECD average gross replacement rate by rate of return on investments
Source: OECD pension models. For details, see notes to Table II.2.2.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/000081617754
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incomes in the future. In Japan, DB, lump-sum and hybrid pension schemes remain the
norm; DC plans have made few inroads.
Data on average contribution rates are even more difficult to obtain than information
on coverage. The preliminary evidence presented in Table II.2.1 showed, for example, mean
contribution rates for those covered of 8.5% in Canada, around 9% in the United Kingdom
and United States and 10% in Ireland. The average contribution in the Czech Republic is
reported as 2.8%. Reliable data are even harder to obtain for Belgium and Germany. A 4%
contribution rate is assumed for Germany, since this is the maximum that attracts sizeable
public subsidy. The results below assume a contribution rate of 4.25% for Belgium, which is
at the upper end of the 1-5% range that is thought to be typical (Table II.2.1). The
contribution rates assumed in the analysis of voluntary private pensions are summarised
in the final column of Table II.2.3.
The first column of Table II.2.3 reprises the mandatory gross replacement rates for
average earners in the seven countries studied. These replacement rates vary from 31% in
the United Kingdom to 49% in the Czech Republic, compared with the 59% average for the
OECD as a whole.
The following columns of Table II.2.3 show total replacement rates, including voluntary
private pensions. These are shown for a full career of contributions (from 20 to the national
normal pension age) and for contribution histories missing 10 and 20 years. The highest
assumed contribution rate is in Ireland: 10% of earnings. Contributing for a full career
would increase the gross replacement rate from 32.5% to 73.3%, well above the OECD
average. Even with ten missing years – i.e., contributions from age 30 to 65 – the total,
mandatory plus voluntary replacement rate would be 61.7%. Only with 20 missing years
does the total replacement rate fall below the OECD average.
Figure II.2.7 shows how indicative replacement rates with voluntary pension schemes
compare with the mandatory replacement rates in the rest of the OECD countries. The
black line in this chart simply repeats the data from Figure II.2.2 in this chapter. With a full
career of voluntary contributions, shown by the light-grey bars, total replacement rates
compare favourably with those in countries with larger mandatory pension provision. Even
Table II.2.3. Indicative replacement rates for average earners
Mandatory pensions plus voluntary private pension schemes
Replacement rate for average earner (percentage)
Assumed
contribution rateMandatory only
Voluntary
Missing 20 Missing 10 Full career
Belgium 40.4 48.3 52.3 57.1 4.25%
Canada 43.9 55.0 63.2 72.6 8.5%
Czech Republic 49.1 53.7 56.3 59.3 2.8%
Germany 39.9 47.5 51.4 56.0 4%
Ireland 32.5 51.8 61.7 73.3 10%
United Kingdom 30.8 47.9 56.8 67.0 9%
United States 41.2 60.7 70.2 81.2 9%
Note: The results for the United Kingdom assume that the individual is contracted in to the public pension scheme
(formerly Serps – the state earnings-related pension schemes –, now S2P – state second pension). If individuals were
contracted out, the overall replacement rate would be lower because S2P benefits would be foregone in return for the
rebate of social security contributions paid for contracting out.
Source:  OECD pension models.
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with ten years’ contributions missing, overall replacement rates are only significantly
below the OECD average in Belgium and Germany, where the assumed contribution rate is
smaller than in the other five countries studied. In Germany, however, voluntary pensions
fill the gap between pre- and post-reform replacement rates.
2.9. Conclusions and future developments
The target replacement rate from the mandatory (usually public) pension system is
relatively low, leaving a large “space” for voluntary, private pension provision in around a
dozen OECD countries. In most of these countries, coverage of private pensions is broad.
Around one half of employees contribute to private pensions (on the best available
evidence). However, this leaves a substantial potential gap in private-pension coverage. In
many cases, this may simply result from the fact that the need for retirement savings is
concentrated among either high- or high- and middle-earners. If low earners can expect an
adequate retirement income from safety-net provisions, there might be no need for them
to save for old age. But this is by no means certain.
A second concern arises because the coverage data are a “snapshot” whereas lifetime
coverage and contributions determine individual’s retirement incomes. It is not possible,
Figure II.2.7. Indicative replacement rates for average earners: 
mandatory and voluntary schemes
Source: OECD pension models.
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for example, to know whether snapshot coverage of 50% implies that half the workforce
contributes for every year of their working lives or the whole workforce contributes for half
of their working lives. The implications for pension policy are very different if the target is
to get more people to contribute or to get the same people to contribute for more of their
careers.
The “traditional” way of encouraging voluntary savings for retirement has been
through tax incentives. However, these can be expensive and there is strong evidence that
they are inefficient, in that much of the saving would have happened anyway without the
incentive; tax incentives tend to be worth more to higher earners, for example.
New approaches to encouraging private pension saving rely on the insights of
behavioural economics about people’s natural inertia. Such “soft compulsion”, requiring
people to save unless they opt out, will be introduced at a national level, first, with the
KiwiSaver plan in New Zealand. The United Kingdom aims to introduce a similar scheme
and Ireland is debating the merits of going down this route in an attempt to raise private-
pension coverage to 70%.
The OECD will continue to monitor these innovations in pension policy in future
editions of Pensions at a Glance and assess their implications for pension policy throughout
its member countries.
Notes
1. See Mattil and Whitehouse (2007) and Whitehouse et al. (2007) on these reforms.
2. Gustman and Steinmeier (1992) and Disney and Whitehouse (1992) call the change in the United
States and United Kingdom, respectively, a “stampede”.
3. However, the Annex to this chapter presents some data on DB plans.
4. In Mexico, a large informal sector means that many workers are not covered by the mandatory
pension system. Moreover, the new pension scheme, based around mandatory individual
accounts, guaranteed all workers in the labour market at the time of reform that their pensions
would not fall below those promised by the old pension system. Thus, the issue of the retirement-
savings gap in Mexico has a very different character from that in other OECD countries.
5. There are nine earnings-related pension programmes for different occupations in Finland, four of
which cover private sector employees. All schemes have harmonised rules, are co-ordinated by the
Central Pension Security Institute and are counted as part of general government.
6. Compounding of interest over time means that missing contributions earlier in the career matters
more for the replacement rate than in later years (provided that the investment return exceeds
wage growth, which is the baseline assumption of this report).
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ANNEX  
Gross Replacement Rates Including Defined-Benefit 
Occupational Plans
Section 2.2 of this chapter showed how DB occupational schemes, particularly for
workers in the private sector, are being replaced by DC plans. This change affects workers
in more than half of countries with significant coverage of voluntary, employer-provided
pensions.
The first edition of Pensions at a Glance showed calculations for replacement rates
including DB occupational plans for three countries: Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States. This Annex provides updated information for these three countries along
with information for Ireland.
Table II.A2.1 briefly summarises the main parameters of the DB schemes that have
been modelled. In most cases, national surveys of pension plan parameters and rules have
formed the basis for choosing these particular values although there is, of course,
considerable variation between different schemes.
Table II.A2.2 provides indicative replacement rates split by component of the pension
system. In all cases, the worker is assumed to spend a full career covered by an occupational
pension plan. However, it is assumed that the career is divided into four equally long jobs.
Changing employer reduces the value of the pension because of incomplete preservation of
final-salary-based rights between the time of changing job and retiring.
Table II.A2.1. Parameters and rules of illustrative defined-benefit occupational plans
Canada Ireland United Kingdom United States
Earnings measure Final salary Final salary Final salary Final salary
Accrual rate 2% 1.67% 1.25% 1.5%
Integration Lower accrual Basic pension Contracted out —
Preservation None Price inflation Price inflation None
Indexation Half price inflation Price inflation Price inflation None
Note: Integration in Canada means that the accrual rate is 1.3% on earnings to the ceiling of the public pension and
2% above. In Ireland, only earnings above the basic pension are assumed to accrue DB pensions. The occupational
plan in the United Kingdom is assumed to be contracted out of the state earnings-related pension scheme/state
second pension (Serps/S2P), implying that the individual foregoes these benefits. The parameters shown for the
United Kingdom are the minimum benefits that allow contracting out. The row entitled “Preservation” shows the
rules for adjusting benefits for early leavers who change job before retiring.
Source: OECD Secretariat based on OECD (1995a), National Association of Pension Funds (2005), Government
Actuary’s Department (2006), Mitchell and Dykes (2000).
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In Canada, a worker on average earnings with an occupational plan would, under
these assumptions, have an extra 26% replacement rate on top of the public pension
scheme. However, part of this would be offset by reduced entitlement to the targeted
scheme, the guaranteed income supplement.
The results for the United Kingdom are complicated by the rules for contracting out of
the state pension. The individual will lose a 15.6% replacement rate from the state second
pension while gaining 37.4% from the occupational plan. The occupational plan in Ireland
delivers a much lower replacement rate than in the United Kingdom because of the
integration of the benefit with the public scheme, meaning that only earnings above the
basic pension are covered.
Table II.A2.2. Indicative replacement rates for average earners
Mandatory pensions plus voluntary defined-benefit occupational schemes
Targeted Basic Public Occupational Total
Canada 4.6 14.4 25.0 43.9
0.0 14.4 25.0 26.4 65.8
Ireland 32.5 32.5
32.5 17.4 49.9
United Kingdom 15.2 15.6 30.8
15.2 37.4 52.6
United States 41.2 41.2
41.2 30.6 71.8
Note:  Assumes that the occupational pension in the United Kingdom is contracted out of the state pension scheme.
Source:  OECD pension models. See also OECD (2005), Part II, “Voluntary, Occupational Pensions”.
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PART III 
Country Studies
This part provides detailed background information on each of the 30 countries’
retirement-income arrangements. These include FFpension eligibility ages and other
qualifying conditions; the rules for calculating benefit entitlements; the treatment of
early and late retirees; and more detailed information on the pre-reform scenarios
explored in the special chapter on pension reforms in Part II. The country studies
summarise the national results in standard charts and tables.
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Introduction
The country studies follow a standard schema. First, there is a detailed description of the
rules and parameters of the pension schemes:*
● Qualifying conditions: pension eligibility (or “retirement”) age and years of contributions
required to receive a pension.
● Benefit calculation: the rules for each of the schemes making up the pension system, such
as earnings-related schemes, mandatory private plans and resource-tested schemes.
● Early and late retirement: the rules and conditions under which workers can retire early or
continue to work beyond the standard retirement age. (This extends the information
provided in the first edition of Pensions at a Glance.)
● Pre-reform scenario: for those countries that had major pension reforms or a series of
smaller reforms since the 1990s, this section explains the parameters and rules chosen to
represent the pre-reform scenario, as discussed in the special chapter on pension reforms.
The treatment of pensioners under the personal income tax and social security
contributions, for reasons of space, is not described in this edition. For details on the tax
rules and social security contributions that apply to retirees in the respective countries,
see the first edition of Pensions at a Glance (OECD, 2005) and Fujisawa and Whitehouse
(2007). For information on the tax treatment of workers, see Taxing Wages (OECD, 2006).
Values of all pension parameters and other relevant figures, such as minimum wages,
are given in national currencies and as a proportion of average earnings. (See Table 0.1 for
values and the surrounding text for a discussion of recent changes to the way the OECD
calculates average earnings.)
A summary results table gives expected relative pension values, replacement rates
and pension wealth at different individual levels of earnings for mandatory pension
schemes. (See Part I of this report for definition and measurement of the different
indicators.) These are given in both gross and net terms (the latter taking account of taxes
and contributions paid when working and when drawing the pension). For countries that
had major pension reforms, a second table shows the same set of indicators under the pre-
reform scenario (see the special chapter on pension reforms for more details).
Summary charts show the breakdown of the gross relative pension value into the
different components of the pension scheme (the first row of the charts). As far as possible,
the same terminology is used to describe these schemes. The particular national scheme
* Note that the modelling relates to single, full-career workers drawing the pension from the normal
eligibility age. Systems can have complex rules for periods out of the labour market (caring for
children or in unemployment, for example) or treat married couples as a single unit. These rules do
not affect the modelling results presented here.
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that is described can be found in the text of the country study. Some standard
abbreviations are used in the legends of the charts:
● SA: social assistance.
● Targeted: separate resource-tested schemes for older people.
● Minimum: a minimum pension within an earnings related scheme.
● Basic: a pension based only on number of years of coverage or residency.
● Earnings-related: all public earnings-related programmes, including notional accounts
and points schemes as well as traditional defined-benefit plans.
● DC: defined-contribution, mandatory private plans.
● Occupational: mandatory pensions, which can be provided by employers, industry-wide
schemes (Netherlands), profession-based schemes (Sweden) or publicly (Finland,
France).
The second row of country charts shows the effect of personal income taxes and social
security contributions on relative pension values and replacement rates, giving the gross
and net values.
The charts use a standard scale to ease comparisons between countries: the scale for
replacement rates runs to 125% while that for relative pension values runs to 2.5 times
average earnings. In some cases, pension benefits exceed these maxima and so the
measure has been capped at these levels.
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Australia
Australia’s pension system has two components: a means-tested age pension plus the
superannuation guarantee, a compulsory contribution to a private pension plan. These
plans are mainly defined contribution.
Qualifying conditions
The age pension is payable from age 65 for men. Women’s pensionable age – currently
62½ – will increase gradually to become 65 by 2014. The minimum age for withdrawing
superannuation guarantee benefits is currently 55, but this will increase gradually to
60 by 2025.
Benefit calculation
Defined contribution
The superannuation guarantee was introduced in 1992. It consists of a mandatory
employer contribution to a private pension plan. The pension plans may be operated by the
employer, industry associations, and financial service companies or even by individuals
themselves. The mandatory contribution rate has been 9% since the 2002-03 tax year.
Employers need not contribute for workers earning less than AUD 450 in a month
(equivalent to AUD 5 400 a year), but they can choose to contribute for these workers. (Note
that this minimum has not been raised in the past.) There is also a limit to the earnings
covered by the superannuation guarantee: employers need not contribute for employees’
pay above this threshold. For each quarter of the financial year 2003-04, this amount is
AUD 30 560 and for each quarter of the year 2004-05, it is AUD 32 180. This limit is worth
around 2½ times average wages and is indexed to a measure of average earnings.
The withdrawal stage of the superannuation guarantee complicates the calculations.
Although there are some defined-benefit occupational plans, most employees are
members of defined-contribution schemes. Members can take out the accumulated capital
as a lump sum or some sort of income stream. Currently, most benefits are taken as a lump
sum. For comparison with other countries (where defined-benefit plans predominate), the
capital from the superannuation guarantee is converted to a price-indexed annuity. The
annuity calculation is based on mortality data for Australia.
Targeted
The value of the age pension is adjusted biannually and it is paid fortnightly. In
September 2003, the maximum single rate of pension was AUD 453 a fortnight, increasing
to AUD 464 in March 2004 and AUD 471 in September 2004. (All values have been rounded
to the nearest dollar.) This gives an average for the tax year of an annual benefit of
AUD 12 241, equivalent to a quarter of average earnings.
The age pension is withdrawn once annual income from other sources exceeds a
threshold known as the “free area”. This is adjusted annually in July. The values for 2004
were AUD 120 in the first half and AUD 122 in the second half of the year (again calculated
fortnightly). The tax year figure for 2004 was therefore AUD 3 172, or 6.5% of average
earnings. The withdrawal rate is 40%. There is also an assets test. However, over 90% of
pensioners affected have their benefits reduced by the income rather than the assets test
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(and so it has been assumed in the modelling that the income test is binding). Around a
third of pensioners have their benefit reduced by the means test, and are therefore on part-
rate age pension. Two-thirds of pensioners are on the maximum age pension.
The age pension’s value is increased in line with prices, but where necessary a further
increase is made to ensure that it does not fall below 25% of the average of pre-tax male
total weekly earnings on the national definition (which is slightly different from the
earnings measure used in OECD analysis).
Early retirement
Access to superannuation benefits (including superannuation guarantee benefits) is
currently possible on retirement on or after age 55 (increasing to age 60). There is no early
retirement under the age pension.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer claiming superannuation after 65. Employers are required to
make superannuation contributions under the superannuation guarantee arrangements
for their eligible employees up to the age of 70.
It is also possible to defer claiming the age pension after 65. The pension bonus
scheme pays a once-only, tax-free lump sum to eligible members who defer claiming age
pension and continue to work. The bonus is paid when the eligible member claims and
receives age pension. A person must register and work a minimum of 12 months from date
of registration, and must complete at least 960 hours of gainful work each year. The bonus
can be accrued for up to five years. The amount of bonus is 9.4 per cent of the basic age
pension entitlement for the first year of deferral. For two years, the bonus is four times that
amount, nine times for three years, 16 times for four years and 25 times for five years. The
maximum, five-year bonus is equivalent to 2.35 times one year’s maximum age pension
entitlement.
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Pension modelling results: Australia
Men
Women (where different)
Median 
earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 40.8 35.4 39.2 43.1 50.8 58.5
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 53.4 46.3 51.4 56.4 64.4 70.7
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 47.9 70.7 52.3 43.1 33.8 29.2
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 61.7 83.5 66.2 56.4 46.1 40.8
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 8.2 12.5 9.0 7.3 5.5 4.6
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.5 14.6 10.5 8.4 6.4 5.4
Net pension wealth 8.2 12.5 9.0 7.3 5.3 4.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.5 14.6 10.5 8.4 6.2 5.0
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Austria
The pension system consists of a defined-benefit public scheme with an income-tested
top-up for low-income pensioners.
Qualifying conditions
Normal pension age is 65 for men. For women, retirement age is currently 60 years but
will be increased to 65 by 2033. There is a coverage condition: 180 months (15 years) in the
last 30 years or 300 months (25 years) during the full lifetime. Alternatively, 180 months of
contributions actually paid (as opposed to coverage alone) are sufficient. Insured months are
either contributory months (from employment or voluntary contributions) or supplementary
(i.e., credited months, known as Ersatzzeiten) for which only limited contributions are paid.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The pension benefit currently accrues at 1.96% (2006: 1.88%) of earnings for each year
of contributions but this will fall gradually, reaching 1.78% by 2009.
The averaging period for calculating benefits is being extended: from a smaller
number of best years’ earnings, it will reach 40 years from 2028. The valorisation procedure
is complex although in practice adjustments have been closer to price inflation than to
earnings growth. Valorisation under this new procedure is still under discussion. The
modelling takes this full-career measure and assumes that earlier years’ earnings are
revalued in line with earnings growth.
Contributions are payable up to a ceiling of EUR 48 300 a year, corresponding to 147%
of average earnings.
In 2005, pensions in payment were adjusted in line with prices up to the median
pension; pensions above this threshold were increased by a flat amount, which was equal
to the absolute increase given to the median pensioner. From 2006 to 2009, it is envisaged
that pensions will be fully indexed to prices up to 15 times the daily contribution ceiling
which for 2004 would have been EUR 115 x 15 = 1 725. The modelling assumes that this
practice will continue.
Targeted
There is a means-tested top-up (Ausgleichszulage) that ensures a minimum retirement
income of EUR 653 per month for single people and EUR 1 015 for a couple. There are fourteen
annual payments. Again, adjustment of the safety-net income is discretionary; the modelling
implicitly assumes that it will rise in line with average earnings.
Early retirement
Retirement is currently possible from 62 for men and from 60 for women, subject to
37.5 years of contributions or credits. From 2017 on, the earliest retirement age for women will
also be 62. Pensions taken before the age of 65 are reduced by 4.2% for each year that the
pension is claimed early.
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Late retirement
For retirement between the ages of 65 and 68 the pension is increased by 4.2% per year
and there is no such increment after 68. Workers who defer their pension continue to pay
contributions thereby increasing their pension entitlements.
Combining work and pensions is possible but there is an earnings limit. If pensioners
below the age of 65 earn more than EUR 323.46 (2005 value), the pension is fully
withdrawn. After age 65, unlimited earnings from work and pension receipt are permitted.
Pre-reform scenario
There have been three main pension reforms in the past decade, in 1997, 2000 and
2005. The modelling aims to capture the cumulated effects of these reforms since 1997.
The pre-reform accrual rate was 2% per year. The earnings measure was the best
15 years of earnings, valorised in line with prices.
The early retirement age was increased from 60 for men in 2000 to 61.5 in 2002. For
women, the age was increased from 55 to 56.5. The 1997 reform introduced for the first
time a reduction for early retirement of 2% per year.
Pension modelling results: Austria
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 68.1 40.0 60.1 80.1 117.7 117.7
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 79.3 53.2 71.5 90.9 122.8 122.8
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 80.1 80.1 80.1 80.1 78.5 58.8
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 90.6 90.4 90.6 90.9 89.2 66.4
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 12.0 12.2 12.2 11.7 10.8 8.1
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 14.0 14.2 14.2 13.5 12.5 9.4
Net pension wealth 9.5 11.0 9.8 9.0 7.7 5.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 11.0 12.8 11.5 10.4 8.8 6.6
Pension modelling results: Austria, pre-reform scenario
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 76.5 45.0 67.5 90.0 132.2 132.2
(% average gross earnings) 68.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 117.5 117.5
Net relative pension level 87.4 57.8 78.7 99.5 135.0 135.0
(% net average earnings) 79.2 53.1 71.5 90.8 122.6 122.6
Gross replacement rate 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 88.2 66.1
(% individual gross earnings) 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 78.4 58.8
Net replacement rate 99.9 98.3 99.6 99.5 98.1 73.0
(% individual net earnings) 90.5 90.3 90.5 90.8 89.1 66.3
Gross pension wealth 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.7 13.4 10.1
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.1 12.1
Net pension wealth 10.6 11.9 10.8 10.3 9.3 7.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 12.9 14.8 13.2 12.6 11.4 8.5
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Belgium
The pension system has two components: an earnings-related public scheme with a
minimum pension and a means-tested safety net.
Qualifying conditions
With 34 years’ contributions, the pension can be claimed at 60 under the 2004 rules.
This contribution condition will increase to 35 years from 2005. Since a full-career worker
from age 20 will meet this condition, the modelling assumes that people draw the pension
from age 60.
Normal pensionable age is 65 for men. For women, the eligibility age in 2004 was 63. It
will increase to 64 in 2006 and 65 in 2009.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The full replacement rate for a single pensioner is 60% and for those with a dependent
spouse, 75%. The annual accrual rate is therefore 60/45 = 1.33% for men and women. The
earnings measure is average lifetime pay. Earlier years’ earnings are revalued in line with
prices.
The full pension is paid provided the qualifying conditions above are met. For shorter
contribution histories, the pension is proportionally reduced.
There is a ceiling to pensionable earnings of EUR 41 564.11 for 2004 (around 117% of
average earnings).
Pensions in payment are uprated in line with a consumer price index (that excludes
some goods). There have also been discretionary real increases (called “adaptations to
well-being”). However, these increments have recently been very limited (either to the
lowest or the longest-running pensions). From 2008 on, the government will have to make
decisions on uprating of all pensions every two years.
There are additional payments (“holiday” and “supplementary” allowances) payable
once a year. These are equal to the value of the monthly pension up to a ceiling of EUR 505
for a single person and EUR 631 for pensioners with a dependent spouse.
Minimum
There is a minimum annual credit designed to increase pension entitlements for
people with low earnings and/or in part-time work. Annual earnings of less than
EUR 14 520.06 (equivalent to 41% of average earnings) are inflated to this level. To qualify
for the minimum credits, at least 15 years’ insurance is necessary. (This gives an effective
minimum pension for a full-career worker of EUR 11 959.67 for a single person, worth 34%
of average earnings.)
There is also a minimum earnings-related pension of EUR 10 191.95 for a single person
(EUR 12 735.92 with a dependent spouse) meeting the full contribution condition. For a
single person, this is around 29% of average earnings. The benefit will be a proportion of
this minimum in the case of less-than-full careers, if the beneficiary has at least two-thirds
of the full number of years. In the other case, the benefit value will simply be obtained
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through the application of the benefit formula (there will be no “levelling up” of the benefit
in line with the minimum pensions).
The minimum pension is indexed to prices, excluding certain goods. Benefits are
increased by 2% each time cumulative inflation exceeds a certain threshold (2%) since the
last adjustment.
Pensioners will receive the higher of the minimum pension described here and the
pension calculated according to minimum annual credit.
Targeted
The safety-net income for the elderly is EUR 7 889.28 for a pensioner living alone (22%
of average earnings) and EUR 5 259.48 for an older person living with others. Indexation is
again to prices excluding certain goods.
Early retirement
Early retirement is possible from age 60, subject to 34 years’ contributions in 2004
rising to 35 years in 2005. There is no actuarial reduction in the pension calculation. The
pension, however, will be incomplete, due to the shortened career. There is an earnings test
limiting the opportunity to combine an early retirement pension with work. This is more
strict than the earnings test applied after normal pension age (see below).
Late retirement
It is possible to defer pension after the normal retirement age for people who continue
working. Work after the age of 62 or beyond 44 years of contributions is credited with a
bonus. Working after normal retirement age can also be used to plug career gaps to obtain
a full pension or can improve the pension amount, since only the 45 last years are used in
the calculation.
It is possible to combine pensions and earnings (after normal pension age) within
limits. For annual earnings under EUR 13 556.68 (single) or EUR 17 267.48 (with a dependent
child), the pensions will not be reduced. The threshold for a single person is worth 38% of
average earnings. Above this ceiling, the pension will be reduced by the amount that
earnings surpass these limits. If actual earnings are 15% above the limits then the pension
will be completely withdrawn.
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Pension modelling results: Belgium
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Men Median
earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 34.6 28.6 30.7 40.4 47.0 47.0
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 56.9 49.3 52.8 63.0 69.2 69.2
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 40.7 57.3 40.9 40.4 31.3 23.5
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 64.4 77.3 65.5 63.0 51.1 40.7
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 6.2 8.8 6.2 6.2 4.8 3.6
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 7.2 10.2 7.3 7.2 5.6 4.2
Net pension wealth 5.9 8.8 6.2 5.6 4.1 3.1
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 6.9 10.2 7.3 6.5 4.8 3.6
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Canada
The pension system offers a universal flat-rate benefit, which can be topped up with an
income-tested benefit, and earnings-related public schemes.
Qualifying conditions
The basic old age security (OAS) pension is subject to a residence test, with1/40th of the
maximum pension earned for each year of residence after age 18 up to a maximum of
40 years. A minimum of ten years’ residence is required to receive any benefit. It is payable
from age 65.
For the earnings-related scheme, a full pension requires about 40 years’ contributions
but a single valid contribution is sufficient to generate an entitlement. Normal pension
eligibility age is 65 but an early pension can be claimed from age 60.
Benefit calculation
Basic
The average 2004 payment for the OAS pension was CAD 5 376, while the full pension
level was CAD 5 592.75. The full pension is equivalent to 14.4% of average earnings. The
value of the basic pension is price-indexed.
This pension is subject to an income test operated through the tax system (a “claw-
back”). For income above CAD 59 790 a year, the basic pension in 2004 was withdrawn at a
15% rate. This threshold was equivalent to 154% of average earnings. It is also indexed to
prices.
Targeted
The guaranteed income supplement (GIS) is added to the basic OAS pension. The
combination gave a maximum benefit of CAD 12 239.67 in 2004. The average combined
basic pension and supplementary benefit was 31.4% of average earnings for a single
person.
The GIS is reduced against income other than the basic pension at a 50% rate. The
target benefit level is price-indexed.
Earnings-related
Earnings-related pensions and benefits are provided by the Canada Pension Plan (CPP)/
Québec Pension Plan (QPP). The CPP and QPP offer broadly similar benefits. The scheme
targets a replacement rate of 25% of earnings, based on average lifetime salary (excluding
the 15% of years with the lowest earnings). Earlier years’ pay is revalued in line with
economy-wide earnings. As noted previously, the full benefit requires about 40 years’
contributions with proportional reductions for shorter work histories. The maximum
earnings-related retirement pension for 2004 was CAD 814.17 a month (a quarter of
average earnings).
People earning less than CAD 3 500 a year are not required to contribute. There was a
ceiling of CAD 40 500 in 2004 (96% of average earnings) to contributions. The ceiling is indexed
to increases in average earnings while the contribution floor is frozen in nominal terms.
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The value of the earnings-related pension after retirement is uprated annually in line
with prices.
Early retirement
Early retirement beginning at age 60 is possible in the state earnings-related scheme
subject to a benefit reduction of 6% per year. Early retirement is not possible in the other
two public schemes (basic and means-tested).
Late retirement
The earnings-related pension can be deferred earning a 6% increment for each year
after age 65 – up to a maximum of five years. The basic and income-tested benefits cannot
be deferred. The income-test for the latter includes earnings, for the former there is a claw-
back against large incomes, again including earnings.
Pension modelling results: Canada
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 42.1 37.7 40.8 43.9 44.4 44.4
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 55.3 50.1 53.9 57.4 58.0 58.0
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 49.5 75.4 54.4 43.9 29.6 22.2
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 62.8 89.2 68.3 57.4 40.0 30.8
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 7.6 11.5 8.3 6.7 4.5 3.4
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.8 13.4 9.7 7.8 5.3 4.0
Net pension wealth 7.5 11.5 8.3 6.6 4.4 3.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.7 13.4 9.6 7.7 5.2 3.9
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Czech Republic
The public pension scheme has a basic element and an earnings-related part calculated
according to a progressive formula. There is also a minimum pension.
Qualifying conditions
The standard retirement age will be gradually increased to 63 for men born in 1953
and later. The pension eligibility age will be 59-62 for women with children (depending on
the number of children that they raised) and 63 for women without children. 25 years’
coverage is required as a minimum but people with 15 years’ contributions can receive a
pension from 65.
Benefit calculation
Basic
The value of the basic pension is CZK 1 400 per month, equivalent to 8% of earnings.
There is no statutory indexation requirement for the value of the basic benefit alone.
However, total pensions in payment must be increased by at least prices plus one third of
real wage growth (see below).
Earnings-related
The earnings-related pension gives 1.5% of earnings for each year of contributions.
The earnings measure currently averages across all years since 1985, but it will gradually
reach 30 years (in 2015). Earlier years’ earnings are valorised by the growth of economy-
wide average earnings.
There is a progressive benefit formula, with the first CZK 8 400 per month replaced at
100%, the slice of earnings between this limit and CZK 20 500 at 30% with 10% replacement
above this level. The first threshold, below which there is 100% replacement, is equivalent
to 48% of average earnings, while the second threshold is 117% of average earnings. There
is no statutory indexation requirement for these thresholds, but both these thresholds
have changed annually.
There is no specific statutory indexation requirement for the earnings-related pension
component in payment. However, the combined total pension benefit (flat-rate and
earnings-related components) is adjusted at least to price inflation plus at least one third
of real wage growth.
Minimum
The total value of the minimum monthly pension benefit is CZK 2 170, which is made
up of a minimum earnings-related pension of CZK 770 plus the basic component of
CZK 1 400. This combined minimum pension is indexed in the same way as described
above. It is worth 12.4% of average earnings.
Social assistance
Older people are covered by the general social-assistance scheme and related benefits
in kind. The target safety-net income for a single-person household is CZK 4 300 per
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month, or 26.4% of average earnings. This is made up of a personal needs amount of
CZK 2 360 plus a household needs amount of CZK 1 940.
Early retirement
It is possible to retire three years before the normal ages, i.e. at 60 for men and 56-60
for women subject to 25 years’ contributions. The total accrual factor (i.e., number of years
of contributions multiplied by the accrual rate) is permanently reduced by 0.9% for each
90 days of early retirement (3.6% per year). For a full-career worker, this is equivalent to a
decrement in the pension level (rather than the replacement rate) for early retirement of
3.6 / 64.5 (1.5% times 43 years) = 5.6%.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer claiming the pension beyond the normal pension age. The total
accrual factor (see section on early retirement above) is increased by 1.5% for each 90-day
period of deferral (6% per year). There is no additional pension accrual for deferred
retirement. It is also possible to combine pension receipt while continuing to work.
Further reading
Hemmings, P. and E.R. Whitehouse. (2006), “Assessing the 2005 Czech Proposals for
Pension Reform”, Working Paper No. 496, Economics Department, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2006), “Ensuring Fiscal Sustainability: Assessing Recent Proposals for Pension
Reform”, Chapter 2 of OECD Economic Surveys: Czech Republic, OECD, Paris.
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Pension modelling results: Czech Republic
Men Median
earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 46.2 39.4 44.3 49.1 54.6 57.8
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 60.6 51.7 58.1 64.4 71.6 75.8
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 54.3 78.8 59.0 49.1 36.4 28.9
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 70.3 98.8 75.6 64.4 49.3 40.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 8.9 13.0 9.7 8.1 6.0 4.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.5 15.3 11.4 9.5 7.0 5.6
Net pension wealth 8.9 13.0 9.7 8.1 6.0 4.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.5 15.3 11.4 9.5 7.0 5.6
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Denmark
The public scheme (folkepension) consists of a basis amount and an income-tested
pension supplement. A means-tested supplementary pension benefit is paid to the financially
most disadvantaged pensioners. There are also two schemes based on individuals’
contribution records, the ATP (the Danish Labour Market Supplementary Pension) and the SP
(the Special Pension savings scheme). In addition, compulsory occupational schemes
negotiated as part of collective agreements cover about 90% of full-time employees.
Qualifying conditions
The normal pension age is 65 (67 for people born before 1 July 1939). A full public old-age
pension requires 40 years’ residence. Shorter periods qualify for a pro-rated benefit (subject to
a minimum of three years’ residence).
A full entitlement under the labour-market supplementary pension (ATP) and the special
saving scheme (SP) requires a full career of contributions. The ATP scheme was established
in 1964 and the SP scheme in 1999.
Benefit calculation
Basic
The full basic pension amount is DKK 4 648 per month or DKK 55 776 per year, equivalent
to 17.6% of average earnings. There is an earnings test which means that the benefit will be
reduced if pay exceeds DKK 237 000 per year (three-quarters of average earnings). The benefit
is withdrawn at a rate of 30% against earnings above this level.
Targeted
The full pension supplement is DKK 4 679 per month or DKK 56 148 per year for single
persons (17.7% of average earnings). The amounts are tested against all sources of income
(including ATP, SP and occupational pensions) apart from the basic pension amount. The
pension supplement is withdrawn once income exceeds DKK 52 300 a year for single persons
(16.5% of average earnings). The withdrawal rate is 30% of income above the threshold for a
single person.
Connected with the public old-age pension, a new supplementary pension benefit of
DKK 6 200 (2005) a year was introduced in 2004. The supplementary pension benefit is taxable
and paid once a year. The benefit is means-tested and targeted to the poorest pensioners.
The public old-age pension (the basic amount and the pension supplement) and the
supplementary pension benefit are adjusted annually in line with average earnings. The
adjustment is based on an index of wage increases during the two preceding years. If nominal
earnings growth exceeds 2%, a maximum of 0.3 percentage points of the excess increase is
allocated to a social spending reserve. Thus, indexation of pensions and other social benefits is
based upon wage increases less any allocation to the reserve.
Occupational
These schemes are fully funded defined-contribution schemes agreed between the
social partners. Coverage of these schemes is almost universal. Contributions are typically
between 9% and 17% of earnings. In 2006, the percentage for the majority of Danish
workers has been raised to 10.8% and this contribution rate is used for the modelling.
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Benefits are usually withdrawn as an annuity. The assumed interest rate is 1.5% for recent
contributions or new schemes. However, the schemes operate on a “with-profit” basis, with
pension increases depending on the return on assets and mortality experience of the fund.
Many schemes also allow lump-sum withdrawals. Since 2000, the annuity calculation must
use unisex mortality tables.
Defined contribution (ATP)
Technically, the ATP scheme pays a deferred annuity. Contributions are split with two-
thirds paid by the employer and one-third by the worker. The contribution amount reflects the
number of hours worked. The contribution schedule against hours worked is shown in the
following table (for monthly paid workers):
Thus, a full-time employee in the private sector paid DKK 2 684 in 2005 – a nominal figure,
which has applied since 1996. The value of the contribution is adjusted if and when the social
partners decide to do so as part of collective agreements. Over the past 20 years the
contribution has been increased in steps more or less in line with average earnings. The
modelling assumes that the contribution will increase in line with average earnings. However,
an increase of 9% has been agreed for 2006.
Until 2002, each DKK 396 of contributions earned DKK 100 of pension benefits paid
from 67 regardless of the age at which they were made. This implied an interest rate of around
4.5%. From 2002, a nominal interest rate of 1.5% has been assumed. ATP is a “with-profit”
scheme: if actual returns exceed 4.5% or 1.5% respectively, pensions may be increased. In the
model, it is assumed that the ATP earns the same interest rate as assumed for funded
DC schemes in other OECD countries.
The ATP scheme increases pensions in payment and pension rights alike if its financial
condition allows. This is done in the form of bonus allowances which reflect the difference in
implicit interest rates for contributions made before and after 2002.
The modelling assumes full indexation to price inflation.
Defined contribution (Special pension, SP)
Employees, self-employed and recipients of unemployment and sickness benefits
contribute 1% of earnings to this mandatory individual retirement savings scheme.
Investments are currently managed centrally. As from 2005, members have been able to
choose their manager and portfolio. There is no ceiling to earnings covered by this scheme.
Benefits are paid at age 65. If the account balance is less than DKK 15 000, it is paid as a lump
sum. If it is between DKK 15 000 and DKK 120 000, then 1/10th of the balance is paid out in the
first year, 1/9th the next year etc. If the balance is more than DKK 120 000 at age 65, then the
payments are monthly with annual adjustments to reflect the market value of the account.
As part of an economic-policy agreement, contributions for the SP scheme have been
suspended since 2004 in order to boost consumption and increase employment. The model
takes a long-term perspective and so assumes that SP contributions resume.
Monthly hours < 39 39-77 78-116 > 116
Contribution, DKK/month up until 2006 0 74.55 149.10 223.65
Contribution, DKK/month as from 2006 0 81.30 162.60 243.90
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Early retirement
There is a partial early retirement pension for workers aged between 60 and 65 who
continue to work for 12 to 30 hours a week. The beneficiary must reduce weekly hours worked
by at least seven hours a week or at least one quarter of total hours worked in an average week.
The partial pension is calculated as a fixed amount for every hour that is reduced. The amount
is approximately DDK 71 an hour for 2004. Since 1999, beneficiaries are subject to a pension
deduction.
People covered by either early-retirement programme revert to the standard old-age
pension once they reach the normal retirement age of 65.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer the public old age pension for up to ten years. The increment for
deferring pension for a year is the ratio of the period of deferral to average life expectancy at
the time the pension is drawn. For example, the World Bank/UN population projections show
life expectancy for a 66-year-old to be 18.7 years. Thus, the increment for deferring for a year
from age 65 would be 1/18.7 = 5.3%.
Pension modelling results: Denmark
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 71.0 59.8 67.8 75.8 91.9 114.2
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 81.6 69.9 78.3 86.7 102.2 118.6
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 83.6 119.6 90.4 75.8 61.3 57.1
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 94.1 132.7 101.6 86.7 77.0 72.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 13.2 19.5 14.4 11.9 9.4 8.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 15.2 22.3 16.5 13.6 10.7 9.9
Net pension wealth 8.9 13.4 9.8 8.0 6.1 5.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.3 15.4 11.2 9.2 7.0 6.1
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Finland
The two-tier pension system consists of a basic national pension, which is income-
tested, and a range of statutory earnings-related schemes, with very similar rules for
different groups. The modelling covers the scheme for private sector employees (TEL). The
schemes for private-sector employees are partially pre-funded while the public-sector
schemes are pay-as-you-go financed (with buffer funds to even out future increases in
pension contributions). Major pension reform was introduced in Finland in 2005. The rules
presented here refer to long-term situation when all reforms are fully phased-in.
Qualifying conditions
The national pension is subject to a residency test and withdrawn against pension
income from the earnings-related schemes. The national old-age pension is payable from
age 65. The full national pension benefit is payable with 40 years residence as an adult,
with pro-rata adjustments for shorter periods of residence. Early retirement on the age
national pension is possible from age 62.
In the earnings-related pension scheme, the retirement age is flexible between 63 and
68 (from 2005). In addition, early retirement is possible at age 62 and the pension can be
deferred beyond age 68.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
From 2005, the accrual rate is 1.5% of pensionable earnings at ages 18-52, 1.9% at
ages 53-62 and 4.5% at ages 63-67. For a full-career worker working from age 20 until
retirement at age 65, the total lifetime accrual will be 77.5% of pensionable earnings. The
earnings measure is based on lifetime average earnings. In the calculation, however, the
employee’s pension contribution is deducted. Note, however, that the replacement rates
are shown relative to total gross earnings.
Earlier years’ earnings are re-valued in line with a mix of economy-wide earnings and
prices. From 2005, wage growth has an 80% weight and price inflation, 20%. After
retirement, the earnings-related pension is uprated using a formula of 20% of earnings
inflation and 80% of price inflation.
From 2010, newly awarded benefits will be reduced according to increases in life
expectancy. The calculations use lagged mortality data: for 2010, for example, the data are
the average for 2004-2008 compared to the base year which in turn results from data
for 2003-07. Between 2002 and 2040, the UN/World Bank mortality projections imply an
increase in life expectancy at age 65 from 16.8 years to 20.4 (calculated from unisex
mortality rates). The adjustment takes the form of an annuity calculation using a discount
rate of 2% per year. The adjustment is expected to reduce benefits to 88.6% of their value
under the pre-reform rules by 2040. The life expectancy coefficient is calculated for each
cohort at the age of 62.
There is no contribution floor and no ceiling to contributions or pensionable earnings.
However, there are minimum earnings limit for pension insurance.
Minimum
The parameters of the national pension scheme differ between municipalities. The
full basic monthly benefit for a single pensioner in 2004 was EUR 496.38 in the first
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municipality group and EUR 475.73 in the second municipality group, corresponding to just
below a fifth of average earnings. The national pension is reduced by 50% of the difference
between other pension income and a small disregard which in 2004 was EUR 559 per year.
No pension is payable once other pension income exceeds EUR 1 016.96 or EUR 975.58 per
month, depending on municipality group. Note that the modelling uses the higher value
for the national pension.
From 2005 on, earnings-related pension rights accrued after the age of 63 will be
disregarded when national pension entitlement is calculated.
The basic pension benefit, the parameters of the means test, and pensions in payment
are uprated annually in line with prices. In practice there have been additional increases
based on separate decisions. Note that the modelling assumes uprating with earnings over
the long term.
Early retirement
Early retirement is possible in the national pension scheme from age 62. From 2005, the
pension is permanently reduced by 0.4% for each month of retirement before the age of 65.
Early retirement is also possible at age 62 under the earnings-related scheme, subject
to a 0.6% benefit reduction per month of early retirement until the age of 63. After the age
of 63 there is no benefit reduction.
Late retirement
From 2004 the national pension can be deferred after the age of 65 and the pension is
then increased by 0.6% for each month by which retirement is postponed.
From 2005 onwards, the increment for late retirement is reduced to 0.4% for each
month (4.8% per year) in the earnings-related scheme after age 68. There is no adjustment
between ages 63 and 68 because of the accelerated accrual of pension at those ages.
It is possible to combine receipt of pension and earnings from work. From 2005, after
taking the old-age pension, earnings accrue additional pension right with a rate of 1.5% per
year until the age of 68.
Pre-reform scenario
There have been several changes in the rules of different pension schemes since 1990
and the model uses 1990 rules as follows.
The normal pension age was 65. The early pension eligibility age was 60.
Before reform, there was a basic element to the national pension that was not
resource-tested. In 1990, this amounted to FIM 390 per month.
The additional, pension-income-tested benefit was FIM 1 824 per month for a single
person. (Again, this varied by municipality: this is the figure for Helsinki.)
To derive parameters that would have applied in 1994 had the system not been
reformed, the ratio of the basic to the national pension that applied in 1990 is used to
calculate basic and pension-income-tested pension levels for 1994. These are
EUR 1 054 and EUR 4 907 respectively.
The earnings-related scheme had a linear accrual rate of 1.5% per year for each year of
contributions in year 1990. The entry age for earnings-related pensions was 23, compared
with 18 currently (i.e. no accrual before 23). There was no accrual from age 65.
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Indexation of pensions in payment and valorisation of earlier years’ earnings were
both 50:50 to earnings and prices. From 1996, pension indexation changed from the age of
65 to 20% earnings inflation and 80% price inflation. For past earnings and to pensions
payable to those under 65, it remained at 50% earnings and 50% prices.
The earnings measure was based on the middle two of the final four years’ earnings in
each job (i.e., excluding the highest and lowest earnings of the final four years). There was
no employees’ pension contribution until 1993. Pensionable earnings were gross earnings
until 1996, when pensionable pay was redefined as earnings less employees’ pension
contributions (see above).
The reduction for early retirement under the pre-reform earnings-related scheme was
between 0.37% and 0.5% per month (4.44%-6% per year) depending on the year of birth of
the recipient. The national pension was reduced by 0.5% per month of early retirement.
Deferral of pensions earned an increment of 1% per month for both earnings-related
scheme and basic/national pension.
Pension modelling results: Finland
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 53.9 35.6 47.6 63.4 95.1 126.9
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 59.8 44.8 54.5 68.8 96.2 121.2
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 63.4 71.3 63.4 63.4 63.4 63.4
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 68.0 77.4 68.4 68.8 70.3 70.5
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 10.0 11.2 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 11.8 13.2 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.8
Net pension wealth 7.6 9.6 7.9 7.4 6.9 6.6
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.0 11.4 9.3 8.8 8.2 7.8
Pension modelling results: Finland, pre-reform scenario
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 56.9 35.5 50.6 66.3 97.8 129.3
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 62.3 44.6 56.5 71.0 98.0 122.4
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 66.9 71.1 67.5 66.3 65.2 64.7
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 70.9 77.0 70.9 71.0 71.6 71.1
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 11.1 11.7 11.2 11.0 10.8 10.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 13.3 14.0 13.4 13.2 13.0 12.9
Net pension wealth 8.4 10.1 8.6 8.1 7.5 7.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.0 12.1 10.3 9.7 8.9 8.4
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France
The pension system has two tiers: an earnings-related public pension and mandatory
occupational schemes, based on a points system. The public scheme also has a minimum
pension.
Qualifying conditions
A full state pension will require 40 years’ contributions by 2008, compared with 37.5 years
in the past. Between 2008 and 2012, this will then increase gradually to 41 years. After 2012, the
minimum contribution will increase in line with increases in life expectancy so that the ratio
of period of pension payment to period of working is kept constant. Normal pension age is 60.
The modelling assumes that a full career is from age 20 to 60. The minimum pension has the
same qualifying conditions as the public, earnings-related scheme.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The state pension targets a replacement rate of 50% after a full career (which will be
40 years’ contributions and then increased further as described above). For each missing
quarter, benefits are reduced by 1.25%, giving a reduction (decote) per missing year of 5%.
For contribution periods less than a full career, the target replacement rate is reduced
pro rata and by an additional penalty for each years missing (or each year the pension is
drawn before 65).
The earnings measure is based on a number of best years of earnings, valorised in line
with price inflation. From 2008 onwards, pay will be averaged over 25 years. Currently, it is
around 20 years.
Because of the limited number of years included in the earnings measure for
calculating pension benefits and the policy of valorisation in line with prices, the
replacement rate in the French public system is very sensitive to the time profile of
earnings throughout the worker’s career. Given the baseline assumption of continuous real
earnings growth of 2% over a worker’s career, combined with the fact that the OECD
calculations use the lifetime revalued average earnings as reference salary, the
replacement rates calculated are lower than those calculated using the observed salary
progression in France, where pay increases are concentrated primarily in the first half of
the career.
There is a ceiling on eligible earnings, which in 2004 was EUR 29 712. This is
approximately equal to average earnings on the OECD measure (EUR 29 549) but is 142% of
average earnings on the national measure. Benefits in payment are indexed to prices.
Minimum
There is a minimum pension, which was EUR 6 706 for the calendar year 2004. This is
worth 23% of average earnings on the OECD measure. To be eligible for the full benefit,
38 years (40 years in 2008 and higher thereafter) of contributions are needed; the minimum
pension is pro-rated for shorter periods. Full-career workers, since the mandatory
occupational pension supplements the public pension benefit, will rarely be eligible for the
old-age assistance programme. The value of the minimum pension is indexed to prices.
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Mandatory occupational
The ARRCO scheme covers the majority of private-sector employees. Different rules
apply to “cadres” (those in professional or managerial positions) under the AGIRC
programme; the following regulations apply to non-cadres.
Although actual contributions are higher, benefits are only earned on 6% of earnings
under the ceiling of the public scheme. Between one and three times the public-scheme
ceiling, benefits are earned on 16% of pay. Thus, the ARRCO ceiling is three times that of the
public pension scheme: EUR 89 136. (Note that there is no ceiling for the AGIRC programme
for cadres.)
Each year, the number of points earned is the value of contributions divided by the
cost of a pension point. At retirement, the accumulated number of points is converted into
a pension benefit by multiplying by the value of a pension point. The pension-point value
was EUR 1.0698 from April 2003 to April 2004 and EUR 1.0886 from April 2004, giving an
annual figure for calendar 2004 of EUR 1.0839. The pension-point cost was EUR 12.362 for
calendar year 2004.
Uprating of the cost and value of pension points is agreed between the social partners.
The current agreement, valid until 2008, is to increase the cost of pension points in line
with earnings and the value of pension points in line with prices. The modelling assumes
that this differential uprating between the cost and value of a point will continue. Again,
this policy of effective valorisation of earlier years’ entitlements to prices results in lower
benefits than valorisation to earnings. At the baseline assumptions, the reduction is to 69%
of the pension entitlement under earnings valorisation.
It is important to note that the uprating policy for these two parameters affects both
the path of pensions in payment (here termed “indexation”) and the change in value of
pension entitlements between the time they were earned and the time they are withdrawn
(akin to the process of “valorisation” in earnings-related schemes).
Targeted
There is a minimum income for people aged 65 worth EUR 7 053 a year. This benefit,
equivalent to 24% of average earnings, is adjusted in line with earnings.
The 2003 reform introduced a new objective that, from 2008, people with a full career
earning the minimum wage (corresponding to about 40% of average earnings on the OECD
measure) would receive a pension equivalent to at least 85% of the net minimum wage.
This has been modelled as a minimum total income guarantee of 85% of the net minimum
wage for a 35-hour week. For 2004, the net minimum wage was EUR 11 086, giving a target
minimum of EUR 9 423 for 2004 were this policy already in place.
Pre-reform scenario
The 50% replacement-rate target of the public, earnings-related scheme has not been
changed. However, the earnings measure has been extended from the best ten years and
will eventually be the best 25 years. Prices valorisation of earlier years’ earnings was
introduced in 1987. Therefore, both pre-and post-reform scenarios assume prices
valorisation. The extension of the contribution qualifying period from 37.5 to 41 years (and
beyond) was explained above. Post-retirement indexation of pensions in payment has been
to prices since 1998.
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Turning to the ARRCO scheme, the major change to this was in 1996. Between 1997
and 2001, the cost of a pension point was uprated in line with average earnings and the
value of the pension point was uprated in line with prices. In 1996, the cost of a pension
point was EUR 9.30 while in 2004, this was EUR 12.36, an increase over the period of 33%.
For the point value, the 1996 figure was just over EUR 0.98, rising to EUR 1.08 in
calendar 2004, an increase of just 11%. It is assumed for the pre-reform scenario that the
relationship between the point cost and value that held in 1996 was maintained, giving a
point-value for 2004 (in the absence of reform) of EUR 1.30 rather than EUR 1.08. Under the
pre-reform case, it is assumed that both the cost and value of pension points was increased
in line with average earnings.
Early retirement
Early retirement operates through a separate programme administered by the
employment fund (FNE). Early retirement is possible from 57 and from 56 under certain
circumstances related to working conditions. The replacement rate is around 80%. At the
normal pension age (or at the age when workers become eligible for a full regular old age
pension up to 65), individuals switch to the public pension. The period on FNE benefits is
fully credited for the public pension.
Under the occupational pension, early retirement is possible, often subject to
reductions related either to age of retirement or years of contributions or both. Retirement
is possible at age 60 with 40 years’ coverage without a reduction. With fewer than 40 years’
coverage, the pension is adjusted as shown in the Table with the adjustment being that
which is more favourable: relating to the retirement age or to the number of missing years.
For retirement at age 61, for example, the pension is reduced to 83% of the full value.
However, if the individual retires at 61 with 39 years’ contributions, the reduction is only to
96%, because there is only one missing year.
Late retirement
If people work after age 60 and have reached the qualifying conditions for a full
pension (which will be 40 years’ coverage and increase further after 2008), each additional
year increases the benefit under the public scheme by 3%. For the period of deferred
retirement, people continue to accumulate ARRCO points.
Work and pension receipt can be combined, provided people leave their usual job.
Retirement age 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
Missing years 5 4 3 2 1
Coefficient 0.43 0.50 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.96
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Pension modelling results: France
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 43.5 31.9 38.4 51.2 70.3 89.4
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 54.6 42.1 50.2 63.1 83.8 103.1
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 51.2 63.8 51.2 51.2 46.9 44.7
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 62.8 78.4 64.9 63.1 58.0 55.4
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 9.2 11.5 9.2 9.2 8.4 8.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.6 13.2 10.6 10.6 9.7 9.3
Net pension wealth 8.2 10.8 8.6 8.1 7.2 6.6
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.5 12.4 9.9 9.3 8.3 7.6
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Pension modelling results: France, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 55.0 32.5 48.5 64.7 87.7 110.5
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 67.3 42.8 60.1 78.1 101.3 123.9
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 64.7 64.9 64.7 64.7 58.4 55.3
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 77.4 79.8 77.7 78.1 70.1 66.6
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 11.6 11.7 11.6 11.6 10.5 10.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.4 12.1 11.5
Net pension wealth 10.2 11.0 10.3 10.0 8.7 8.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 11.7 12.7 11.8 11.5 10.0 9.2
III. GERMANY
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007 127
Germany
The statutory public pension system has a single tier and is an earnings related PAYG
system. Calculation of pensions is based on pension points. There is a social-assistance
safety net for low-income pensioners.
Qualifying conditions
The pension is payable from age 65 with five years’ contributions and from age 63 with
35 years’ for those born in 1952 and later. Fewer than five years’ contributions earn no benefit.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
A year’s contribution at the average earnings of contributors earns one pension point.
The relevant average earning is approximately identical to National Accounts average
earnings. Contributions based on lower or higher income earn proportionately less or more
pension points. Contributions are levied on annual earnings up to EUR 61 800 in 2004. The
ceiling is equivalent to around 210% of the relevant average earnings. The relevant average
earnings were EUR28 973 in 2004, equivalent to 70% of the OECD average earnings measure.
At retirement, the pension points of every year are added up. The sum of pension points
is multiplied by a “pension-point value”, which was EUR 313.56 in calendar year 2004. The
pension point value is valid for newly retired and already retired pensioners. It is uprated
annually in line with gross wages as a starting point but depends on two additional factors.
The first factor incorporates changes of the contribution rates to the statutory pension
scheme and to the subsidised voluntary occupational and personal pension schemes. An
increase of contribution rates will reduce the adjustment of pension point value. The second,
so-called sustainability factor links the adjustment of the pension-point value to changes in
the system dependency ratio, that is, the ratio of pensioners to contributors.
These factors were integrated into the indexation rules with the aim to limit the increase
of the contribution rate from currently 19.5% to 22%. The increase of the pensioner/contributor
ratio will result in indexation to less than average wages. In the long run, the adjustment of the
pension-point value is expected to be 18% below the increase of average earnings.
The relevant average earnings for calculating the pension points as well as the
pension-point value are slightly different in the new Länder. This difference is assumed to
disappear in a long run as wages will align.
Social assistance
For people with low income there is a social assistance which is also applicable for
pensioners. The social-assistance amounts in the Western Länder in 2004 to
EUR 7 932 per year including average benefits for housing and fuel costs; this is equivalent
to 19.3% of average earnings.
Early retirement
For those born 1952 or later, early retirement is possible from 63 with 35 years’
contributions and eight years of contribution immediately before retirement. If retiring
before the age of 65, benefits are reduced by 3.6% per year of early retirement. In addition,
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compared to someone retiring at 65, pension entitlement are significantly lower due to
working two years less and not earning additional pension points.
Late retirement
Deferring the pension after 65 earns a 6% increment for each year of additional work.
Pre-reform scenario
For the pre-reform scenario, the modelling takes the pension-point value without
adjustment for contribution increases and the sustainability factor. The pre-reform
scenario allows for the tax concessions on pension income, while the baseline results
assume that the transition from the old tax system to full taxation of pensions is
completed.
Pension modelling results: Germany
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 33.9 20.0 29.9 39.9 59.9 60.1
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 51.0 32.0 46.0 58.0 81.2 81.5
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9 39.9 30.0
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 57.3 53.4 56.6 58.0 59.2 44.4
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 5.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 6.5
Net pension wealth 6.2 6.6 6.3 6.0 5.6 4.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 7.3 7.8 7.4 7.0 6.6 4.9
Pension modelling results: Germany, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 41.4 24.4 36.5 48.7 73.1 73.3
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 67.5 39.7 59.6 79.5 119.2 119.6
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 48.7 48.7 48.7 48.7 48.7 36.7
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 75.9 66.3 73.4 79.5 86.9 65.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 6.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 7.9
Net pension wealth 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 6.1
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 7.3
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Greece
Pensions are provided through an earnings-related public scheme with two components
plus a series of minimum pensions/social safety nets. The pension system described
applies to labour-market entrants from 1993.
Qualifying conditions
The normal pension age is 65 for men and 60 for women, equalised at 65 for people
entering the labour force from 1993. A pension from this age requires a minimum of
4 500 days of contributions (equivalent to 15 years). Workers with a contribution record of
11 100 working days (37 years) can retire on a full benefit regardless of age. There are
concessions for people who work in arduous or unhygienic occupations and for women
with dependant or disabled children.
The minimum social pension requires 15 years’ contributions.
Benefit formula
Earnings-related scheme: main component
For labour-market entrants from 1993, the pension is 2% of earnings for each year of
contributions up to 35 years. There is therefore a maximum replacement rate of 70% for
people retiring at the normal age or earlier. However, for working after age 65 and up to 67,
there is a higher accrual of 3% per year and there is no accrual rate for those working
after 67 ( giving a maximum replacement rate of 76%).
The maximum pension (see below) also does not apply for additional work after 65.
The earnings measure is the average over the last five years before retirement. Earlier
years’ pay is adjusted in the pension value (“valorised”) in line with increases defined in
national incomes policy.
There is a maximum pension, calculated as four times the 1991 GNP per capita, linked
to the evolution of civil servants’ pensions. For 2004, this cap on pension benefits was
EUR 2 346.76 per month. The calculations indicate that, for a full-career worker, this is
equivalent to a ceiling on pensionable earnings of 275% of average earnings.
Adjustment of pensions in payment is discretionary. In the last five years, pension
increases have been progressive with one exception, when all pensions were increased by
the same proportion (see below). In 1999-2001, increases of low pensions were
substantially larger than price inflation. However, in 2002, they lagged behind. Given the
lack of consistent practice in recent benefit adjustments, pension wealth calculations are
based on price indexation.
All pensions have 14 monthly payments.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Inflation 2.6% 3.2% 3.4% 3.6% 3% 2.9%
Increases 3.9% (< EUR 733) 4.0% 5.5% (< EUR 352) 3.5% (< EUR 400) 4% (< EUR 500) 5% (< EUR 500)
3.4% (> EUR 733) 2.75% (< EUR 587) 1.5% (< EUR 620) 2% (< EUR 1 000) 3% (< EUR 1 000)
1.4% (< EUR 880) 0.75% (< EUR 910) 0% (> EUR 1 000) 0% (> EUR 1 000)
0% (> EUR 880) 0% (> EUR 910)
III. GREECE
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007 131
Earnings-related scheme: supplementary component
The full supplementary pension is 20% of the earnings measure under the main
component of the earnings-related scheme for workers with 35 years of contributions. The
pension is proportionally reduced for shorter contribution periods, implying a linear
accrual rate of 0.57%. The value is increased by 5th for each year of contributions (300 days)
beyond 35 years.
Minimum pension
The minimum pension is set as 70% of the minimum wage for a married, full-time
employee. For 2004, the value was EUR 419.48 per month, equivalent to 34% of average
earnings. This value is adjusted annually as part of the incomes policy.
Income-tested scheme: social solidarity benefit
This scheme, introduced in 1996, is a non-contributory, means-tested benefit payable
to low-income pensioners eligible under most schemes (apart from the farmers’ pension
programme).
Eligibility for benefits under this scheme, known as EKAS, requires that total net
income from all sources is less than EUR 6 562.02 (2004). Total taxable income must not
exceed EUR 7 655.71 and the total taxable family income, EUR 11 913.22.
Early retirement
Early retirement is possible subject to reductions, as shown in the table below. The
adjustment is 1/267 per month of early retirement, which is equivalent to 4.5% per year.
Late retirement
It is possible to retire after the normal pension age of 65. An increased accrual rate of
3% is applied in the main component up to 67 and there is no accrual rate for those
working after 67 (maximum replacement rate of 76%). After 65, maximum pension is not
applied. The supplementary component also continues to accrue. It is possible to combine
work and pension receipt as long as the people earn below EUR 700.
Income level, lower limit 0 EUR 5976.14 EUR 6 210.52 EUR 6 366.73 EUR 6 562.02
Benefit per month EUR 141.2 EUR 105.9 EUR 70.6 EUR 35.3 0
Number of years Eligibility age Conditions
15 65 No reduction
15 60 With reduction (1/267)
35 55 With reduction (1/267)
37 Any No reduction
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Pension modelling results: Greece
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 81.4 47.9 71.8 95.7 143.6 191.4
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 97.4 60.4 87.9 110.1 151.3 187.6
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 111.1 113.6 111.7 110.1 110.3 107.0
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6
Net pension wealth 13.6 14.3 13.9 13.0 11.9 11.1
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 15.7 16.5 16.0 15.1 13.8 12.8
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Hungary
The new system combines an earnings-related public pension with mandatory, funded,
defined-contribution schemes. It applies to new labour-market entrants and people
aged 42 or under at the time of reform. Older workers could choose between this mixed
system or a pure pay-as-you-go, public pension. The modelling assumes that workers are
covered by the mixed system.
Qualifying conditions
A phased increase in the pension eligibility age will equalise this at 62 for both men
and women (from 60 and 55 respectively). The age for men reached 62 in 2000 and will
reach 62 for women from the end of 2009. In addition, 20 years’ service is required for both
the earnings-related pension and the minimum pension. For those retiring before the start
of 2009, 15 years’ service is required to receive a partial pension.
The reformed system was introduced in June 1998. People who switched voluntarily to
the new, mixed system were allowed to return to the pure pay-as-you-go system until the
end of 2002. Moreover, the obligation for new entrants to join a private pension fund was
suspended in calendar year 2002.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
For those covered by the mixed system, the accrual rate is 1.22% of earnings for each
year of service (subject to the contribution ceiling, see below). This compares with an
accrual rate of 1.65% for those covered by the pay-as-you-go system alone.
The earnings base is currently pay in all years since 1988, moving towards the full
lifetime. Earlier years’ earnings are valorised with economy-wide average earnings to a
point two years before retirement. The last three years’ earnings prior to retirement are
entirely unvalorised.
A ceiling to pensionable earnings was introduced in 1992. In 2004, the ceiling was
HUF 14 500 per day. This is equivalent to 4.2 times average earnings on the OECD measure
(HUF 1 260 948). There have been increases in the ceiling relative to earnings since 2002.
The pension in payment has been indexed half to wages and half to prices since 2001.
There is currently an additional two weeks of pension paid each year, which will
increase to an additional month’s pension from 2006.
Minimum
There is a minimum pension, which was worth HUF 23 200 per month in 2004 (around
16% of gross average earnings and around 25% of net average earnings). The value is
indexed in the same way as benefits under the earnings-related scheme, that is, half prices
and half average earnings. The minimum pension will be abolished from 2009.
Defined contribution
Some 8% of gross pensionable earnings is diverted to the funded plan from 2004 for
people covered by the mixed public-private pension option (either by choice or by
mandate). This represents an increase from 6% in 2002 and 7% in 2003. The accumulated
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capital must be converted into an annuity on retirement. The annuity must provide the
same mixed indexation of the pension in payment as the public pension scheme. Unisex
life tables must be used to calculate annuity rates.
Early retirement
Early retirement is currently possible for men at age 60 and at age 57 for women.
When pension ages are equalised at 62, early retirement will be available from 59 for both
men and women. This early-retirement age will increase to 60 from 2013.
Currently, early retirement on a full pension requires 38 years of service, which will
increase to 40 years from 2009 and 41 years from 2013. A reduced pension is paid with at
least 33 years of service currently, increasing to 37 years in 2009 and 38 years from 2013.
The reductions follow the schedule below. The maximum reduction is therefore 30% for
five missing years.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer the earnings-related pension. The pension is increased by 0.5%
for each month of deferral.
Pre-reform scenario
Before the reform, the system was based solely on an earnings-related, pay-as-you-go
scheme. Benefit accrual was non-linear with the number of years of contributions. The
system gave a replacement rate of 43% for 15 years of coverage, with 2% extra per year up
to 25 years, 1% for the next 11 years and 1.5% for each year after that.
The pension was indexed fully to wages but is now mixed earnings/prices indexed
(see above). There is a minimum pension under this system as described above. As noted
above, the reform also increased the pension ages for men and women. Most elements of
the reform package were legislated in 1997 and implemented in 1998.
Pensions are currently calculated based on net earnings but under the 1997 reform, the
base will change to gross earnings from 2013.
Missing years 1 2 3 4 5
Reduction per year of early retirement 1.2% 2.4% 3.6% 4.8% 6.0%
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Pension modelling results: Hungary
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 65.3 38.4 57.6 76.9 115.3 153.7
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 89.2 58.4 80.5 102.2 131.0 167.3
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 96.5 94.7 95.1 102.2 98.5 98.5
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4
Net pension wealth 11.1 12.4 11.4 10.8 9.3 8.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 13.7 15.3 14.1 13.4 11.4 11.0
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Pension modelling results: Hungary, pre-reform scenario
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 52.6 34.4 47.9 57.7 78.4 101.1
(% average gross earnings) 48.0 31.4 43.7 52.7 71.6 92.2
Net relative pension level 80.3 52.5 73.1 88.1 119.6 154.2
(% net average earnings) 73.3 47.9 66.7 80.4 109.2 140.7
Gross replacement rate 61.9 68.9 63.9 57.7 52.3 50.5
(% individual gross earnings) 56.5 62.8 58.3 52.7 47.7 46.1
Net replacement rate 86.9 85.2 86.4 88.1 90.0 90.7
(% individual net earnings) 79.3 77.8 78.8 80.4 82.1 82.8
Gross pension wealth 12.0 13.3 12.4 11.2 10.1 9.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 16.2 18.0 16.7 15.1 13.7 13.2
Net pension wealth 12.0 13.3 12.4 11.2 10.1 9.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 16.2 18.0 16.7 15.1 13.7 13.2
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Iceland
The public pension system has three components, including a basic and two income-tested
schemes. There are also mandatory occupational pensions with a hybrid (albeit mainly
defined-benefit) formula.
Qualifying conditions
The normal pension age is 67. A full basic pension is earned with 40 years’ residency.
The pension is proportionally reduced for shorter periods of residency, with a minimum of
three years required. The pension age is also 67 for members of private-sector occupational
plans. 
Benefit calculation
Basic
The full basic pension value is ISK 21 249 per month, equivalent to around 9% of
average earnings. This benefit is income-tested: withdrawal begins once income (from
sources other than the supplementary pension) exceeds ISK 1 716 020, equivalent to 62%
of average earnings, and lapses at ISK 2 565 980. This income test applies only to non-
pension income, such as earnings from work or social assistance as well as 50% of capital
income.
Targeted
A second element is the pension supplement. The maximum value of this benefit is
ISK 41 655 per month for a single person, some 18% of average earnings. This benefit is
withdrawn against income above ISK 550 656 per year (around 20% of average earnings).
The basic pension, however, does not affect the value of the pension supplement. The
withdrawal rate for the income test in the pension supplement is 45%.
Finally, there is an additional pension supplement with a maximum entitlement of
ISK 20 540 per month, just under 9% of average earnings. This is withdrawn against all
other income at a rate of two-thirds and lapses at a level of 439.680.
The benefit levels are adjusted in line with public-sector pay (which is assumed here
to be equal to the standard assumption of economy-wide earnings growth).
Mandatory occupational
Employer schemes are mandatory. The law requires schemes to target a replacement
rate of 56% with 40 years’ contributions, giving an accrual rate of 1.4% for each year of
service. Coverage is mandatory for people aged 16 to 70. The earnings base in this
calculation is average lifetime salary for each year of membership. There is no ceiling to
pensionable earnings. Past earnings are valorised in line with price inflation plus a 3.5%
interest rate.
Occupational pensions in payment must by law be increased in line with consumer
price inflation.
In practice, many schemes pay more than the legal minimum outlined above, typically
introducing a hybrid defined-contribution/defined-benefit element into the system. There
is a minimum contribution to occupational schemes of 10% of earnings. The employee
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pays 4% and the employer 6%. Contributions above the level needed to finance the
statutory benefits described above can be used either to increase defined-benefit
entitlements or be diverted to individual accounts thus delivering a defined-contribution
pension. However, the modelling covers only the mandatory component and not these
extra-statutory benefits as they are not guaranteed.
Early retirement
Under the mandatory occupational scheme, early retirement rules vary between
funds, depending on the structure of fund membership. In the private sector, the normal
retirement age is 67 and the pension can be claimed from 62. In general, pensions are
reduced by 7% for each year that pension is claimed early.
It is not possible to claim the basic or targeted pensions before the normal pension age.
Late retirement
Under the mandatory occupational scheme, workers can postpone retirement until
the age of 70 with a pension increase of 9% for each year of deferral. Workers who defer
their pension continue to contribute and earn extra pension entitlements. In some cases,
the total contribution period is limited to 32 years.
It is not possible to defer the basic or targeted pension after normal pension age. The
basic pension is subject to an earnings test (see above), while the targeted schemes are
tested against all income, including earnings.
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Pension modelling results: Iceland
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 68.1 55.0 64.4 77.5 111.6 145.7
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 76.0 64.6 72.8 84.2 113.8 143.5
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 80.1 109.9 85.8 77.5 74.4 72.9
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 86.9 110.9 92.0 84.2 80.3 79.7
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 12.3 17.7 13.3 11.8 11.3 11.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 13.8 20.0 15.0 13.3 12.6 12.3
Net pension wealth 9.7 14.7 10.6 9.1 8.1 7.6
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.9 .6 12.0 10.2 9.1 8.6
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Ireland
The public pension is a basic scheme paying a flat rate to all who meet the contribution
conditions. There is also a means-tested pension to provide a safety net for the low-income
elderly. Voluntary occupational pension schemes have broad coverage: around half of
employees.
Qualifying conditions
The old-age contributory pension is payable from age 66 while the retirement pension
is paid from 65. Full entitlement to both benefits requires an average of 48 weeks
contributions or credits per year throughout the working life. The pension value is
proportionally reduced for incomplete contribution histories. However, the old-age
contributory pension requires a minimum average of ten weeks’ contributions per year
and the retirement pension 24 weeks per year. There is also a minimum total period of
contributions of 260 weeks (equivalent to five years’ full coverage).
The means-tested pension is payable from age 66.
Benefit calculation
Basic
The values of the old-age contributory pension and the retirement pension are both
EUR 167.30 per week (paid for 53 weeks per year) for 2004, which is around 30% of average
earnings (on the OECD measure of average earnings). There is an addition of EUR 111.50 for
a dependent adult of working age and EUR 129.20 for a dependant aged 66 or over. The
value of the basic pension under a recent long-term plan is fixed relative to earnings: the
national target is 34% of the previous year’s average industrial earnings.
Pensioners are entitled to many benefits-in-kind. The government estimates that the
price of these goods and services would be EUR 870 per year, excluding health benefits.
(Note that the modelling covers only cash benefits and not benefits-in-kind.)
Targeted
The maximum value of the means-tested benefit is EUR 154 per week for a single
person with an extra EUR 101.80 for an adult dependant for 2004. The single person’s
benefit is worth 27% of average earnings. There is a small disregard in the means test:
otherwise, the benefit is withdrawn at 100% of income. There is also an assets test, with
capital of more than EUR 20 315 being converted to income using a standard formula.
The value of the target safety-net income in the means-tested scheme broadly follows
the uprating of the basic schemes (i.e., linked to earnings).
Early retirement
Pensions can not be claimed before the normal eligibility age.
Late retirement
Work and pension can be combined subject to earnings being less than EUR 38 per
week (under the retirement pension). However, the old-age contributory pension is not
subject to an earnings test. It is not possible to defer claiming the pension.
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Pension modelling results: Ireland
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 32.5 32.5 32.5 32.5 32.5 32.5
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5 38.5
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 38.2 65.0 43.3 32.5 21.7 16.2
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 44.4 65.8 49.3 38.5 29.3 23.5
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 6.8 11.5 7.7 5.8 3.8 2.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.1 13.7 9.2 6.9 4.6 3.4
Net pension wealth 6.8 11.5 7.7 5.8 3.8 2.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.1 13.7 9.2 6.9 4.6 3.4
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Italy
The new Italian pension system is based on notional accounts. Contributions earn a rate
of return related to GDP growth. At retirement, the accumulated notional capital is
converted into an annuity taking account of average life expectancy at retirement. It
applies in full to labour-market entrants from 1996 onwards.
Qualifying conditions
As a result of the 2004 pension reform, the normal pension age under the new system
will be 60 for women and 65 for men from 2008 onwards. However, early retirement will
still be possible under various contribution conditions (see below). The baseline modelling
assumes that men retire at 65 and women at 60.*
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
Under the notional-account scheme, employees are credited with 33% of earnings,
which is slightly above the actual contribution rates paid by employees and employers.
Contributions are then uprated in line with a five-year moving average of GDP growth until
the year of retirement. The baseline assumption in modelling all countries is 2% annual
real wage growth. Given the projected decline in the Italian labour force, a consistent
assumption is that real GDP growth is 1.6% per year.
The resulting notional capital is multiplied by a “transformation coefficient” at
retirement. The coefficient varies with the age at which the pension is claimed. The values
are supposed to be reviewed every ten years based on evidence of mortality rates at
different ages. Social partners and parliament are consulted but final responsibility rests
with government. The calculations assume a real interest rate of 1.5%. Actuarial
illustrations for 2036-45 (which includes 2040, the year used for the baseline projections)
based on ISTAT 2001 demographic forecasts are:
For employees, minimum pay for contribution purposes is EUR 164.87 per week (39%
of average earnings). Maximum earnings for benefits are EUR 82 401 per year under the
new scheme, or just over 370% of average earnings.
The indexation of pensions in payment is complex, since smaller pensions are accorded
a more generous treatment than larger pensions. For benefits up to three times the
minimum pension, there is full price indexation of pensions in payment. This threshold is
EUR 1 206 per month for 2003 (which is used to index pensions in 2004) and EUR 1 236 for
2004 (for 2005 indexation) or approximately two-thirds of economy-wide average earnings.
For benefits between three and five times the minimum pension, pensions in payment are
* Italy has expressed serious doubts about the adequacy of data used in the report, and consequently
about the comparability of results. In particular, baseline assumptions about labour market entry
ages and career length (respectively, 20 and 45 years) are different from those agreed in a comparable
exercise undertaken at the EU level, and differ from current Italian labour market norms.  Italy
thinks interpretations based on these data may be misleading.
Age of retirement 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65+
Transformation coefficient (%) 4.014 4.113 4.217 4.328 4.446 4.572 4.705 4.847 4.999
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uprated by 90% of price inflation. Above this threshold, indexation falls to 75% of prices. Note
that the indexation applies separately to each slice of a large pension.
Social assistance
The minimum pension (see below) is abolished for people covered only under the new
system; i.e., entrants after 1996. However, pensioners with incomes below the social-assistance
level can claim a means-tested benefit from age 65. Including supplements, the 2004 value of
the social-assistance benefit (assegno sociale) was EUR 4 952. There is a higher benefit of
EUR 6 967 for over 70s. These are equivalent to 22% and 31% of average earnings, respectively.
Early retirement
The 2004 pension reform set normal pension ages under the new system at 65 for men
and 60 for women from 2008. This is the same normal pension age as in the old system.
Men with at least 35 years of contributions will be able to retire from age 60 (as of 2008).
The minimum retirement age for men will subsequently increase to 61 from 2010
and 62 from 2014. There is a further nine-month (on average, as of 2008) waiting period for
early retirement with fewer than 40 years’ coverage, giving effective early retirement ages
9 months higher than those quoted. Women will remain able to draw a pension from
age 57 until 2015. From 2016, women cannot retire before age 60.
However, it will remain possible to retire at any age with 40 years’ contributions.
Finally, taking any early retirement requires that the pension is worth at least 1.2 times the
social-assistance pension.
Late retirement
Women have the right to continue working until the normal pension age for men.
Retirement is not compulsory at 65 but employers have the right to dismiss employees
reaching that age. Under the notional-account scheme, it is not possible to combine
employment and pension receipt until age 63. After age 63, it is possible but there is a
penalty: the tax rate on earnings is 50% on income above the minimum pension until the
total tax is equal to the entire pension.
It is possible to defer the pension claim after age 65, however the transformation
coefficient (see above) remains the same, and benefits increase only because of the
accumulation of further contributions and their (notional) capitalisation for one or more
further years.
Pre-reform scenario
New labour-market entrants from 1996 onwards are covered solely by the new system.
People with more than 18 years contributions at the time of the reform are covered only by
the old system. The cohorts in between have their accrued rights up to the end of 1995
covered by the old system and subsequent rights under the new system.
The old system was a defined-benefit scheme paying a variable proportion of earnings
for each year of contributions. For years of work after 1993, a schedule applied to different
bands of earnings. This is the schedule for 2004:
There was no ceiling to earnings covered in the old system.
Band (lower limit) 0 EUR 37 884 EUR 50 386 EUR 62 887 EUR 71 980
Accrual rate 2.0% 1.6% 1.35% 1.10% 0.9%
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Normal pension age under this scheme was increased gradually from 1992 (60 for
men, 55 for women) to reach 65 for men and 60 for women from 2000 onwards. Pension
receipt requires 20 years of contributions (15 years until 1992).
However, there was also a “seniority pension” (pensione di anzianità) that enabled
earlier receipt of pension. The 1992 reform gradually tightened these requirements. Thus,
people can retire at any age with 37 years’ contribution in 2001-03, 38 years in 2004/05,
39 years in 2006/07 and 40 years from 2008 onwards. With 35 years’ contributions, the
pension could be drawn at 56 in 2001 increasing to 57 from 2002. Further increases are
envisaged, as set out below.
The minimum pension is set at EUR 50 per month higher than the social-assistance
benefit (described above) for 60-64-year-olds and EUR 110 higher for 65-69-year-olds. From
age 70, the minimum pension is the same as the social-assistance benefit.
Under the old system, it was possible to combine work and pensions after
age 58 conditional on 37 years of contributions.
Pension modelling results: Italy
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 57.7 34.0 51.0 67.9 101.9 135.9
(% average gross earnings) 44.9 26.4 39.6 52.8 79.2 105.6
Net relative pension level 68.1 46.7 61.6 77.9 108.8 139.6
(% net average earnings) 55.8 36.3 50.7 63.4 88.7 111.9
Gross replacement rate 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.9
(% individual gross earnings) 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8 52.8
Net replacement rate 77.9 81.8 78.2 77.9 78.1 79.3
(% individual net earnings) 63.8 63.6 64.4 63.4 63.7 63.5
Gross pension wealth 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.6
Net pension wealth 8.6 10.0 8.8 8.4 7.7 7.4
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.7 10.7 10.0 9.4 8.7 8.2
Pension modelling results: Italy, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 76.5 45.0 67.5 90.0 135.0 174.9
(% average gross earnings) 68.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 120.0 155.5
Net relative pension level 86.1 55.9 77.5 98.6 138.1 170.8
(% net average earnings) 78.0 51.1 70.3 89.5 124.7 155.1
Gross replacement rate 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0 87.5
(% individual gross earnings) 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 80.0 77.7
Net replacement rate 98.5 97.8 98.4 98.6 99.2 97.0
(% individual net earnings) 89.2 89.5 89.2 89.5 89.5 88.1
Gross pension wealth 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.3 12.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 15.8
Net pension wealth 10.9 12.0 11.1 10.6 9.9 9.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 13.6 15.1 13.8 13.2 12.3 11.5
III. JAPAN
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007146
Japan
The public pension system has two tiers: a basic, flat-rate scheme and an earnings-
related plan (employees’ pension scheme).
Qualifying conditions
The old-age, basic pension is paid from age 65 with a minimum of 25 years’ contributions.
The full basic pension requires 40 years of contributions, with benefits adjusted proportionally
for shorter or longer contribution periods.
The earnings-related pension is paid in addition to basic pension, with a minimum of one
month’s contribution, provided a pensioner is entitled to the basic pension. The pension age is
gradually being increased from 60 to 65 years (between 2001 and 2013 for men and
between 2006 and 2018 for women) for the flat-rate component and from 60 to reach 65 years
for men in 2025 and for women in 2030 for the earnings-related component. The earnings-
related component of the employees’ pension scheme is adjusted for shorter or longer
contribution periods.
Benefit calculation
Basic
The full basic pension for 2004 was JPY 794 500 per year, corresponding to 16% of
average earnings. The basic pension is price indexed.
Earnings-related
The employees’ pension scheme has a flat-rate and an earnings-related component, of
which the earnings-related part is by far the most important. The accrual rate was 0.75% of
earnings excluding bonuses until fiscal year 2002. From fiscal year 2003, the base for
calculating pension was extended to include bonuses. With the extension of the base for
calculating the pension, the accrual rate has been reduced to 0.5481% of earnings
(including bonuses).
Earlier years’ earnings are valorised in line with economy-wide average net earnings.
There is a ceiling on earnings subject to contributions of JPY 620 000 a month
equivalent to 150% of average earnings.
The flat-rate benefit depends on year of birth. In 2004, it ranged between JPY 1 676 and
JPY 3 143 per month of contributions. This is paid only to pensioners between 62 and
64 years and this benefit will be phased out by 2013.
The employees’ pension in payment is price indexed.
Contracting out
Employers who have at least 1 000 employees, may “contract out” of a portion of the
earnings-related pension (known as the “substitution part”) if they cover their employees
themselves; around 15% of employees participate in these schemes. Contracting-out
requires that employers offer at least 150% (before 2005: 110%) of the benefit that the public
earnings-related scheme would have provided. The calculation of the pension required for
contracting out is based on lifetime average nominal earnings. Indexation of pensions in
payment and valorisation of past earnings is financed by the government.
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The contribution rate in contracted-out schemes is determined by the government
depending on the age structure of the covered employees and actuarial assumptions.
Until 1996, however, the rate was uniform across plans. Since 2005, the rate ranges
between 2.4% and 5% of total remuneration.
Since 2001, the government has also been promoting DC pension schemes and
DB occupational pension schemes. As a consequence, several employees’ pension funds
have been dissolved.
Early retirement
Until 2001, a “specially provided” employees’ pension was available at age 60. This is
being phased out and retirement with a full benefit will not be possible before age 65.
Early retirement at a reduced benefit is possible in both the basic and earnings-related
schemes. The benefit is reduced by 0.5% per month of early retirement, i.e. 6% per year.
Individuals can claim the flat-rate component of the employees’ pension between 60 and
65. The pension in payment is indexed to net average earnings until the pensioner reaches
age 65 and price-indexed after age 65.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer receipt of the basic and earnings-related pensions. Deferral
increases the pension benefit by 0.7% per month, i.e. 8.4% per year. Pension rights continue
to accrue for each year of contributions beyond 65.
From 2006, combining work and pension after age 65 will be possible provided total
income (from earnings and pension) does not exceed JPY 480 000. Above this limit, half of
the excess is reduced from the full earnings-related pension payment but basic pension is
paid in full. From April 2007, the reduction will also apply to the workers over 70 but they
do not need to pay contributions.
Pre-reform scenario
In 1994, the increase in pension age (as set out above) for the flat-rate component of
the employees’ pension scheme was introduced. The rate of growth of gross earnings was
formerly used for valorisation while the current system uses net earnings. In 2000, the
pension age in the earnings-related component was increased. The base for contribution
was extended to include the bonus and the contribution rate for the earnings-related
scheme was reduced.
The most recent reform took place in 2004. The contribution rate will be fixed
after 2017 at 18.3% for the earnings-related scheme while the contribution for the basic
scheme will be fixed at JPY 16 900 plus inflation.
This reform also introduced a link to projected changes in life expectancy risk into the
benefit formula. For about 20 years, until the moment when pension revenues are equal to
expenditures, a special adjustment factor will be used for valorisation. This factor is
calculated as the sum of the average decrease of the number of contributors in the public
pension schemes over three years and the growth rate of life expectancy. The latter is
assumed to grow at a constant rate of 0.3%. The factor is subtracted from the net earnings
growth (for valorisation) and from price inflation (for indexation), but some ratchets are
built in to prevent negative valorisation and indexation. The target minimum replacement
rate for a single-earner couple at average earnings with 40 years of contributions is 50%.
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If the replacement rate falls below 50% as a result of the adjustment, the mechanism will
be suspended and further measures will be introduced to ensure the level of the
replacement rate. According to government estimates the adjustment factor will be 0.9%
until 2025. Afterwards, the system will return to valorisation to net earnings and inflation
indexation.
Pension modelling results: Japan
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 31.3 23.9 29.2 34.4 44.9 54.4
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 35.6 26.9 33.1 39.2 49.6 59.3
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 36.8 47.8 38.9 34.4 29.9 27.2
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 41.5 52.5 43.5 39.2 34.3 31.3
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 6.1 7.9 6.4 5.7 5.0 4.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 6.9 8.9 7.3 6.4 5.6 5.1
Net pension wealth 5.6 7.2 5.9 5.3 4.5 4.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 6.3 8.2 6.7 5.9 5.0 4.5
Pension modelling results: Japan, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 37.0 28.4 34.6 40.7 53.1 64.3
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 42.4 32.2 39.5 46.5 60.4 72.3
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 43.6 56.8 46.1 40.7 35.4 32.2
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 49.4 62.9 51.9 46.5 41.7 38.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 7.2 9.4 7.6 6.8 5.9 5.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.1 10.6 8.6 7.6 6.6 6.0
Net pension wealth 6.7 8.7 7.1 6.3 5.4 4.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 7.6 9.8 8.0 7.1 6.1 5.5
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Korea
The Korean public pension scheme was introduced relatively recently. It is an earnings-
related scheme with a progressive formula, since benefits are based on both individual
earnings and the economy-wide average of earnings.
Qualifying conditions
The pension is currently available from age 60 provided the individual has contributed
for ten years or more. A reduced, early pension can be drawn from age 55.
The normal pension age is gradually being increased and will reach 65 from 2033. The
modelling assumes the long-term pension age of 65 and that the early pension age will
also be raised (from 55 to 60.)
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
Benefits accrue at the rate of 1.5% of the earnings measure for the first 20 years of
contributions. Thereafter, the benefit is increased by 5% for each additional year of
contributions. The pension thus amounts to 60% of the earnings measure for 40 years of
contributions. The earnings measure is the average of individual lifetime average earnings,
valorised in line with wage growth, and average economy-wide earnings, measured over
the previous three years and valorised in line with prices. There is a ceiling on pensionable
earnings of KRW 3.6 million per month, equivalent to 1.6 times average earnings.
The maximum level of benefit is 100% of individual earnings. The benefit is indexed to
prices after retirement. People over age 60 do not pay contributions and benefits are not
accrued after this age.
Early retirement
When the normal pension age is increased from 60 to 65, it is assumed that the early
pension age will increase from 55 to 60. At 60, the early old-age pension will then be 75% of
the normal old age pension. The benefit is increased by 5% every year, so a person who
retires at age 64 will be entitled to 95% of the full old age pension.
Late retirement
People do not earn extra pension for retiring late, so it is assumed that people start
claiming pension no later than age 65.
In the future, individuals aged between 65 and 69 will be able to combine work and
pension, known as the “active old-age pension”. The pension payable during this period
will be 50% of full old age pension with the benefit increasing by 10% for each year of
additional work.
Pre-reform scenario
The basic structure of the current pension system has been maintained from its first
introduction of 1988. At first, only employees were insured, but the self-employed in rural
areas and urban areas were included in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In 1999, there was a
parametric reform which resulted in a reduction of the replacement rate. For a person on
average earnings and with 40 years of contributions, it was reduced from 70% to 60%. There
was also a lower pension age before reform (see above).
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Pension modelling results: Korea
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 61.8 50.0 58.4 66.8 83.7 90.2
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 66.6 54.2 63.1 71.8 88.5 94.4
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 72.7 99.9 77.9 66.8 55.8 45.1
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 77.8 106.1 83.1 71.8 61.9 50.7
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 10.1 13.9 10.8 9.3 7.8 6.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 12.1 16.6 12.9 11.1 9.3 7.5
Net pension wealth 9.9 13.7 10.6 9.1 7.4 6.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 11.8 16.3 12.7 10.8 8.9 7.1
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Pension modelling results: Korea, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 64.1 50.0 60.6 69.3 86.8 93.5
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 68.9 54.3 65.3 74.3 91.3 97.4
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 75.4 100.0 80.7 69.3 57.9 46.8
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 80.5 106.2 86.0 74.3 63.9 52.4
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 12.4 16.5 13.3 11.4 9.5 7.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 14.6 19.4 15.6 13.4 11.2 9.1
Net pension wealth 12.1 16.2 13.0 11.1 9.1 7.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 14.2 19.1 15.3 13.1 10.7 8.6
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Luxembourg
The public pension scheme has two components: a flat-rate part depending on years of
coverage and an earnings-related part. There is also a minimum pension.
Qualifying conditions
An early pension is payable from age 57 with 40 years’ (compulsory or voluntary)
contributions. With 40 years’ coverage of compulsory, voluntary or credited contributions,
the pension can be paid from age 60. Since the modelling assumes a full career from age 20,
it is assumed in the base case that workers retire at age 60. Otherwise, the normal pension
age is 65 (subject to at least ten years’ contributions).
Benefit calculation
Basic
This was worth EUR 330 per month in 2004 (from August 2003), subject to 40 years’
coverage. This is equivalent to around 10% of average earnings. For incomplete insurance,
the benefit is reduced proportionally. (Formally, the basic pension is 23.5% of a reference
amount, which was EUR 1 403 in 2004.)
There is also an “end-of-year allowance”, which adds EUR 45 per month to the pension
for 40 years’ contributions. This is proportionally reduced for insurance periods under
40 years, implying a little over EUR 1 per month for each year covered. The end-of-year
allowance is indexed to nominal earnings (see below).
Earnings-related
The accrual rate for the earnings-related pension is 1.85%. The earnings measure used
in the formula is lifetime average pay revalued in line with nominal earnings.
The accrual rate is higher for older workers and those with longer contribution periods.
For each year of work after age 55, the accrual rate is increased by 0.01 percentage points.
Furthermore, each year of contributions beyond 38 also attracts an additional accrual of
0.01 percentage points. The maximum accrual rate is 2.05% per year. Under the standard
assumption of a full career starting at age 20 and ending at age 60, the accrual rate is 1.92%.
The maximum pension in 2004 (from August 2003) was EUR 5 847 per month (formally
specified as 25/6 of the reference amount). This is just under 180% of average earnings.
Benefits are automatically indexed to changes in the cost of living (if cumulative
inflation is at least 2.5%). In addition, adjustments to increases in real wages must be
considered every two years. Recent practice has seen increases close to earnings and the
modelling assumes that this practice continues.
Minimum
The minimum is EUR 1 263 per month (defined as 90% of the reference amount),
conditional on 40 years’ coverage, equivalent to about 39% of average earnings. This is
proportionally reduced for shorter periods subject to a minimum of 20 years of service
periods (compulsory, voluntary or credited contributions).
Social assistance
The social-assistance safety-net level is EUR 999 per month for a single person.
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Early retirement
It is possible to retire at 57 with 40 years’ paid contributions and at 60 with 40 years’
paid or credited contributions. Early retirees may work periodically provided earnings do
not exceed one third of the minimum social income. There is no actuarial adjustment to
benefits for early retirement.
In addition, there are a number of pre-retirement programmes. Relevant here are the
pre-retirement solidarity and pre-retirement adaptation schemes. The first allows early
retirement on the condition that the employer hires a job seeker assigned by the
employment administration. The second allows early retirement for older workers losing
their jobs due to restructuring or bankruptcy. Both schemes apply from age 57 up to age 60.
The pre-retirement benefit is 85% of prior earnings in the first year, 80% in the second year,
and 75% in the third. The earnings measure is pay in the preceding three months.
Late retirement
The pension has to be claimed at the retirement age of 65. After this age, it is possible
to combine work and pension benefits without reductions in the pension benefit.
Pension modelling results: Luxembourg
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 76.8 49.9 69.1 88.3 126.7 165.1
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 86.4 60.3 79.4 96.2 126.1 155.9
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 90.3 99.8 92.1 88.3 84.5 82.5
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 98.0 107.6 99.8 96.2 92.9 91.0
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 19.7 21.8 20.1 19.3 18.4 18.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings)
Net pension wealth 16.5 19.6 17.2 15.6 13.7 12.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings)
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Mexico
New labour-force entrants are obliged to join the new funded and privately managed,
defined-contribution scheme. The government contributes 5.5% of the 1997 real minimum
wage to the individual account. There is also a minimum pension.
Qualifying conditions
Normal retirement age is 65 for men and women subject to 1 250 weeks (around
25 years) of contribution.
Benefit formula
Funded scheme
Workers and employers contribute a total of 6.275% of earnings to an individual
account to which is added a government contribution equivalent to 0.225% of earnings. An
additional 5% contribution is made to an individual housing account (a scheme known as
Infonavit) which reverts to the retirement account when it is not used. Finally, the
government contributes 5.5% of the 1997 real minimum wage into all individual retirement
accounts; this is considered to be the equivalent of a basic pension component here. The
value of the flat contribution is equivalent to 1.4% of average earnings.
The calculations assume that the individual converts the accumulated account balance
into a price-indexed annuity at normal pension age. Annuity rates in Mexico are sex-specific.
Minimum pension
The minimum pension is equivalent to the same 1997 real minimum wage value and
was estimated to be approximately 26% of the average covered wage in 2002 (MXN 20 158
in 2004). The link to the real minimum wage means that the minimum pension is
effectively price-indexed.
Early retirement
Early retirement is possible from age 60 for men and women. Conditions are that the
worker is not employed and that at least 1 250 weekly contributions have been made (or
the contribution exemption period should be less than 25% of the entire insured period).
Workers who leave the labour market permanently may withdraw the entire balance
from their defined contribution (Afore) account.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer the pension after age 65.
Pre-reform scenario
The Mexican pension system was reformed in 1999. All workers who were covered
under the old system at the time of reform will be able to choose between the benefit
resulting from the new system and the one that the old system would have paid. For new
labour-market entrants, however, this option does not exist.
The old pension system is a defined-benefit system that provides a 35% replacement
rate for the first ten years of contributions and an accrual of 1.25% of the earnings base for
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each year of contributions thereafter. Past earnings are valorised in line with average
economy-wide earnings growth while pensions in payment are indexed to price inflation.
The ceiling on pensionable earnings is MXN 288 000.
There is a minimum pension of MXN 20 158 or 26% of average earnings, the same as
the minimum pension under the new system.
Pension modelling results: Mexico
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Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 31.1 26.4 28.0 35.8 51.6 67.3
(% average gross earnings) 26.4 26.4 26.4 29.7 42.8 55.8
Net relative pension level 33.2 28.2 29.9 38.3 55.1 71.8
(% net average earnings) 28.2 28.2 28.2 31.7 45.7 59.6
Gross replacement rate 36.6 52.8 37.3 35.8 34.4 33.6
(% individual gross earnings) 31.1 52.8 35.2 29.7 28.5 27.9
Net replacement rate 37.9 50.3 37.8 38.3 39.0 40.0
(% individual net earnings) 32.2 50.3 35.7 31.7 32.3 33.2
Gross pension wealth 4.9 7.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 5.0 8.5 5.6 4.8 4.6 4.5
Net pension wealth 4.9 7.0 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 5.0 8.5 5.6 4.8 4.6 4.5
Pension modelling results: Mexico, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 61.6 36.3 54.4 72.5 108.8 145.0
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 65.8 38.7 58.1 77.4 116.1 154.8
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 75.1 69.0 73.5 77.4 82.2 86.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4
Net pension wealth 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4 17.4
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Netherlands
The Dutch pension system has two main tiers, consisting of a flat-rate public scheme
and earnings-related occupational plans. Although there is no statutory obligation for
employers to offer a pension scheme to their employees, industrial-relations agreements
mean that 91% of employees are covered. These schemes are therefore best thought of as
quasi-mandatory.
Qualifying conditions
The basic old age pension is payable from age 65. Normal retirement age is typically
also 65 in occupational plans. All residents are eligible for this benefit.
Benefit calculation
Basic
For a single person, the gross pension benefit in 2004 was EUR 921.28 in the first half
of the year and EUR 920.12 in the second half. There was an additional holiday allowance
of EUR 43.78 and EUR 43.69, respectively. This gives an annual total of EUR 11 578 or 31% of
average earnings. For a couple, the total yearly benefit would be EUR 15 906. The benefit
value is linked to the net minimum wage, which is uprated biannually.
The basic benefit accrues at 2% of the full value for each year a worker lives or works
in the country. There is also a social-assistance scheme for older people. Its value is equal
to the net basic pension.
Occupational schemes
The Netherlands also has a private pension system with broad coverage. The system
consists of 819 pension funds; 101 of them are industry-wide schemes. Under certain
conditions, Dutch companies may opt out of these plans if they offer their own scheme
with equivalent benefits. Furthermore, there are around 700 single-employer plans.
Another 40 500 (in the year 2002) mainly smaller employers offer schemes operated by
insurance companies.
Approximately 97% of the employees in these funds are covered by a defined-benefit
scheme. The remaining employees are covered by a defined contribution scheme.
For about three quarters of participants in defined benefit schemes, the earnings
measure is based on lifetime average earnings, and for 13% on the final salary. For the
remainder it is either a combination of the two (9%) or a fixed amount (1%).
There is no statutory requirement for entry ages for occupational plans. In 2004, a little
over half of the employees in a pension scheme were in schemes with no entry age, 8% in
schemes with an age of 16-20, 18% with an age of 21-24 and nearly 19% with age 25.
Most final-salary schemes give 1.75% of those earnings for each year of service,
implying a replacement rate of 70% after a 40-year career. In most average-salary schemes
the accrual rate varies from 1.75% to 2% per year of service.
There are no legal requirements for valorisation of earlier years’ pay and practice
varies between schemes according to rules agreed upon by the social partners. For
approximately 80% of the participants in average wage schemes, past earnings are
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valorised in line with growth of average earnings while for 6% the rate of inflation is used.
The modelling assumes an average-salary scheme with valorisation to average earnings.
Although there is no legal uprating requirement, most pensions in payment are raised
on an annual basis as well. Nearly half of the pensions in payment are indexed to wage
growth in the respective industry, while 27% of the pensions are indexed to prices.
Pension rights are fully transferable when people change jobs. There is a legal
requirement to index pension rights of people leaving a scheme before retirement in
exactly the same way as pensions in payment are indexed. Vesting periods are very short.
There is no ceiling to pensionable earnings.
Occupational pensions are integrated with the public pension system. The current tax
rules allow a maximum benefit of 100% of final pay at 65 from both public and private
systems. Most schemes have a target total replacement rate of 70% of final pay, so private
benefits are reduced by a franchise amount. In 2004, the average franchise amount was
EUR 14 500, which is greater than the full basic pension.
Early retirement
The basic pension is not payable before age 65.
There are separate early retirement programmes, called the Vervroegde Uittreding
(VUT), which pay pre-pension benefits between ages 60 and 65. The replacement rates
differ between schemes; on average, they are about 80%. The eligibility criteria differ
hugely between companies and branches. In 2004, the government and the social partners
agreed to end the tax-favoured status of the VUT schemes in order to increase labour-
market participation of older workers.
Late retirement
It is not possible to defer the basic old age pension scheme after 65. It is possible to
combine the basic pension receipt with work.
The rules on pension deferral vary between occupational plans. It is possible to
combine the occupational pension scheme with work. Indeed, some schemes allow a
member to draw a pension and continue to work with the same employer. There is no
legislation regarding this issue.
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Pension modelling results: Netherlands
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 69.4 40.3 61.1 81.9 123.5 165.2
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 86.1 53.4 76.9 96.8 135.0 166.1
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 81.7 80.6 81.5 81.9 82.4 82.6
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 105.3 97.0 103.8 96.8 96.3 94.8
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 15.1 14.9 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 17.6 17.4 17.6 17.7 17.8 17.8
Net pension wealth 12.8 13.5 13.0 12.3 11.4 10.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 15.0 15.8 15.2 14.3 13.3 12.3
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New Zealand
The public pension is flat rate and based on a residency test. There are occupational
schemes but coverage has fallen since 1990 from 22.6% of the employed workforce to 14.1%.
Qualifying conditions
Ten years’ residency since the age of 20 (including five years after age 50) entitles
people to the public pension at 65 years of age.
Benefit calculation
Basic
The pension for a single person living alone was NZD 301.33 gross per week from
1 April 2004. For 2003/04, the rate was NZD 296.49. This gives a total pension for the tax
year 2004 of NZD 15 670, equivalent to around 40% of average earnings.
The rate of public pension is indexed to prices, but is subject to a floor and ceiling
linked to movement in wages. For a couple, the net-of-tax rate at each 1 April must be not
less than 65% and not more than 72.5% of a net-of-tax surveyed weekly earnings measure.
The net-of-tax rates for single people are set at 65% (living alone) and 60% (sharing
accommodation) of the net-of-tax couple rate. If movements in prices remain consistently
below movements in the net-of-tax surveyed weekly earnings, effectively the latter
becomes the index.
Early retirement
It is not possible to claim the pension before the normal eligibility age of 65.
Late retirement
Receipt of the public pension is not dependent on retirement. It is therefore possible to
combine pension and employment.
While people are not obliged to claim the public pension on reaching the qualifying
age, there is no advantage in deferring a claim.
Pre-reform scenario
The reform increased the pension age from 60 to 65.
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Pension modelling results: New Zealand
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 39.7 39.7 39.7 39.7 39.7 39.7
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.7
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 46.8 79.5 53.0 39.7 26.5 19.9
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 48.6 81.4 54.9 41.7 29.4 23.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 8.6 14.7 9.8 7.4 4.9 3.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.2 17.3 11.5 8.6 5.8 4.3
Net pension wealth 7.1 12.2 8.1 6.1 4.1 3.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.4 14.3 9.5 7.1 4.8 3.6
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Pension modelling results: New Zealand, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 39.7 39.7 39.7 39.7 39.7 39.7
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.7 41.7
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 46.8 79.5 53.0 39.7 26.5 19.9
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 48.6 81.4 54.9 41.7 29.4 23.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 10.5 17.9 11.9 8.9 6.0 4.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 12.2 20.8 13.9 10.4 6.9 5.2
Net pension wealth 8.7 14.8 9.8 7.4 4.9 3.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.1 17.2 11.5 8.6 5.7 4.3
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Norway
The public pension system in Norway consists of a flat-rate basic pension, a special
supplement and an earnings-related (supplementary) pension. Part of the minimum
pension is means-tested against the earnings-related pension. Recently, a mandatory
occupational pension was introduced.
Qualifying conditions
The current public system was introduced in 1967. As the required earnings period for
a full pension is 40 years, the first cohort of old age pensioners that fulfil the insurance
period is the one to retire in 2007. However, the requirements for the minimum pension
and for people born before 1937 are relaxed to allow them higher pensions.
The normal pension age is 67. Persons with a residence period in Norway of at least
three years between the ages of 17 and 67 (inclusive) are entitled to the minimum pension,
consisting of basic pension and special supplement. Full benefits are granted after a forty
year long residence period. The requirement for a supplementary pension is at least three
years of annual pension point earnings. A full pension is granted after 40 years. Both
benefits are proportionally reduced for shorter earnings histories.
Benefit calculation
Basic
Many benefits under the National Insurance Scheme are determined in relation to the
basic amount, G, that was NOK 58 139 in 2004. The full basic pension for a single person
equals the basic amount. This is equivalent to 18% of average earnings. Historically,
indexation of the basic amount has been lower than average wage growth. However, the
government has since 2002 linked the value of the basic amount to average earnings. The
modelling assumes that this practice continues.
Minimum
The special supplement is 79.33% of the basic amount for 40 years of contribution and
proportionally reduced for shorter contribution periods. This supplement is withdrawn
against the earnings-related supplementary pension. The basic pension above and the
special supplement form the minimum pension.
The overall minimum pension has been upgraded intermittently, as the special
supplement has been increased in real terms. It has over time tended to track earnings
growth. Again, since 2002 the minimum pension has been formally indexed to average
earnings.
Earnings-related
Since the basic pension replaces the first slice of earnings, the earnings-related
scheme only covers earnings above the value of the basic amount. The special supplement
then replaces a further slice of earnings, up to 2.89 times the basic amount. The earnings-
related replacement rate falls for higher earnings. Annual earnings between 2.89 times the
basic amount and six times the basic amount are replaced at a 42% rate (the rate was
lowered from 45 % in 1992 and is for each pensioner the average of these two weighted by
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the number of years with annual points prior to 1992). Between 6 and 12 times the basic
amount, the replacement rate is one third of that level. Given that 40 years’ contributions
are needed for a full pension, these are equivalent to annual accrual rates (for those with
all entitlements earned after 1992) of 1.05 and 0.35% respectively. The first threshold,
where the accrual rate declines, is a little over average earnings (109%). The ceiling on
earnings eligible for benefits is therefore a little over double average earnings (219%).
The calculation of the pension uses the best 20 years of point earnings. The
valorisation of earlier years’ accruals depends on the adjustment procedure for the value
of the basic amount (G). As discussed previously, the modelling assumes that the basic
amount will in future be uprated in line with average earnings.
Defined contribution
From the beginning of 2006, employers must make a minimum contribution to a
defined-contribution pension plan of 2% of the earnings of their employees. (If employers
offer a defined-benefit scheme instead, then benefits must be at least the same level as the
expected benefits under the mandatory 2% contribution.) Contributions are only required
on earnings between the basic amount (G) and 12 times the basic amount.
Benefits can currently only be taken at age 67. They must be withdrawn over a
minimum period of ten years. For comparison with the results for other countries, it is
assumed that the benefit is taken as a price-indexed annuity calculated using unisex
mortality tables.
Early retirement
About two-thirds of employees work in businesses participating in early retirement
programmes under the Contractual Early Retirement Scheme (AFP). This scheme, which
was introduced in 1989, allows retirement from age 62. The pension level under this
scheme is about the same as the ordinary old-age pension from 67 years of age, i.e. if the
person had continued until that age in the job he/she was holding at the time he/she
actually retired.
The calculation of AFP pensions differs between sectors. In the private sector,
AFP pensions are calculated in the same manner as the permanent disability pension
(granting pension points for the remaining years including 67). In addition, these
pensioners receive a so-called AFP-supplement of NOK 11 400 per year. This supplement is
not taxed.
Late retirement
People can defer their pension after 67 and continue to work and people can combine
working with receiving a pension.
Originally, the pension age was set at 70 but later reduced to 67. The possibility of
earning pension points based on labour income up to age 70 was kept, and for age groups 67-
70 the pension was (and is) income-tested against labour income. This income-testing
consists of reducing the pension by 40% of labour income exceeding two basic amounts (G)
when the individual is combining work and pension.
There is no additional increment earned by deferring pension after 67, and the income
testing from 67 to 70 is at 40% when combining work and pension. However, note that the
latter only is effective for income exceeding two basic amounts (G).
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Pension modelling results: Norway
Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 51.0 33.2 45.9 59.3 75.3 85.4
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 60.8 41.9 55.3 69.3 85.2 95.1
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 60.0 66.4 61.2 59.3 50.2 42.7
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 70.0 77.1 71.2 69.3 62.5 55.1
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 10.3 11.5 10.5 10.2 8.6 7.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 12.1 13.4 12.3 11.9 10.0 8.5
Net pension wealth 8.6 10.1 8.9 8.3 6.8 5.6
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.1 11.8 10.4 9.7 7.9 6.6
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Poland
The new pension system was introduced in 1999; it applies to people born in 1949 or
after. The new public scheme is based on a system of notional accounts. People under 30
(born in 1969 and after) at the time of the reform must also participate in the funded
scheme; people aged 30-50 (born between 1949 and 1968) could choose the funded option.
However, the choice had to be made in 1999 and it was irrevocable.
Qualifying conditions
The minimum pension age in the new system will be 65 for men and 60 for women.
For the minimum pension, 25 and 20 years’ contributions are required from men and
women, respectively.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
A contribution of 12.22% of earnings (or 19.52% for workers born between 1949 and
1968 who do not choose the defined-contribution option) will be credited to individuals’
notional accounts. Initially, these contributions were uprated between the time they are
made and the time of retirement by price inflation plus 75% of the growth of the real
covered wage bill. From 2004 onwards, this notional interest rate has been defined as 100%
of the growth of the real covered wage bill and no less than price inflation. It is applied
retrospectively to accounts from the year 2000.
At retirement, the accumulated notional capital is divided by the “g-value” to arrive at
the pension benefit. The g-value is average life expectancy at retirement age: this process
is equivalent to the process of annuitisation in funded pension systems. The g-value is
calculated using life tables published by the Central Statistical Office. In the modelling,
actuarial data from the UN/World Bank population database is used.
The ceiling to contributions and pensionable earnings was PLN 68 700 or 2.3 times
average earnings in 2004.
Between 1999 and 2004 pensions in payment were uprated in line with 80% of prices
and 20% of average earnings, projected for a given year. Note, however, that from 2005 the
minimum indexation is to prices and adjustments are only made when compounded
inflation reaches 5%.
Minimum pension
There is a minimum pension under the pay-as-you-go scheme, which was
PLN 562.86 per month in 2003-04, corresponding to 23% of average earnings. The minimum
pension target was adjusted to 80% inflation plus 20% of wage growth but from 2005, it is
indexed to prices.
Defined contribution
Some 7.3 percentage points of the total contribution are diverted to the funded
scheme for those compulsorily covered or choosing this option. The law on annuities has
not been legislated yet. But it is assumed that at retirement, the accumulated capital will
be converted to an annuity and at the minimum, annuities will be price-indexed (used in
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the model calculation). Annuity rates will most likely have to be based on unisex life-tables
though this has not been decided yet.
Early retirement
There are no provisions for early retirement in the pension system. The old pension
system (applicable to persons born before 1949) allowed various forms of early retirement
for specific groups, such as miners, railway workers, teachers, people working in special
conditions and women.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer both the notional and the funded, defined-contribution pension
component without any age limits. People who defer claiming pension after normal
pension age contribute and earn extra pension.
It is possible to combine work and pension receipt. For old-age pensioners below legal
retirement age (in the old pension system), there are limits of income. If the work income
is above 70% of average wage, the pension is reduced, if it is above 130% of average wage,
the pension payment is suspended.
Pre-reform scenario
The pre-reform system was a defined-benefit scheme; there were no individual
accounts. The old system had two components.
The first part paid a flat base amount, linked to average economy-wide earnings (net
of social security contributions). The benefit is set at 24% of average earnings on a national
definition. These were PLN 1862.62 in 2003-04 and PLN 1829.24 for 2004-05. The benefit in
recent years is adjusted annually in March. The benefit was conditional on 25 years of
contributions for men and 20 years for women.
The earnings-related component paid 1.3% of earnings for each year of contributions.
The earnings measure was the best ten consecutive years in the final 20 or any period of
20 years in the whole career, relative to the average wage in the economy and multiplied by
the base amount.
The minimum pension and ceiling are the same under the old system as under the
new.
Pensions in payment were indexed from 1999 to prices plus at least 20% of the real
wage growth projected for a given year and from 2005 they are indexed to prices (as with
pensions under the new system).
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Pension modelling results: Poland
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 52.0 30.6 45.9 61.2 91.8 122.4
(% average gross earnings) 37.8 23.1 33.4 44.5 66.8 89.0
Net relative pension level 64.1 38.8 56.8 74.9 111.0 147.1
(% net average earnings) 47.3 29.9 42.1 55.2 81.4 107.7
Gross replacement rate 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2 61.2
(% individual gross earnings) 44.5 46.2 44.5 44.5 44.5 44.5
Net replacement rate 74.8 74.5 74.8 74.9 75.0 77.1
(% individual net earnings) 55.3 57.5 55.3 55.2 55.0 56.4
Gross pension wealth 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.6 8.9 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6
Net pension wealth 7.0 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 7.3 7.9 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.1
= =
=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=

=
=
=
=
=

 = = = = === =
 = = = = === =
 = = = = === =
 = = = = === =
8	#
"	,	##
0.%&%+7.(/0'()
(' $.,77
&"	
		#
"	,	##
8	,#
*"	
"
&"	
		,#
*"	
"
%)&;&)60/*(0.%&%+7C*1.,1,.'&,%*,@*0;(.0+(*(0.%&%+7
%)&;&)60/*(0.%&%+7C*1.,1,.'&,%*,@*0;(.0+(*(0.%&%+7
%)&;&)60/*(0.%&%+7C*1.,1,.'&,%*,@*0;(.0+(*(0.%&%+7
%)&;&)60/*(0.%&%+7C*1.,1,.'&,%*,@*0;(.0+(*(0.%&%+7

III. POLAND
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007 171
Pension modelling results: Poland, pre-reform scenario 
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 55.6 40.1 51.1 62.2 84.2 106.3
(% average gross earnings) 51.4 37.7 47.5 57.3 76.9 96.5
Net relative pension level 68.2 50.0 63.0 76.0 102.0 128.1
(% net average earnings) 63.3 47.1 58.7 70.2 93.4 116.5
Gross replacement rate 65.4 80.3 68.2 62.2 56.1 53.1
(% individual gross earnings) 60.5 75.4 63.3 57.3 51.2 48.2
Net replacement rate 79.7 96.1 82.9 76.0 69.0 67.1
(% individual net earnings) 74.0 90.6 77.2 70.2 63.1 61.0
Gross pension wealth 9.0 11.0 9.3 8.5 7.7 7.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 11.7 14.6 12.2 11.1 9.9 9.3
Net pension wealth 7.5 9.3 7.9 7.1 6.4 6.0
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.8 12.4 10.3 9.3 8.2 7.7
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Portugal
Portugal has an earnings-related public pension scheme with a minimum pension and a
means-tested safety net.
Qualifying conditions
The standard pension age is 65 although early retirement is possible from age 55. A
minimum of 15 years of contributions are required for retirement at 65. Early retirement is
possible with 30 years of contributions.
The social pension is payable from age 65.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The pension accrues at 2% of the earnings base for each year of contributions for 20 or
fewer years’ contributions. For beneficiaries with 21 or more years of contributions, the
accrual rate ranges between 2% and 2.3% depending on earnings. The schedule for the
accrual rate depends on individual earnings relative to the value of the national minimum
wage (EUR 365.60). Each slice of earnings accrues pension at a different rate.
Pension accrues for a maximum of 40 years.
The earnings measure is presently the best 10 of the final 15 years. However, this base
is currently being extended, such that it will reach lifetime average earnings from 2017.
The recent reform accelerated this change so that pensions of people retiring between 2006
and 2017 will be based pro rata on the best 10 of final 15 and lifetime-average earnings
measures. People who joined the system after 2002 will be fully covered by the new rules.
For people with more than 40 years’ contributions, only the best 40 count in the benefit
formula. 
Valorisation of earnings for pension calculation from the beginning of 2002 is to a mix
of earnings and prices. The weights are 75% price inflation and 25% earnings growth,
subject to a maximum real increase of 0.5%.
The recently agreed pension reform introduces an adjustment of future pensions to
increases in life expectancy at age 65, known as the sustainability factor. Based on the UN/
World Bank database on mortality rates, life expectancy in Portugal at age 65 in the
year 2006 is 16.2 years. This is projected to increase to 20.3 years life expectancy in
45 years’ time. Thus, benefits are expected to be 81% of their value under current rules as
a result of the link to life expectancy for an individual spending a whole career with this
adjustment.
Pensions in payment are now progressively indexed, with larger increases on smaller
pensions. In addition, indexation will be more generous if GDP growth is higher. The
following matrix will apply from 2008.
Earnings/minimum wage ≤ 1.1 >  1.1-2.0 > 2.0-4.0 >  4.0-8.0 >  8.0
Accrual rate (%) 2.3 2.25 2.2 2.1 2.0
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Minimum
There is a monthly minimum pension of EUR 208 from January to May 2004,
EUR 211.50 from June to November and EUR 216.79 from December 2004 (for workers with
up to 15 years of contributions). For workers with 15 to 40 years, the amount of the
minimum pension varies between 65% and 100% of the minimum wage net of employee’s
social contributions. For 2004, the lower limit was EUR 217.65 (January-May), EUR 222 (June-
November) and EUR 233.10 (December-) and the upper limit was EUR 325.31,
EUR 325.38 and EUR 333.51 for the same three periods, as described in the table below. In
annual terms, the minimum pension varied between EUR 3 096 and EUR 4 564 of average
earnings in calendar 2004.
There are 14 monthly payments.
Targeted
For people who do not qualify for the earnings-related scheme, the monthly social
pension was EUR 151.84 (January-May 2004), EUR 154.88 (June-November) and EUR 164.17
(December-).
Pension GDP growth
Multiple of IAS < 2% 2-3% ≥ 3%
< 1.5 CPI CPI + 20% GDP growth* CPI + 20% GDP growth
1.5 – 6 CPI – 0.5 p.p. CPI CPI + 12.5% GDP growth
6 – 12 CPI – 0.75 p.p. CPI – 0.25 p.p. CPI
≥ 12 zero zero zero
Note: CPI = consumer price inflation; GDP = gross domestic product; p.p. = percentage point. The IAS is a measure of
a minimum subsistence income. For 2007, the IAS will be based on the minimum wage for 2006 (EUR 385.90) uprated
by inflation for 2006 (3.1%). It is not yet determined how the IAS will evolve over time, but the modelling assumes
that it will track average earnings in the long term.
 * Subject to a minimum limit of 0.5 percentage points above inflation.
Years of contributions
Minimum pension (euros)
January-May June-November December
15 and 16 217.65 222.00 233.10
17 and 18 222.48 226.93 236.01
19 and 20 227.31 231.86 238.82
21 and 22 238.43 243.20 255.36
23 and 24 243.25 248.12 259.29
25 and 26 248.08 253.04 263.16
27 and 28 252.90 257.96 265.70
29 and 30 257.72 260.30 266.81
31 279.33 284.92 310.56
32 284.16 289.84 313.03
33 288.99 294.77 315.64
34 293.81 299.69 317.67
35 298.63 304.60 319.83
36 303.46 309.53 325.01
37 308.28 314.45 327.03
38 313.12 319.38 328.96
39 317.94 324.30 332.41
40 and over 325.31 325.38 333.51
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This is only paid if total income for a single person does not exceed 30% of the
minimum wage or 50% of the minimum wage in case of couples. Again, there are
14 monthly payments.
Minimum pension amounts and other social benefits will be linked to the IAS
according to the following table:
Early retirement
Early retirement is possible at age 55 with 30 years’ contributions. There is a
decrement of 0.5% for each month of early retirement (6% per year). If the individual has
more than 30 years’ contributions on reaching age 55, then the number of years over which
the pension is adjusted is cut by one year for each complete three years of contributions
beyond 30 years.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer the pension after age 65. The recent reform allows for a pension
increment of 1% per month for people with a full (40-year) career (12% per year). For people
with incomplete contribution histories, the increase varies between 0.33% per month
(<25 years career) and 0.65% (35-39 years).
Individuals who qualify for retirement before age 65 will, as a result of the recent
reform, receive an increment of 0.65% per month of deferral (7.8% per year).
All of these increases are granted subject to a maximum replacement rate of 92%.
Pre-reform scenario
The pre-reform scenario models benefits using the measure of the best 10 of the final
15 years’ earnings. It also excludes the sustainability adjustment.
Benefits Amount (% IAS)
Minimum pension (earnings related)
 15 years of contributions 57.8
 15 to 20 years of contributions 64.5
 21 to 30 years of contributions 71.2
 More than 30 years of contributions 89.0
Social pension 44.5
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Pension modelling results: Portugal
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 46.1 35.2 40.9 54.1 80.1 105.3
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 59.0 45.0 52.3 69.2 102.0 130.1
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 54.3 70.4 54.5 54.1 53.4 52.7
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 67.4 81.6 66.0 69.2 72.2 73.7
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 8.2 10.5 8.2 7.9 7.8 7.7
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.6 12.3 9.6 9.2 9.1 9.0
Net pension wealth 8.2 10.5 8.2 7.9 7.8 7.4
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 9.6 12.3 9.6 9.2 9.0 8.7
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Pension modelling results: Portugal, pre-reform scenario 
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 76.9 45.7 68.1 90.1 133.5 175.5
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 98.3 58.5 87.1 113.2 158.4 199.2
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 90.5 91.5 90.8 90.1 89.0 87.8
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 112.4 106.1 110.0 113.2 112.1 112.9
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 13.2 13.3 13.2 13.1 13.0 12.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 15.4 15.6 15.4 15.3 15.1 14.9
Net pension wealth 13.2 13.3 13.2 12.9 12.0 11.4
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 15.4 15.6 15.4 15.1 14.0 13.2
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Slovak Republic
The earnings-related, public scheme is similar to a points system, with benefits that
depend on individual earnings relative to the average. There is no minimum pension, but
low-income workers are protected by a minimum amount of earnings on which pension is
calculated. All pensioners are eligible for social assistance benefits. Defined-contribution
plans were introduced at the beginning of 2005.
Qualifying conditions
Ten years of pension insurance are needed to be eligible for a benefit. Pension ages are
being increased gradually, to be equalised between the sexes at age 62. For men, pension
age will reach 62 from 2006. For women, the increase in pension age will be spread over the
period 2004-14.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
Contributors to the pension scheme earn annual pension points. These are calculated
as the ratio of individual earnings to economy-wide average earnings. The pension
entitlement is the sum of pension points over the career multiplied by the pension-point
value. This was SKK 183.58 for 2004. The pension-point value is indexed to average
earnings. National average earnings in 2004 were SKK 15 825 per month. Dividing the point
value by the earnings figure gives the equivalent to the accrual rate in a defined-benefit
scheme, which is just under 1.2%.
There is a ceiling to earnings for contribution and benefit purposes, which is set at
three times average earnings. The earnings data are lagged, so the ceiling for the first half
of 2004 was three times average earnings in 2002 (SKK 13 511 per month). In the second
half, the ceiling was based on 2003 data for average earnings (SKK 14 365 per month). (At
the baseline assumptions for earnings growth and price inflation, the lagging means that
the ceiling is slightly less than three times contemporaneous average earnings.)
Pensions in payment are indexed to the arithmetic average of earnings growth and
price inflation.
For workers joining defined-contribution plans, the benefits under the public,
earnings-related scheme are half of those of workers who remain only in the public plan.
Minimum
There is no minimum pension. However, there is a minimum assessment base for
pension purposes that is equal to the minimum wage. The minimum wage was
SKK 6 500 from the beginning of October 2004 and SKK 6 080 earlier in the year. The
minimum wage is worth just under 40% of average earnings.
Defined contribution
The contribution rate for the defined-contribution scheme is 9% of earnings.
Participation is mandatory for workers entering the labour market from January 2005; all
others may choose by June 2006 to remain solely under the public scheme or join the mixed
system. The defined-contribution pension can be taken as an annuity or as a combination
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of scheduled withdrawal and annuity. The modelling assumes withdrawal in the form of a
price-indexed annuity calculated using unisex annuity rates.
Early retirement
Early retirement is possible. Benefits are reduced by 0.5% per month that the pension
is claimed early (equivalent to 6% per year). Early retirement requires that the resulting
pension is equal to at least 1.2 times the adult subsistence income level, which was
SKK 5 052 in the first half of 2004 and SKK 5 497 in the second half. The subsistence
minimum for the calendar year 2004 was worth 32% of average earnings, meaning that the
minimum pension required for early retirement is 38% of average earnings.
There is currently no age limit on early retirement: it is theoretically possible at any
age provided the ten-year contribution condition and the requirement for the level of the
benefit are both met.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer claiming the pension after the normal pension age. The benefit
is increased by 0.5% for each month of deferral (6% per year). For people who claim the
pension and continue to work, the pension will be recalculated when the individual
eventually retires adding one half of the points earned during that period.
Pre-reform scenario
The new pension scheme is applicable to the pension claims arising from
1 January 2004. Workers who had reached the pension eligibility age under the old system
but not yet claimed their pension were entitled to the higher of the pension calculated
under the old or new rules.
Under the old system, eligibility for a (full) pension required 25 years of contributions
or credited periods. Normal pension age was 60 for men and 57 for women. Pension ages
were lower for men in hazardous or arduous work and for women who had raised children.
The pension was 50% of earnings plus 1% for each year of contributions over 25 years. The
earnings measure was the best five years in the final ten. There was a maximum pension of
SKK 8 282 per month in the first half of 2002 and SKK 8 697 in the second half. This gave an
annual total for 2002 of SKK 101 874, equivalent to 63% of average earnings in that year. Based
on Slovak Government estimates of 10.2% nominal wage growth in 2004 and actual wage
growth of 6.3% in 2003, the annual maximum pension for 2004 would have been SKK 119 338
(had the system not been reformed). This is worth around two-thirds of average earnings.
Pensions in payment under the old system were increased in line with the growth of
average earnings (provided the growth was at least 5%).
There was a minimum pension under the old system and this was SKK 550 per month
plus an adjustment to reflecting changes in living standards. For 2002, the minimum
pension was therefore SKK 1 240 per month. Given the growth in earnings since 2002
(see above), the modelling assumes a 2004 value for the minimum pension of
SKK 1 453 per month, equivalent to around 10% of average earnings. Again, 25 years’
contributions were required to receive the minimum pension.
There was no early retirement under the old pension system. For late retirement,
pensions were increased by 6% for each year the claim was deferred.
III. SLOVAK REPUBLIC
PENSIONS AT A GLANCE: PUBLIC POLICIES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES – 2007 EDITION – ISBN 978-92-64-03214-9 – © OECD 2007 179
Pension modelling results: Slovak Republic
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 48.2 28.4 42.6 56.7 85.1 113.5
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 62.0 36.5 54.7 72.9 109.4 145.8
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7 56.7
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 71.7 66.4 70.6 72.9 75.4 76.7
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
Net pension wealth 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
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Pension modelling results: Slovak Republic, pre-reform scenario 
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 55.3 32.5 48.8 59.5 59.5 59.5
(% average gross earnings) 52.7 31.0 46.5 59.5 59.5 59.5
Net relative pension level 71.0 41.8 62.7 76.4 76.4 76.4
(% net average earnings) 67.7 39.8 59.8 76.4 76.4 76.4
Gross replacement rate 65.0 65.0 65.0 59.5 39.6 29.7
(% individual gross earnings) 62.0 62.0 62.0 59.5 39.6 29.7
Net replacement rate 82.1 76.1 80.9 76.4 52.7 40.2
(% individual net earnings) 78.3 72.5 77.2 76.4 52.7 40.2
Gross pension wealth 12.8 12.8 12.8 11.7 7.8 5.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.1 10.7 8.0
Net pension wealth 12.8 12.8 12.8 11.7 7.8 5.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.1 10.7 8.0
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Spain
The Spanish public pension system consists of a single, earnings-related benefit. There is
also a means-tested minimum pension, which replaces the previous special social assistance
scheme.
Qualifying conditions
The retirement age for a full benefit is 65 years for men and women. 15 years of
contributions are necessary to qualify for a pension benefit.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The benefit accrues according to a schedule. After 15 years’ contributions, it is 50% of
the earnings base. Over the next ten years, an extra 3% is accrued per year, followed by 2%
per year thereafter. The maximum accrual is 100%, reached after 35 years’ contributions.
The earnings base is pay over the last 15 years, up-rated in line with prices, apart from
the last two years. This means that the replacement rate relative to final salary is less than
100%. On the standard assumptions for earnings growth and price inflation, this is
calculated to be 88%.
There is a ceiling to earnings for contributions and benefit purposes of EUR 32 778,
corresponding to 165% of average earnings. 
Benefits are price-indexed.
Minimum
There is a minimum pension payable from age 65 amounting to EUR 417.81 per
month, or 30% of average earnings, for pensioners without a dependent spouse. There are
14 payments per year.
Early retirement
Early retirement is available from age 61 for people entering the system in 1967 or later
who are unemployed, provided they have contributed for at least 30 years. The actuarial
reduction depends on the number of years of contributions: 8% (30 years), 7.5% (31-34 years),
7% (35-37 years), 6.5% (38-39 years), and 6% for more than 40 years of contributions. 
For people who entered the system before 1967, early retirement was possible from
age 60.
The minimum pension for early retirees is EUR 389.31 or 27% of average earnings, and
after 65 it moves to the higher level.
Between 60 and 64, it is possible to combine partial pension receipt and a part-time
job, if working hours are reduced between 25% and 85%. Another employee must replace
the remaining working hours left by the partial pensioner.
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Late retirement
It is possible to defer the pension after normal retirement age. For people with 65 years
and 35 years of contributions, the amount of the pension may exceed 100% of the
calculation base. The benefit increases by 2% per year of deferral.
From 65 there is also the possibility of combining partial pension and part-time job. In
this case, there is no obligation to replace the working hours.
Pension modelling results: Spain
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 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 69.0 40.6 60.9 81.2 121.8 134.2
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 73.0 46.0 65.2 84.5 121.3 132.5
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 67.1
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 84.2 82.0 83.9 84.5 85.2 72.4
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 10.1
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 11.8
Net pension wealth 10.3 11.0 10.4 10.1 9.7 7.9
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 12.1 12.9 12.2 11.9 11.4 9.3
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Sweden
The new pension system, introduced in 1999, applies to people born in 1954 and after.
The old and the new systems will cover older workers proportionally: people born 1938-1953
will receive pensions under a mix of the old and new rules. The earnings-related part is
based on notional accounts and there is a small mandatory contribution to individual,
defined-contribution funded pensions. There is also a pension-income-tested top-up.
Occupational pension plans – with defined-benefit and defined-contribution elements –
have broad coverage.
Qualifying conditions
Eligibility for the guarantee pension will be earned with three years’ residency. It is
possible to get a guarantee pension from age 65.
Maximum guarantee pension is earned with 40 years’ residency and is reduced
proportionally for shorter periods. The pension can be claimed from age 65.
The standard pension age in the occupational plan for white-collar private workers
(the ITP plan) is 65, with an early pension age of 55. There is a minimum entry age of 28.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The new earnings-related scheme uses notional accounts. Contributions of 16% of
pensionable pay are credited and then up-rated in line with a three-year moving average of
economy-wide average earnings. Pensionable pay is defined as earnings less the employee
contribution to the pension system (i.e. to both the notional accounts and the premium
pension) of 7% of gross earnings, giving an effective contribution rate on gross earnings of
14.88% to the notional-accounts system. Contributions are only levied when annual
earnings exceed a small floor of SEK 16 600 in 2004, less than 5% of average earnings,
although they are due on the whole of earnings for all people earning above the floor. There
is a ceiling to benefits calculated in terms of pensionable earnings of SEK 317 500 in 2004.
However, this again relates to pensionable earnings, giving an effective ceiling relative to
gross earnings of SEK 341 400 in 2004 (around 130% of average earnings). Employer
contributions are also paid only to the ceiling, but there is an additional tax on earnings
above the ceiling. This tax has the same percentage as the pension contribution but goes
directly to the central government budget. It does not accrue any pension rights.
The notional accounts are increased every year by the distribution of the pension
balances of deceased persons of the same age as the survivors (inheritance gains). The
inheritance gains from people who die before the earliest possible retirement age (61 years)
are those actually arising. After this age the inheritance gains factor is estimated on the
basis of the mortality observed for an earlier period (computed from five year unisex
mortality tables).
At retirement, the accumulated notional capital will be converted to an annuity. This
calculation will use a coefficient dependent on individual retirement age and
contemporaneous life expectancy (based on the previous five year unisex mortality tables).
A real discount rate of 1.6% a year will be assumed in this calculation. Illustrative values for
the annuity coefficient at age 65 are 15.4 for 2000 rising to 16.8 by 2020 and 17.4 by 2040.
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The annuity coefficient is currently 18.0 for retirement at 61 and 12.8 at age 70 for people
born in 1940.
After retirement, pensions are uprated with the increase in nominal average earnings
less the imputed interest rate in the annuity divisor of 1.6%.
There is also a “balance mechanism”: if assets (the buffer fund plus the estimated
value of assets in the form of contribution revenues) fall below liabilities (accrued notional
pension capital and capital value of outgoing pensions), then indexation of pensions in
payment and returns credited to notional accounts are reduced by the ratio of assets to
liabilities. The balancing ratio is now close to the point at which the automatic balancing
mechanism would be activated (1.0097 in 2003, 1.0014 in 2004 and 1.0044 in 2005). (The
balance ratio for year t is used to calculate the balance number or the need for activating
the balancing mechanism in year t+2. An activated balancing mechanism would mean
lower replacement rates from the national system but could also produce higher results
when the pension system recovers and the balance figure increases (the balance index can
exceed the income index during the recovery period).
For modelling purposes, the annuity coefficients are calculated using the above rules
and the relevant mortality data from the UN/World Bank population database. It is
assumed that the balance mechanism does not affect the uprating of benefits.
Minimum
The “guarantee pension” is an income-tested top-up for people with low levels of
benefit from notional accounts. For a single person, the guaranteed benefit in 2004 was
SEK 83 709 for a single pensioner born after 1938 or 33% of gross average earnings.
The guarantee pension is withdrawn at 100% against the first SEK 49 518 (2004) of
income, for a single person, from the earnings-related pension, thereafter at 48%. This
threshold is equivalent to 20% of average earnings. Only when earnings-related pension
exceeds SEK 120 651 – nearly 50% of average earnings – is entitlement to the guarantee
exhausted.
The guarantee level is price indexed under current legislation. However, the baseline
assumption in the modelling for all countries is that the value of safety-net retirement
benefits will, over time, tend to track average earnings rather than decline relative to
general living standards.
There is also a housing benefit that covers 93% of housing costs up to a maximum of
SEK 5 000 per month for a single pensioner. The benefit is an important part of the
minimum living standard for Swedish pensioners. This means-tested benefit is not
included in the modelled calculations.
Defined contribution
A further 2.5% of pensionable income (giving an effective contribution rate against
gross earnings of 2.325%) will be paid into personal pension accounts: the premium
pension. People have a broad choice of where these funds are invested.
At retirement, people have a choice over the way benefits are withdrawn. First, people
can convert the pension into an annuity to avoid investment risk. Alternatively, people will
be able to choose a variable annuity, where their funds continue to be invested by their
chosen fund manager. These annuities do not have a guaranteed value. The principle of the
pension calculation in this case is that the value of the account is divided by an annuity
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divisor (based on estimated average life expectancy) and the pension benefit is credited
with an estimated future interest rate of 3% minus administrative costs. If returns exceed
3%, then either an additional payment is made or the balance of the account is higher and
so, therefore, is the base for calculating the annual pension.
Quasi-mandatory occupational
The occupational schemes together are estimated to cover almost 90% of employees.
There are only four major occupational schemes. The modelling uses the ITP scheme for
white-collar workers, which mixes defined-benefit and defined-contribution elements.
The defined benefit is 10% of final salary on earnings up to a ceiling specified as
7.5 times the income base amount or SEK 317 250 in 2004. However, this threshold is in
practice lower than the effective ceiling to the public scheme because it applies to gross
earnings rather than pensionable earnings. Between this threshold and around 3.1 times
average earnings, the full-career replacement rate is 65%; and from around 3.1 to 4.6 times
average earnings, 32.5%. A full pension is earned with 30 years’ contributions from an entry
age of 28. Shorter tenures result in a proportionally reduced benefit.
Pensions in payment are adjusted at the discretion of the ITP board. However, recent
increases have been broadly in line with price inflation and so this procedure is assumed
in the modelling.
The ITP also has a defined-contribution component, which receives a contribution of
2% of gross earnings. The modelling assumes that this is withdrawn at the normal pension
age in the form of a price-indexed annuity. The entry age is again 28.
The ITP plan has been recently renegotiated and the new scheme applies to those
born 1979 or later. The new scheme is a defined-contribution with a contribution of 4.5% of
gross earnings up to 7.5 income base amounts (SEK 333 750 in 2006) and 30% of gross wages
above this limit. This system has not been modelled in the calculations.
Early retirement
Retirement is possible from age 61 in the public pension scheme (both the income
pension and the premium pension). There is no fixed retirement age. The notional-
accounts and annuity calculations provide an automatic actuarial reduction depending on
the age of retirement.
The income-tested guarantee pension cannot be claimed before 65. If the notional-
accounts pension is withdrawn before or after age 65, the guarantee pension is still
calculated as if the notional-accounts pension had been withdrawn at age 65. 
It is possible to draw the ITP occupational pension from age 55. There is a reduction in
benefits for pensions claimed before age 62. For retirement at 62 or above, the full
occupational pension is paid as if contributions were paid until age 65, though reduced by
0.5% per month that the pension is withdrawn earlier than the age of 65.
Late retirement
It is possible to defer the notional accounts pension with no upper age limit, again
with automatic actuarial adjustments.
It is possible to defer the ITP occupational pension after age 65. No additional pension
rights can be accrued after age 65.
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It is possible to combine work and pension receipt. Pensions can be withdrawn
partially (at 25, 50 or 75% of the full pension). The guarantee pension is adjusted against
other pensions from the Swedish old-age pension system and from comparable foreign
national pensions, but is not reduced by wage income, capital income, occupational
pension or private pension insurance. Thus, it is also possible to combine work with receipt
of the guarantee pension.
Pre-reform scenario
The reform of the public pension system was introduced in 1999. The coverage of the
old and new systems is described above.
The old system had two tiers. The first was a basic pension subject to residency
(40 years) or contributions (30 years) with proportional reductions if the number of years
fell short of the requirement. The pension value for a single person was 96% of the price
base amount, the latter being SEK 39 300 in 2004. The price base amount is indexed to
prices.
The earnings-related tier was based on a points system. Pension receipt required at
least three years’ contributions. The pension value was 60% of the base amount (at the
time of reaching pension age) multiplied by the average number of points in the 15 years
with the highest points. In turn, the number of points was defined as earnings less the
contemporaneous base amount divided by the contemporaneous base amount. (Note that
since the base amount was price indexed and the formula depended on both the
contemporaneous and the final base amount, then this policy is equivalent to prices
valorisation.) The ceiling to pensionable earnings was 7.5 price base amounts. A full
pension required 30 years of contributions with proportional reductions for shorter
contribution histories. Pensions in payment under the pre-reform system were indexed to
prices. Early (to 61) and late (to 70) retirement was possible with adjustments. These were
0.5% per month (6% per year) for early retirement and 0.7% per month (8.4% per year) for
late retirement.
The pre-reform pension system also had a pension supplement, payable to those with
little or no earnings-related pension. This was 0.56 price base amounts (SEK 21 565 in
2002). It was withdrawn against the earnings-related pension (not other sources of
income).
As part of the reform package introducing the guarantee pension, tax concessions for
older people were withdrawn. In 2002, older people were entitled to a special income-tax
deduction of between SEK 11 104 and SEK 59 688 (depending on pension income). This
extra deduction was withdrawn at 66.5% of income above the minimum pension level,
implying no special deduction for pensioners with incomes above SEK 132 605.
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Pension modelling results: Sweden
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 54.2 39.6 50.0 62.1 97.1 132.5
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 56.6 42.8 52.7 64.0 97.1 122.9
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 63.7 79.1 66.6 62.1 64.7 66.3
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 66.2 81.4 69.2 64.0 71.9 73.9
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 10.2 12.6 10.7 10.0 10.3 10.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 11.7 14.4 12.2 11.4 11.8 12.0
Net pension wealth 7.4 9.5 7.8 7.2 7.2 6.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 8.5 10.9 9.0 8.2 8.2 7.8
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Pension modelling results: Sweden, pre-reform scenario 
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 67.7 41.5 60.2 78.9 115.1 150.6
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 69.2 44.7 62.2 79.8 110.8 135.5
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 79.6 83.1 80.3 78.9 76.8 75.3
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 81.0 84.9 81.8 79.8 82.0 81.5
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 12.5 13.0 12.6 12.3 12.0 11.8
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 14.2 14.8 14.3 14.1 13.7 13.4
Net pension wealth 8.9 9.8 9.1 8.7 8.1 7.4
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.1 11.1 10.3 9.9 9.2 8.4
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Switzerland
The Swiss pension system has three main parts. The public scheme is earnings-related,
but has a progressive formula. There is also a system of mandatory occupational pensions
and an income-tested supplementary benefit.
Qualifying conditions
Pensionable age under the public scheme and mandatory occupational pensions is
currently 65 for men and 63 for women, although the latter will increase to 64 from 2005. A
full pension requires contributions for 44 years.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The public pension is based on average lifetime earnings. If this figure is less than
CHF 37 980, then the entitlement is CHF 9 368 plus 26% of average lifetime earnings. For
lifetime earnings above the threshold, the entitlement is a flat CHF 13 166 plus 16% of
average lifetime earnings.
There is a minimum pension of CHF 12 660 and a maximum pension of twice that
level. These are equivalent to 18 and 36% of average earnings, respectively. The maximum
benefit is reached when average lifetime earnings are CHF 75 960, equivalent to 108% of
economy-wide average earnings.
Pensions in payment are indexed 50% to prices and 50% to nominal earnings.
Mandatory occupational
The system of mandatory occupational pensions was introduced in 1985. It is built
around “defined credits” to an individual’s pension account. These vary by sex and age:
The value of accumulated credits at retirement naturally depends on the interest rate
applied to earlier years’ contributions. For a long period, until the end of 2002, there was a
minimum rate of 4%. It was cut to 3.25% in 2003 and to 2.25% in 2004. If the interest rate is
broadly equivalent to the growth rate of earnings, then a full career in the system will give
a man at age 65 accumulated credits of 500% of earnings. However, higher (or lower)
outcomes are possible if the interest rate exceeds (is less than) growth in earnings. The
modelling assumes that the interest rate applied to the credits will be equivalent to the
growth rate of earnings over the long term.
The system has a minimum annuity rate of 7.2% that is applied to this notional capital
sum. This gives a full career replacement rate of (500 x 7.2 =) 36% (subject to the interest
rate being equal to earnings growth). From 2005, the minimum annuity rate is being
reduced over a ten-year period, eventually reaching 6.8%.
Men, of age 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64
Women, of age 25-31 32-41 42-51 52-63
Credit (% of co-ordinated earnings) 7 10 15 18
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The defined credits (and hence the replacement rate) apply only to “co-ordinated”
earnings. This is pay between the maximum pension of the public scheme (CHF 25 320 for
2004) and three times that level (CHF 75 960 for 2004). These thresholds are equivalent to
36% and 108% of average earnings. Note that the ceiling for pensionable pay is the same in
the public scheme and in the mandatory occupational pension schemes. There is a
minimum for co-ordinated earnings of one eighth of the maximum value. Credits accrue at
this minimum level for people with co-ordinated earnings below this level.
The range of co-ordinated earnings is being extended. The entry level in 2005 is
reduced to three-quarters of its previous level. This is included in the modelling.
Targeted
The supplementary benefit scheme aims to give a minimum pension income to single
people of at least CHF 17 300, equivalent to 24% of average earnings. The supplementary
benefit is indexed in the same way as the public old age pensions, i.e. to a mixed index of
50% prices and 50% wages. There are discretionary cantonal additions for low-income
pensioners; these are disregarded in the model.
Early retirement
Early retirement in the public scheme is possible two years before the standard retirement
age, i.e. from age 63 for men and 62 for women as of 2005. For each year that the pension is
claimed early, it is reduced by 6.8% from the full value. This is equivalent to an actuarial
adjustment, as operated in other countries, of 4.5% (since 1/44 = 2.3% of the adjustment
reflects the additional year that the member has contributed).
For women born in 1947 or before, the reduction in pension benefits from their full
value is 3.4% per year of early retirement.
Early retirement is permitted in the occupational schemes. In practice, schemes may
allow retirement up to five years before the normal age, although schemes can decide on
their own policy. Generally, the statutory annuity rate is reduced from the 7.2% at age 65, by
0.2 percentage points per year of early retirement. (Note that this conversion rate will fall
gradually to 6.8% over the ten years starting in 2005.) The 0.2 percentage point reduction is
equivalent to an actuarial adjustment, as conventionally measured, of 2.9-3.2% per year of
early retirement (increasing with the extent of early retirement). Including also the loss of
contributions and credits as a result of early retirement, the benefit is 6.7-8.8% lower per
year of early retirement. The loss increases the earlier that retirement is taken. (The range
given is from age 61 to age 65.)
Late retirement
Both public and occupational pensions can be deferred after normal pension age.
Pensions are adjusted in the same way as for early retirement. The pension can be deferred
for up to five years after the normal pension age. The pension is increased according to the
following schedule:
It is also possible to claim the public pension at 65 and continue working.
Deferral 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
Adjustment 5.2% 10.8% 17.1% 24.0% 31.5%
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Contributions are not levied on people working after age 65 if earnings are below
CHF 16 800 per year (2004). For earnings above that level, contributions are levied when
people defer the pension or claim the pension while continuing their work, but no
additional pension entitlement can be earned.
In the occupational plans, the annuity rate is increased by 0.2 percentage points for
each year that retirement is deferred. The authorities, in practice, allow deferral for up to
five years
In principle, it is possible to combine receipt of the occupational pension with work. In
practice, these are mainly cases of people with incomplete careers or people who have
retired early rather than late. Therefore, the modelling assumes that people defer their
occupational pension if they continue to work after the normal pension age. People do not
continue to contribute after 65 under the public pension scheme.
Pension modelling results: Switzerland
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 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 52.7 31.2 46.6 58.4 61.1 61.1
(% average gross earnings) 53.2 31.4 47.0 59.1 61.8 61.8
Net relative pension level 59.0 39.4 51.9 64.3 67.2 67.2
(% net average earnings) 58.4 39.6 52.4 65.0 68.0 68.0
Gross replacement rate 62.0 62.5 62.1 58.4 40.7 30.5
(% individual gross earnings) 62.6 62.8 62.6 59.1 41.2 30.9
Net replacement rate 68.8 75.0 68.2 64.3 45.7 35.1
(% individual net earnings) 68.1 75.4 68.9 65.0 46.3 35.5
Gross pension wealth 10.5 10.7 10.5 9.8 6.8 5.1
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 12.8 13.1 12.9 12.0 8.3 6.3
Net pension wealth 8.8 10.1 8.8 8.1 5.6 4.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.5 12.4 10.8 9.9 6.9 5.2
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Turkey
Turkey has an earnings-related public scheme with an income-tested safety net and a
flat-rate supplementary pension.
Post-reform system
Qualifying conditions
The minimum pension age for men retiring in 2004 is 45 and 40 for women. An earlier
pension reform proposed increases in the age so that it would reach 60 for men and 58 for
women in the late 2030s. The most recent reform includes further increases to 65 for men
retiring in 2043 and for women retiring slightly later. The modelling uses the long-term
pension age.
The means-tested pension is payable only to those who have no other social security
rights and who are either older than 65 or older than 18 and disabled.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
Benefits accrue at a rate of 2.5% of the earnings measure per annum until the end
of 2015; thereafter the accrual rate will be 2% per annum. The model uses the long-term
accrual rate of 2%. The earnings measure is based on lifetime average earnings, re-valued
with an index composed of 50% real earnings growth and 50% price inflation.
Pensions in payment are indexed to prices.
Minimum
There is a minimum pension, which was TRY 364.7 million at the beginning
of 2004 and TRL 400.7 million at the end, corresponding to about one third of average
earnings.
Targeted
The means-tested pension is paid quarterly. For the first half of 2002 the pension was
TRY 54.6 million per month, for the second, pension was TRY 57.9 million per month or
about 5% of average earnings.
A monthly supplement is paid to all retirees. Its value started the year 2003 at
TRY 75 million. As the monthly increases are awarded to individuals’ earnings-related
pensions this supplement is reduced by the amount of those increases. In 2004, there was
no such supplement.
There was an increase in Consumer Price Index in 2003 by 18.4% and subsequently, all
pensions in payment were increased by 10% in January 2004, and 10% in July 2004.
Early retirement
Workers in specific industries (e.g. mining) and people with disability can retire early
but other workers cannot claim pensions before the eligibility ages.
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Late retirement
It is possible to defer the pension beyond the normal pension age, but the amount of
pension benefit is not adjusted to the longer period of contributions. However from 2006,
the extended contribution will be reflected.
Pre-reform scenario
Qualifying conditions
Recent entrants (from September 1999) can draw a pension from age 60 (men) or 58
(women) with 7 000 days of contributions. This is equivalent to around 20 years of
contributions for continuous employment. An alternative eligibility condition is 25 years of
insurance coverage with 4 500 days of contributions but the pension could be claimed
at 60 for men and 58 for women.
Benefit calculation
The pension is based on average lifetime earnings revalued in line with GDP growth.
For consistency with the modelling for other countries, it is again assumed that real
earnings grow at 2% a year. Given projected labour-force growth of 1% a year over the next
50 years, it is assumed that annual real GDP growth will be 3%.
The pension has a non-linear formula with years of coverage. The first 3 600 days of
contributions earn a pension of 35% of pay, with 2% per year extra until 9 000 days of
contributions and 1.5% per year thereafter.
There is a floor above which contributions are required. This had two different values
during calendar 2004: TRY 549.6 million from January to June 2004, TRY 444.1 million from
July onwards. Minimum pensionable earnings were higher than the minimum wage in the
earlier period while the two values were the same from July.
There is a ceiling to pensionable earnings; its value was TRY 2 748.1 million from
January to June 2004 and TRY 2 886.9 million from July onwards. After the reform started
in 1999, the ceiling was only three times minimum wage but it is raised to five times in
April 2000.
The modelling uses the average of the variables above for the calendar year 2004.
Indexation of pensions in payment is to the consumer price index. Pensions are
adjusted monthly. However, in the past two years additional, real increases in pensions
have been granted and in one year a “social supplement” was added. The modelling
assumes price indexation of pensions in payment.
The minimum pension and targeted pension were described above.
Further reading
Brook, A.-M. and E.R. Whitehouse (2006), “The Turkish Pension System: further
reforms to help solve the informality problem”, Social, Employment and Migration
Working Paper No. 44, OECD, Paris (also available as Working Paper No. 529, Economics
Department, OECD.)
OECD (2006), “Making the Pension System Less of an Obstacle to Formalisation”,
Chapter 4 of OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, Paris.
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Pension modelling results: Turkey
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 61.6 36.2 54.4 72.5 108.7 144.9
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 88.4 52.0 78.0 104.0 156.0 208.0
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5 72.5
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 103.4 101.0 102.9 104.0 106.4 108.3
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
Net pension wealth 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
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Pension modelling results: Turkey, pre-reform scenario
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 91.4 53.8 80.7 107.6 161.4 215.2
(% average gross earnings) 87.4 51.4 77.1 102.8 154.2 205.6
Net relative pension level 131.2 77.2 115.8 154.4 231.6 308.8
(% net average earnings) 125.4 73.8 110.6 147.5 221.3 295.0
Gross replacement rate 107.6 107.6 107.6 107.6 107.6 107.6
(% individual gross earnings) 102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8
Net replacement rate 153.5 150.0 152.8 154.4 157.9 160.8
(% individual net earnings) 146.7 143.3 146.0 147.5 150.9 153.7
Gross pension wealth 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1
Net pension wealth 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1 19.1
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United Kingdom
Britain has a complex pension system, which mixes public and private provision.
The public scheme has two tiers, (a flat-rate basic pension and an earnings-related
additional pension), which are complemented by a large voluntary private pension sector.
Most employee contributors “contract out” of the state second tier into private pensions of
different sorts. A new income-related benefit (pension credit) has recently been introduced
to target extra public spending on the poorest pensioners.
Qualifying conditions
Pension age, currently 60 for women and 65 for men, will be equalised at 65 during the
period 2010 to 2020. The eligibility age for the minimum income guarantee/pension credit
is 60, and will increase in line with the women’s pension age. The new savings credit is only
available from 65 for both men and women.
To qualify for the basic state pension, people need to pay social security contributions
or have credits for around nine-tenths of their potential working lives (44 years). A
proportionally reduced pension is available for people who do not meet the full condition,
but only to a minimum of 25% (i.e., 11 years).
Benefit calculation
Basic
The full basic state pension for a single person was GBP 79.60 per week in 2004/05
(GBP 77.45 in 2003/04 giving an annual total for 2004 of GBP 4 111), equivalent to 15% of
average earnings.
Earnings-related
For earnings between the lower earnings limit (GBP 4 108 per year in 2004/05 and
GBP 4 004 in 2003/04) and the first threshold (GBP 11 600, GBP 11 200), the replacement rate
is 40% of the difference. The lower earnings limit is worth 15% of average earnings while
the first threshold is 42%. This also applies to people covered by credits. This is equivalent
to treating people earning below the first threshold as if they had earned at this level. Over
the next range, the replacement rate is 10%, ending at GBP 26 600, GBP 25 600. Between this
threshold and the ceiling, the replacement rate is 20%. The ceiling was GBP 31 720 in 2004/05
and GBP 30 940 in 2003/04. The upper threshold is worth around 96% of average earnings
and the ceiling is 115% of average earnings.
The benefit value is calculated on average lifetime salary, with earlier years’ pay
uprated in line with average economy-wide earnings. The benefit is then price-indexed
after retirement.
Contracting out
Some 48% of employees are “contracted out” of the state second pension, into either
an occupational plan (provided by an employer), a personal pension or a stakeholder plan
(both provided by financial-services companies). Occupational schemes are mainly DB, but
there has been rapid growth since the mid-1980s in DC occupational plans, albeit from a
very low base. Personal pensions and stakeholder plans are DC.
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A contracted-out employee forgoes some or all of their state second pension
entitlement. For employees contracted out through a DB occupational plan, there is a lower
rate of social security contributions. In contrast, for a contracted-out DC pension plan, the
employer and employee continue to pay the full rate of social security contributions
(although there is a small reduction in the case of DC occupational plans), but the State
makes a contribution to the plan, related to the employee’s age. Contracted-out
DB schemes must meet minimum benefit standards.
The government sets the social security rebates, reviewed every five years, on the
advice of the Government Actuary. The rebates are designed to reflect the value of the state
pension rights forgone as a result of being contracted out.
Targeted
The pension credit, introduced in 2003, targets a minimum income level. This is
GBP 105.45 for 2004/05 (GBP 102.10 for 2003/04) for a single person. There is no requirement
to have paid social security contributions to receive the pension credit. The credit is worth
about one fifth of average earnings.
The pension credit also includes a “savings credit” in addition to the “guarantee credit”
described above. This is designed to reduce the effective withdrawal rate of benefits from
100% under the old scheme to 40%. Individuals whose income (apart from the pension
credit) is less than the target minimum income, but more than a “starting point”, receive a
top up. The starting point is equal to the full value of the basic pension. The top up is 60%
of income above the starting point. For people with incomes above the target minimum
income, the benefit is reduced by 40% by the amount of the excess. The maximum savings
credit for 2004/05 is therefore around (GBP 105 – GBP 80) x 60% = GBP 15 per week for a single
person.
Pre-reform scenario
The state second pension is an amended version of the state earnings-related pension
scheme, known as Serps that was introduced from 2002-03. The Serps scheme was
introduced in 1978 and substantially reformed in 1988.
The principal difference between the state second pension and Serps is the
introduction of the differential replacement rate over different bands of earnings. The
Serps scheme had a single accrual rate on all earnings between the lower and upper
earnings limits. Following the 1988 reform, the target replacement rate was 20%, giving an
annual accrual rate of 20/49 or 0.41% in the long term. Prior to 1988, the target replacement
rate was 25%. Furthermore, the scheme was established with accelerated accrual for early
generations. Only 20 years were required to receive a full pension, giving an accrual rate for
someone retiring in 1998-99 or before of 25/20 or 1.25%. This affects interim cohorts until
people have spent a full career under Serps/state second pension (i.e., those reaching
pension eligibility age after 2027-28).
The pre-reform scenario takes the long-term accrual rate for Serps including the full
effect of the 1988 reform.
A subsequent reform replaced from 2003/04 the minimum income guarantee with the
pension credit. The Mig is counted as part of the pre-reform system. The rate for the Mig
used in the modelling is the same as the guarantee credit under the new pension credit.
The pre-reform scenario also includes the effect of the increase in pension age for
women, since this formed part of a different, earlier reform.
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Early retirement
Early retirement is not possible in the public scheme.
Late retirement
Until April 2005, deferral of the state pension was possible until age 70. This earned an
increment of 7.4% per year. From April 2005, the age limit for deferral will be removed and
the increment will be increased to 10.4%. Also, it will be possible instead to take a lump
sum after the period of deferral. The amount of pension not claimed during the period of
deferral will be paid at the end with an interest rate guaranteed to be at least two
percentage points above the repo rate (the Bank of England base rate).
Pension modelling results: United Kingdom
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 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 29.3 26.7 28.3 30.8 33.9 33.9
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 39.2 36.0 38.0 41.1 44.6 44.6
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 34.4 53.4 37.8 30.8 22.6 17.0
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 45.4 66.1 49.2 41.1 30.6 24.0
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 5.1 8.0 5.7 4.6 3.4 2.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 5.9 9.1 6.5 5.3 3.9 2.9
Net pension wealth 5.1 7.9 5.6 4.5 3.3 2.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 5.8 9.1 6.4 5.2 3.8 2.8
Pension modelling results: United Kingdom, pre-reform scenario 
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 28.1 21.7 26.2 30.8 33.9 33.9
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 37.7 29.4 35.5 41.1 44.6 44.6
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 33.0 43.3 35.0 30.8 22.6 17.0
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 43.7 53.9 45.9 41.1 30.6 24.0
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 4.9 6.5 5.2 4.6 3.4 2.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 5.7 7.4 6.0 5.3 3.9 2.9
Net pension wealth 4.9 6.5 5.2 4.5 3.3 2.5
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 5.6 7.4 6.0 5.2 3.8 2.8
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United States
The publicly provided pension benefit, known as social security, has a progressive
benefit formula. There is also a means-tested top-up payment available for low-income
pensioners.
Qualifying conditions
The pension age (called normal retirement age, or NRA) is between 65 and 66 in 2004,
increasing to 67 in steps. Eligibility for retirement benefits depends on the number of years
in which contributions are made with a minimum requirement of ten years’ contributions.
Early retirement is possible from 62 with reduced benefits.
Benefit calculation
Earnings-related
The benefit formula is progressive. The first USD 612 a month of relevant earnings
attracts a 90% replacement rate. The band of earnings between USD 612 and USD 3 689 a
month is replaced at 32%. These thresholds are 22 and 133% of average earnings,
respectively. A replacement rate of 15% applies between the latter threshold and the
earnings ceiling. A 50% dependants’ addition is available to married couples where
secondary earners have built up a smaller entitlement and for a qualifying dependent
child.
Earlier years’ earnings are revalued up to the year in which the recipient reaches
age 60 in line with growth in economy-wide average earnings. There is no adjustment of
earnings for years after age 60. The basic benefit is computed for payment at age 62.
Thereafter, the basic benefit is adjusted in line with prices. The benefit is based on career
average earnings for the 35 highest years of earnings (after valorisation), including years
with zero earnings if needed to total 35 years.
The earnings ceiling for both contributions and benefits is USD 87 900 a year,
corresponding to almost three times (290%) average earnings uprated annually in line with
growth in economy-wide earnings.
Pensions in payment are adjusted in line with prices.
Minimum
There is a minimum pension under social security. People earning less than a special
minimum primary insurance amount are given a minimum pension that depends on their
lifetime total years of coverage, varying between USD 32 for 11 years’ coverage and
USD 639 for 30 years. The threshold for this minimum pension was USD 9 765 in 2004, or
32% of average earnings. (The threshold is defined formally as 15% of the “old law”
contribution and benefit base.) The minimum pension does not affect the modelling
results because the earnings range affected is below that presented.
Targeted
The United States provide a means-tested benefit for the elderly, known as
supplemental security income. Single people over the age of 65 can be eligible for up to
USD 6 768 a year depending on assets and other income. The benefit rate for couples is
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USD 10 152 (50% higher than the rate for singles). These benefit rates are equivalent to
around 22% and 33% of the national average wage, respectively. The benefit is indexed to
prices.
The asset tests are strict: single people are limited to USD 2 000 worth of assets and
couples to USD 3 000, excluding personal belongings, a home, a car, funeral insurance and
life insurance (the last two up to USD 1 500 in value). There is a small (USD 20 a month)
“disregard” in calculating the entitlement. The benefit is then withdrawn at a 100% rate
against income above this level.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that states can supplement the federally
determined minimum. While 12 states pay only the federal minimum, some 28 administer
their own system and 12 offer supplements that are operated by the federal Social Security
Administration. The average additional payment in these 12 states is 13% for single
pensioners and 18% for couples. Note that the modelling does not include these additional
payments.
Early retirement
Early retirement is possible from 62, subject to an actuarial reduction. For the first
three years of retirement before the normal age, the benefit is reduced by 62/3 per cent per
year. Thereafter, the reduction falls to 5%. This applies to retirees with a normal retirement
age (NRA) of over 65. For retirees becoming eligible at age 62 in 2004, the normal retirement
age is 65 years and ten months. This will increase gradually to reach 67 for people
becoming eligible for retirement in 2022.
Late retirement
Initial receipt of the pension may be deferred until after NRA, and credit is given for
deferment up to age 70. The actuarial increment for 2004 is 7% for each year deferred. It
will be 7.5% in 2006-07 and 8% from 2008 onwards.
It is also possible to combine work and pension receipt subject to an earnings test. For
beneficiaries under age of their NRA, the pension is reduced by 50% of earnings in excess
of USD 11 640. For workers who have reached their NRA, there is no benefit reduction based
on earnings.
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Pension modelling results: United States
 Men
Median earner
Individual earnings, multiple of economy-wide average
Women (where different) 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2
Gross relative pension level 37.1 27.6 34.4 41.2 54.7 64.3
(% average gross earnings)
Net relative pension level 47.6 36.1 44.5 52.4 68.3 78.9
(% net average earnings)
Gross replacement rate 43.6 55.2 45.8 41.2 36.5 32.1
(% individual gross earnings)
Net replacement rate 55.3 67.4 58.0 52.4 47.9 43.2
(% individual net earnings)
Gross pension wealth 6.2 7.9 6.5 5.9 5.2 4.6
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 7.2 9.2 7.6 6.8 6.1 5.3
Net pension wealth 6.1 7.9 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.3
(multiple of individual gross earnings) 7.1 9.2 7.5 6.6 5.8 5.0
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Government-mandated pension and retirement policies have changed dramatically during the past 
decade. Pensions at a Glance presents a consistent framework for comparing public pension policies 
across OECD countries, as well as reliable data. The report thus provides the basis for not only 
evaluating existing pension systems, but also designing and implementing future reforms.  
This second edition updates in-depth information on the key features of mandatory pension  
systems – both public and private – in the 30 OECD countries, including projections of  
retirement income for today’s workers.
Two new and important sections have been added to this edition: 1) description and analysis of 
pension reform in OECD countries during the past decade; and 2) a closer look at the complex range 
of private, voluntary retirement plans now playing a greater role in pension provision in many OECD 
countries, including an analysis of the private savings effort required to maintain standards of living 
during retirement.  
About the first edition of Pensions at a Glance:
“Pensions at a Glance deserves much more than a glance. It is a compendium of facts and analyses 
that should inform policymaking and public debate around the world for years to come. By providing 
in clear and easy-to-understand form a wealth of information about pension systems throughout 
the OECD, it will make it much harder for even the most insular to ignore the valuable lessons to be 
learned from the pension experience of other nations.” − Henry J. Aaron, The Brookings Institution
Named one of 12 international “notable government documents” by the American Library Association.
www.oecd.org/els/social/ageing/PAG
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The full text of this book is available on line via these links: 
 www.sourceoecd.org/finance/9789264032149 
 www.sourceoecd.org/socialissues/9789264032149
Those with access to all OECD books on line should use this link: 
 www.sourceoecd.org/9789264032149
SourceOECD is the OECD’s online library of books, periodicals and statistical databases.  
For more information about this award-winning service and free trials ask your librarian, or write to us  
at SourceOECD@oecd.org.
